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Editors’ Note

T

he debate over both domestic and international climate
policy continues to evolve each year, adapting to broader
global politics and ever changing current events. Today,
at the forefront of everyone’s mind is the global financial crisis.
In both the financial crisis and the climate crisis, the unknown
factors are the most frightening. While the immediacy of the
financial crisis impacts each of our lives, we must not forget
the longer term and potentially much more severe and lasting
impacts of the climate crisis. As Australian professor Ross Garnaut recently noted, the unprecedented “financial crisis—no
matter how severe—will be short-lived and should not stand in
the way of action on global climate change.”
Perhaps it is because the world’s global policy focus is on
the financial industry that so many of our submissions focused
instead on local, regional, and to a lesser degree, national climate issues. It is encouraging to see the real progress outlined
in many of our articles—as one of our authors says, local and
regional governments are, in some situations, particularly well
poised to deal with climate adaptation measures.
While the 2009 Copenhagen climate negotiations are looming only months away, the global climate debate continues.
The United States is finally beginning to not only to take steps
towards reducing its own carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions but
also is poised to reengage in the dialogue and move towards a
post-Kyoto framework. This new energy and resolve is exemplified by President Obama’s commitment, during his first address
to a joint session of Congress, to placing a “market-based cap
on carbon pollution” and driving domestic renewable energy
production.
Despite other world events, it is most certainly time for all
countries to engage in the global dialogue and seriously commit to binding CO2 reductions. As this issue illustrates all too
well, the potentially catastrophic effects of global warming are
not only appearing in the data and statistics but also becoming
visible in the daily lives of many people around the planet. And
as we have heard all too many times, it is not those of us who
are most responsible for the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
that are feeling the heat; it is those of us who have the fewest
resources to adapt that are most severely impacted.
We hope you enjoy this fifth annual edition of Sustainable Development Law & Policy’s (“SDLP’s”) Climate Law
Reporter. In these five years, we have seen the discourse evolve.
Five years ago, many still questioned whether to act. Today the
debate is no longer whether or when to act; the debate is focused
how and where to act. This issue covers a wide range of topics from addressing climate change in a human rights context
to using legal tools to help Indigenous populations deal with the
climate impacts for which they are not responsible.
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As is evidenced by our diverse authors, we have become
an important international venue in the global climate debate.
We hope this issue of SDLP helps push the discourse beyond
debate and towards action, because our future and our livelihoods depend on it.

Lisa Novins
Addie Haughey
Editor-in-Chief	Editor-in-Chief
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An Overview of This Issue: Climate Change in 2009
by Professor Perry Wallace*

“C

limate change has long since ceased to be a scientific curiosity,” observes the recent United Nations
Environment Programme’s World Year Book
2009.1 Indeed, climate change is “the major, overriding environmental issue of our time, and the single greatest challenge facing
decisionmakers at many levels.”2 So powerful and overarching
is this global phenomenon that its destructive potential comprises economic, health and safety, food production, security,
and other dimensions. This includes such problems as: shifting
weather patterns threatening food production; ice loss and thermal expansion creating rising sea levels that contaminate freshwater reserves and threaten catastrophic flooding; and warming
atmospheres spreading pests to new terrain.
Moreover, successive assessments indicate that global
warming, with its associated effects on climate, is a greater
threat than predicted in earlier evaluations. Particularly disturbing are recent predictions that climate change will not evolve
in a slow, linear pattern. In fact, we may have already reached
certain important “tipping points,” which portend irreversible
changes in major Earth systems and ecosystems. In response to
these developments, governmental and private actors around the
world have begun the monumental work of creating mitigative
and adaptive mechanisms for this equally monumental problem.
Emerging at a pace that has accelerated with the similarly
growing certainty about the reality and the effects of climate
change, a comprehensive network of regulatory regimes is finally
beginning to occur. At the international level, negotiations for a
post-Kyoto Protocol climate treaty have already begun.3 Further,
this activity reflects ongoing commitments of nations around the
world to address climate change.
In the United States, in addition to earlier action by private
actors and state and local governments, all branches of the federal
government have now addressed climate change in some important way. The United States Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, held that greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) fit well within the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air
pollutant” and that the federal Environmental Protection Agency
possesses authority to regulate GHGs.5 Additionally, the U.S.
Congress is also considering legislative proposals to address
the subject. Finally, the turnaround by the American Executive
Branch, from doubt and resistance toward acknowledgement
and determination to address the problem, is perhaps the most
significant development. President Obama’s vow to address climate change as a serious and urgent matter is widely seen as a
key element in the quest for global consensus and action.
Nevertheless, these important developments portending positive action on climate change must be viewed against
a background of both structural and current realities of a geopolitical and economic nature. Thus, while developed countries
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of the North, the historic GHG emitters, are generally favorable
toward taking assertive, binding action, developing countries
of the South have raised concerns about many of the proposed
models. One major concern of these latter countries holds that
while they were not the culprits, they are the most adversely
affected by climate change. Further, they possess insufficient
economic and technological resources for taking action. Another
concern, they argue, is that implementing such measures could
stifle their continuing development. China and India, with the
most prodigiously emerging economies today, are major actors
in this debate.
Another major dynamic that will affect progress in addressing climate change is the state of the global economy. A seriously recessionary global economy only makes for scarce
governmental and corporate resources, and this in turn places
limits on the abilities of those key actors to embark upon the
massive project of creating a new, carbon-constrained world.
Further, significantly decreased energy demand has reduced the
prices of oil and other traditional sources of energy, thus taking away a previous source of pressure (high energy prices) to
explore alternative energy sources. Decreased production during
this period has also had unfortunately negative effects on a burgeoning emissions trading market. Thus, lower production has
led to decreased GHG emissions and thereby lowered demand
for emissions credits. Emissions credit prices have dropped precipitously, and, as with other market drops in an ailing economy,
confidence in the larger system has suffered.
Nevertheless, these challenges will at best only slow down
or complicate the evolution of the global movement to control
and manage climate change. The urgency of the threat is welldocumented at this point in history, and public and private actors
around the world have resolved to travel the path towards a
carbon-constrained planet. The articles in this edition of SDLP
well reflect that resolve. These articles report on particular
developments in as diverse set of governments as Mongolia,
Australia, the European Union, and the small island states. They
also encompass a range of crucial aspects relative to building
regulatory effectiveness and institutional capacity, such as strategy, policy, technology, legal tools, and financial mechanisms.
Together, they present an impressive treatment of the current
state of affairs in developments relative to climate change.
Endnotes: An Overview of This Issue continued on page 65
* Perry Wallace is professor of law at American University, Washington College
of Law. He specializes in Environmental Law, Corporate Law, and Finance. He is
a member of the National Panel of Arbitrators, National Association of Securities
Dealers Dispute Resolution, and has recently been elected to the Board of Directors of the Environmental Working Group.
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Resolving the Climate Wars
by Dr. Alan D. Hecht*
Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or polices of the EPA. Mention of trade
names or commercial products does not constitute Agency endorsement or recommendations for use.

F

Introduction

rom 2001 through 2008 the United States experienced
a period of climate wars: politics vs. science, business
vs. government, and states vs. the federal government.
By early 2009 some of these conflicts started to move toward
resolution through legal action,
scientific advances, and shifts
in business strategies. Decisions made today will determine whether a new era of
climate protection begins or
the climate cold wars continue.
Business as usual is not in our
nation’s best interest and every
effort must be made to end the
period of continued infighting
between business and government, federal-state conflicts,
and denial of the root causes of
climate change. This paper reviews several of the climate wars
from 2001 to 2008, describes their historic context, and looks at
lessons learned for the future.

When candidate George H.W. Bush took office in 1988,
he declared: “Those who think we’re powerless to do anything
about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House
effect. As President I intend to do something about it.”2 But President Bush may have underestimated the underlying economic
challenges. After EPA Administrator William Reilly briefed the
cabinet on climate change and
the prospect for an international
climate convention, he reported
to EPA officials3 what he had
heard at the briefing. Despite
growing agreement among climate modeling groups, White
House chief of staff John Sununu
declared that the climate models
were fundamentally flawed and
that the best atmospheric scientists had yet to become involved
in climate research. Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman called the concept of a climate convention
“clean air for the whole world.” Council of Economic Advisors
(“CEA”) chairman Michael Boskin advised the president that an
international treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy
decision.”
Listening to the above advice would scare anyone worried
about destabilizing the U.S. economy. But, in the end, President
Bush supported the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) as a way to address the division among
scientific viewpoints. Later he also supported the development
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (“FCCC”)
that in turn led to the development of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the 1990s and during the Clinton Administration similar debates over science and economics continued. During the
subsequent Bush Administration (2001–2009) these debates
became more of a series of wars between politics vs. science,
business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government.

Decisions made today will
determine whether a new
era of climate protection
begins or the climate cold
wars continue.

Origin of the Climate Wars
For decades scientific uncertainty and the cost and regulatory approach of addressing global climate change have been at
the root of the climate debate. When in 1983 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a report evaluating
the effectiveness of specific energy policies to reduce greenhouse emissions (“Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?”),
responses from Congress, business, and federal agencies were
highly polarized.1 A sense of urgency among some Congressional leaders emerged in 1986. “Deeply disturbed” by the implications of published reports on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-induced
climate change, Senators Chafee, Stafford, Bentsen, Durenberger, Mitchell, Baucus, Leahy, and Gore began to pressure the
White House to take action on climate change.
While the United States wavered on actions to address
climate change, the United Nations Environment Programme
(“UNEP”) was committed to initiating international and domestic actions to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. UNEP
had a clear sense of purpose and in 1985 called for a legal convention on climate change and began to lead international scientific efforts to establish the foundation for negotiating such an
agreement. As discussed later, this effort had a major impact on
the U.S. climate debate.
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*Dr. Alan D. Hecht is the Director for Sustainable Development, Office of Research
and Development of the U.S. Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”). From
2001 to 2003 while on detail from EPA, Dr. Hecht served as Associate Director
for Sustainability at the Council of Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). Previously
he was director of the U.S. National Climate Program from 1982 to 1989 where
he was instrumental in launching the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”).
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My review of several of the confrontations during this period
suggests a written or unwritten strategy aimed at:
• Avoiding new federal legislation and regulations. This
meant not allowing CO2 to be identified as a pollutant under
the Clean Air Act or as an endangerment to human health.
One approach used to prevent legislation was to emphasize
the uncertainty in the science of climate change.
• Doing nothing to hamper economic growth. The sluggish
economy didn’t need extra burdens on business. Instead,
federal actions promoted voluntary programs on climate
change, many of which have
helped to slow the growth of
greenhouse gases.
• Doing nothing until China,
India, and other developing
counties commit to reduce
GHG emissions. The United
States walked away from
both the intention of the 2002
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol largely based on economic considerations.
At the beginning of 2009,
many of the conflicts surrounding
climate change are moving toward
resolution and the time may be
at hand to resolve long-standing
conflicts over regulations and economic impacts and launch a
new era of energy-climate policy. While legitimate policy differences remain, as evidenced by different approaches advanced
by leading economists like Sir Nicholas Stern4 who argues for
immediate action on climate change and William Nordhaus who
proposes a modest and slower response,5 steps to resolve differences must be based on a different federal-business and federalstate-local government model. Business as usual is not in our
nation’s best interest.
This paper will examine several of the most significant
recent climate wars and their historic roots and suggested future
actions. Given the current economic recession, now more than
ever new government and business partnerships and close cooperation with non-government conservation, environmental, and
economic groups are needed to help the public understand the
economic and social costs of dealing with climate change, stimulate the economy, create a broader energy portfolio, mitigate
and adapt to climate change, and advance a new business and
foreign policy agenda.

Unfortunately, the campaign promise in 2000 was reversed in
March 2001 following an international conference among the
G-8 countries. The reversal, a surprise to the newly appointed
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, was a clear indication of behind-the-scene concerns about energy policy, economics, and government regulations.
At a meeting of the G-8 industrial countries in Trieste, Italy,
Governor Whitman announced that the United States was committed to regulation of GHG emissions. Whitman assured her
counterparts that the United States wanted a mandatory cap on
CO2 emissions. The Joint Communiqué expressed an international commitment to “take
the lead by strengthening and
implementing national programs and actions, to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as to promote and disseminate environmentally
sound technologies and practices and renewable energy
sources.” 7
Unfortunately, Administrator Whitman was unaware
of a behind-the-scenes effort
led by Senators Chuck Hagel,
Jesse Helms, Larry Craig, and
Pat Roberts to reverse this commitment. In a letter to the president, these senators made clear their view that the commitment
was unwise. The letter attracted the attention of Vice President
Cheney who, according to Barton Gellman, embarked on a plan
to “walk the president away from his promise.” 8 Cheney’s staff
prepared a four-page memo “that would put the White House
on record against the collective judgment of the world’s climate
scientists.” 9 The memo said Bush should be nudged toward the
position that the “current state of scientific knowledge about
causes of and solutions to global warming is inconclusive.
Therefore it would be premature at this time for the president
to propose any specific policy or approach aimed at addressing
global warming.” 10
The President accepted this approach and signed a letter
responding to the senators that was prepared by Cheney’s staff
and given to the President (by Cheney) without any consultation
across the government, especially with Governor Whitman. In a
White House press release the president said: “I do not believe,
however, that the government should impose on power plants
mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not
a ‘pollutant’ under the Clean Air Act.” 11
Chief of Staff Josh Bolten ultimately assumed responsibility for the president’s reversal, asserting that he had been
in error: the intended designation for CO2 was “emission” not
“pollutant.” 12 Underlying such a distinction was fear of establishing a legal basis for regulating CO2. After Bolten’s admission, Vice President Dick Cheney agreed, arguing that putting a
cap on CO2 “was bad energy policy.” 13

Underlying the opposition
to CO2 regulation was
the critical issue of the
supposed economic
impacts that would result
from regulating CO2 and
who would pay for it.

Resisting GHG Regulations:
The 2001 G-8 Meeting
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George
W. Bush promoted legislation to “require the mandatory reduction in U.S. of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
mercury and carbon dioxide from power plants.” 6 Many observers saw this as a significant departure from past history and
were optimistic that a new era of climate change would begin.
5
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Underlying the opposition to CO2 regulation was the critical issue of the supposed economic impacts that would result
from regulating CO2 and who would pay for it. The Bush administration’s priority for economic growth was clearly evident in
all policy actions. A key chapter of the Economic Report of the
President submitted to Congress in 2002 focused on the cost of
environmental regulations. Recognizing the significant achievement of the past decades in reducing the most obvious risks
to health and the environment, the report states, “there is evidence that further improvements in air quality would improve
health and reduce mortality, but these improvements might be
extremely expensive.” 14
Risk and cost-benefits analyses were key factors driving
public policy in 2001 through 2008. Regulating emissions that
affect climate change was recognized as potentially very valuable but not as an immediate priority in light of the cost and
questions about the potential risks. “We are uncertain about
the effect of natural fluctuations on global warming. We do not
know how much the climate could or will change in the future.
We do not know how fast climate change will occur, or even
how some of our actions could affect it. Finally, it is difficult
to say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of
warming that must be avoided.” 15
Fearing the economic impact of any climate legislation,
promoting scientific uncertainty and denying global warming
became the operating plan for many business and government
leaders.

Promoting Scientific Uncertainty:
Challenging the 2001 and 2007
IPCC Assessments
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
has become the world’s preeminent scientific body assessing
the impacts of and proposing options for responding to climate
change. A key element of its 2001 assessment was its statement
on the growing evidence for human-induced climate change.16
And one specific diagram—later termed the “hockey stick”—
was ultimately to cause considerable angst among policy makers. What is the IPCC? What are its assessments? And how does
this relate to domestic energy policy?
In 1985 UNEP, in cooperation with other international
organizations and non-government organizations, organized a
conference and prepared a scientific assessment of the impacts
of climate change.17 UNEP Executive Director Moustafa Tolba
sent the report to then Secretary of State George Schultz urging
the United States to take appropriate policy actions on climate
change and to launch negotiations on a climate convention. The
State Department passed the letter to the National Climate Program Office (“NCPO”) and its senior interagency policy board
to draft a response. (The NCPO, created within NOAA by Congress as a coordinating body among all federal agencies, was
mandated to develop a climate action plan. From 1982 to 1989 I
was the director of NCPO, which was later replaced by the interagency Global Change Research Program.)
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The NCPO policy board, which included all relevant federal agencies, vigorously debated the merit of the report. The
U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) representative argued that
it was inadequate, in part because it had no government sanction. DOE vocally insisted on a government-led international
scientific assessment. At the same time, EPA and the Department of State representatives supported the idea of a convention
on climate change and suggested that perhaps it was timely for
governments to prepare an international scientific assessment,
especially in light of conflicting scientific evidence. During the
debate, I offered a consensus proposal where the United States
would support an international government-led scientific assessment and would agree to international negotiations if the seriousness of the problem were affirmed. For different reasons, each
agency agreed to the proposal. At a time when it was difficult to
get interagency agreement on any action, there was agreement
around the concept of an international scientific assessment.
The action of the NCPO Policy Board eventually led to the
U.S. proposal for “an intergovernmental mechanism” to conduct
a government-led, scientific assessment of the climate change
issue.18 This “mechanism” later became the IPCC, which continues today as the preeminent global scientific court on climate
change. In the end, the IPCC report confirmed the seriousness of
the climate problem and triggered the beginning of negotiations
for a climate convention.
Back to the climate wars—because of their relevance to
policy, the 2001 and 2007 scientific assessments came under
intense scrutiny. One figure in the 2001 report triggered particularly intense reaction. This report drew on data from a 1998
publication by Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm
Hughes that reconstructed temperature patterns over the past
1000 years (“MBH98”).19 The controversial graph depicted a
sharp rise in temperatures over the past 100 years, which the
authors attributed to human activity. The graph, with its “hockey
stick” pattern, was a key piece of supporting evidence in the
2001 IPCC report.
Mann, who has been an author of the IPCC report, testified before Congress in 2003 that: “It is the consensus of the climate research community that the anomalous warmth of the late
20th century cannot be explained by natural factors, but instead
indicates significant anthropogenic, that is human influences.” 20
Nevertheless the underlying scientific methods used by MBH98
were criticized by other authors who challenged the evidence
that the sharp rise in global temperature was being caused by
human activities.21
The hockey stick became an element of the climate war
when, in June 2003, Representative Joe Barton of Texas, the
Republican chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, requested that Mann provide responses to eight detailed
questions related to his credentials and past work.22 The Subcommittee ultimately asked the National Academy of Science
(“NAS”) to review the issue, and NAS formed a committee of
twelve scientists to assess the main areas of uncertainty, the principal methodologies used, any problems with these approaches,
and how central the debate is to the state of scientific knowledge
6

on global climate change. In the end, the NAS report agreed that
there were statistical shortcomings in the analysis but concluded
that the conclusions were in fact correct.
Considering that the essence of the scientific process is peer
review and reproduction of results, why was this an issue for a
Congressional oversight subcommittee? Who or what was the
real focus of this debate? Two objectives seemed to underlie this
debate: to dispute any claim of human-induced climate change
and hence any need for legislation; and to challenge the IPCC
process and its current and future credibility by showing it relied
on publishing flawed papers.
In 2001, the IPCC assessment scientists concluded that it
was “likely” (which it defined as with a greater than sixty-six
percent probability) that climate change was caused by human
activities.23 Six years later, the 2007 report raised the probability
of human influences on climate to “very likely” (indicating a
probability greater than ninety percent) and detectable in observational records.24 This stronger conclusion reflected a great
deal of scientific progress made over the intervening years, both
in direct observations of the impacts of climate change, and in
computer modeling. Nearly all scientists have concluded that
current trends could not be explained without including humanrelated increases in greenhouse gases. While the 2007 report
strengthened the consensus among most scientists and governments, a number of critics argue either that the report was too
conservative or too alarming.
Using scientific uncertainty to undermine support for climate legislation was further advanced by reliance on an obscure
law known as the Federal Data Quality Act (“FDQA”).

Regulating Science by Lawsuits on
Data Quality
FDQA, a little-known rider to the 2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act, directed the director of the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) to issue government-wide guidelines that
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies
for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility,
and integrity of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by Federal agencies.” 25 The law requires that any
scientific document issued by the government include clearly
supportable data and any uncertainties related to the topic. It was
approved without any congressional hearings. Many businesses
supported the Act as a means to reign in regulation perceived to
be unsupported by science. Environmentalists criticized its passage and predicted it would be used to stop regulations aimed at
protecting public health and the environment.
The first lawsuit to be filed under the FDQA asked the government to cease dissemination of the 2000 U.S. National Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and
Change. The 2003 suit filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”) against President Bush asked the federal courts to
order the White House Office of Science Technology and Policy
(“OSTP”) to withdraw the assessment report. The suit asserted
that data in the Assessment was derived from “demonstrably
inaccurate computer models, and dissemination of historical
7

temperature data that it modified to inaccurately omit the occurrence of recognized climatic periods. This Act prohibits Defendant from disseminating data failing to meet its standards.” 26
The CEI claimed that the assessment failed to meet the DQA’s
scientific standards for objectivity and utility, because two of the
models used “are incapable of providing reliable predictions.” 27
Understanding this morass requires some history. In 1990,
Congress enacted the Global Change Research Act that required
the preparation of national climate assessments.28 The Act
established the United States Global Change Research Program
with the aim of understanding and responding to global change,
including the cumulative effects of human activities and natural
processes on the environment, to promote discussions toward
international protocols in global change research, and for other
purposes. The Act requires “on a periodic basis (not less frequently than every 4 years)” the preparation of an assessment
report to the President and Congress that among other things
“analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water
resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human
social systems, and biological diversity,” and “analyzes current
trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and
projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years.” 29
The National Assessment Synthesis Team (“NAST”) a
federal advisory committee, consisting of experts from government, universities, industry, and non-governmental organizations prepared the first of these assessments completing it in late
2000. Using results from two different climate models, the team
developed two different but plausible scenarios of future climate
change and evaluated their environmental impacts.
Considering the potential impact of climate change on the
United States, NAST leader Michael MacCracken’s staff sent
the report to every state governor. Ironic as it may be, then Texas
Governor George Bush responded, “Thank you for your letter
and the enclosed copies of your assessment about the potential
consequences to the U.S. of a climate change. I appreciate the
work that went into preparing this information.” 30
The 2000 Assessment Report, completed before the enactment of the FDQA, became the foundation for the U.S. annual
report to the UN on climate change required under the 2002
UNFCCC. The third U.S. report in 2002, based on the 2000
assessment report, concluded: “Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities,
causing global mean temperature and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. While the changes observed over the last several
decades are likely due mostly to human activities, we cannot
rule out that some significant part is also a reflection of natural
variability.” 31
This conclusion, which seemed at odds with federal policy,
prompted The New York Times science writer Andrew Revkin to
report (June 3, 2002) “[i]n a stark shift for the Bush administration, the United States has sent a climate report to the United
Nations detailing specific and far-reaching effects that it says
global warming will inflict on the American environment. In the
report, the administration for the first time mostly blames human
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actions for recent global warming. It says the main culprit is the
burning of fossil fuels that send heat-trapping greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.” 32
Perhaps recognizing that the U.S. Report to the UN interpreted in this manner was setting a foundation for possible future
regulatory action, President Bush dismissed the U.S. report by
saying it had been put “out by
the bureaucracy.” 33 Recognizing the potential legal implications of the U.S Report, the
rationale for the CEI lawsuit
becomes clearer. On August
6, 2003, CEI filed a lawsuit
against the Administration to
invalidate the 2000 National
Assessment of the Potential
Consequences of Climate Variability and Change that formed
the basis for many of the conclusions in the Climate Action
Report.
Amid Congressional investigations of possible White
House promotion of the initiation of the lawsuit, the lawsuit
was ultimately withdrawn after the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) acknowledged that the
National Assessment on Climate Change had not been subjected
to the FDQA guidelines.
The use of the FDQA as a tool in the war on science is not
over. In August 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce asked the
government to withdraw the Second National Climate Report
that argued that it is “likely that there has been a substantial
human contribution to surface temperature increases in North
America.” 34 The Chamber argued that the report contained
unpublished data that made it difficult to assess its scientific reliability. The Bush Administration settled the dispute by inserting
a disclaimer that the National Report was not subject to FDQA
guidelines.
The war on science is likely to continue, but specific actions
could go a long way toward restoring the independence and
integrity of scientific assessment by rescinding the FDQA and
any executive orders that provide political oversight of science,
such as the controversial Executive Order 13422, which requires
that “[f]ederal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law,
or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of
the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate,
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” On
February 4, 2009, President Obama repealed EO 13422.35
Peer review—not lawsuits—is the underlying framework
for evaluating science. This traditional process allows critical
examination of new ideas and theories and forces scientists to

defend their work. One critical element of peer review needed
for policy makers is estimating scientific uncertainty. Translating science into policy is well illustrated by the IPCC. While
the IPCC reports are designed to reflect scientific consensus, an
IPCC policy summary is a document prepared for policy makers. Reflecting governments’ concerns, the IPCC process was
designed to allow governments
to review and approve a summary for policy makers while
being faithful to the underlying
science. Although a good deal of
climate change science is fundamental physics, a large portion
of the impacts of climate change
reflects modeling that may
include uncertainties in extent
and timing.
Although the negotiations
and approval of the policy summaries by governments can be
torturous, the IPCC process has
been successful in both preserving integrity and forging consensus among governments and scientists. This process underscores
that there is some discretion in how scientists and policy makers
can communicate the significance and the need for action. The
situation was less clear in 2003 when EPA was finalizing its first
Draft Report on the Environment (“RoE ”).
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Editing EPA’s 2006 Draft Report on
the Environment
The EPA RoE, launched in 2001 by Governor Whitman
aimed to give the public a snapshot of the quality of the U.S.
environment and to establish a set of indicators or metrics to
measure improvements (or declines) over time. One contentious
issue was the chapter on climate change. Initially, the Chairman
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)
argued that such a chapter was not needed since so many other
climate reports were available. It was later recognized that an
EPA RoE without a chapter on climate change would not be
credible.
The interagency review of the chapter on climate change
was heated. (From October 2002 to June 2003 while on detail
as CEQ Associate Director for Sustainable Development, I was
given the task of helping resolve interagency disagreements.)
Flagging the chapter’s section on climate change, White House
staff noted: “This section should be thoroughly reviewed for
content and usefulness of that content. The section ‘What are
the contributions to climate change . . .’ is not balanced and
virtually ignores any mention of natural variability . . . . If this
cannot be balanced, it needs to be removed.” Office of Management and Budget staff commented to CEQ Chief of Staff Philip
Cooney on March 4, 2003, “Phil, I don’t know whether you have
reviewed the Climate Section of the EPA report, but I think you
and Jim [Connaughton] need to focus on it before it goes final.
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Even though the information is generally not new, I suspect this
will generate negative press coverage.” 36
While the review was underway, CEQ’s chief of staff was
promoting a new paper by Willie Soon and Sally Baliunas that
contradicted published accounts of historic climate trends. The
Soon-Baliunas paper asserted that it was an authoritative review
of the literature and concluded: “that the 20th century is probably not the warmest nor a uniquely extreme climatic period of
the last millennium.” 37 Shortly thereafter, thirteen of the authors
of papers cited by Soon and Baliunas refuted the Soon-Baliunas interpretation of their work and contradicted “thousands of
papers that go into a document like the IPCC report.” 38
Four versions of the RoE climate change chapter went back
and forth between CEQ and EPA, which was finally instructed
to take the changes or leave it. On May 23, 2003, after several
days of internal EPA discussions, EPA Administrator Whitman yanked the chapter from the report. This war is one of several described in the House Oversight Committee’s review of
science editing. Two years later on June 8, 2005, a similar incident of heavy CEQ editing of a NOAA report was described in
The New York Times. On March 19, 2007, Chairman Connaughton and Chief of Staff Cooney of CEQ testified before Congress
and defended their editing as necessary to make the final report
consistent with published literature. The hearing highlighted the
role of policy-makers distorting or asserting their own interpretation of scientific results. In the IPCC policy-makers summary
that governments negotiate, all scientists must agree with the
changes thus preventing any government from distorting the
results.
The hearing failed to invite the one key witness whose
judgment ultimately decided the fate of the report. In the end it
was the EPA administrator (and former Republican governor of
New Jersey) who decided that the revised chapter should not be
included. Administrator Whitman said in effect that the chapter—as edited—would diminish EPA’s credibility as an environmental agency. EPA staff advised Whitman that the benefits
of removing the chapter “were that it would provide little content for attacks on EPA’s science and that it may be the only way
to meet White House and EPA needs.” 39

States vs. Federal Government:
A Supreme Court Decision
In 1999 the International Center for Technology Assessment, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and other environmental
groups petitioned the EPA to regulate and set limits for CO2 and
other GHGs emitted from new motor vehicles, arguing that such
action was EPA’s duty under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act.
The petitioning groups’ central argument was that CO2 was a
pollutant and that its impact on global warming was negatively
affecting human health and the environment. EPA failed to
respond to the petition within three years, leading to a lawsuit
brought by the environmental groups in 2002.40
Subsequently, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine filed
a petition in June 2003 arguing that by failing to regulate CO2
EPA was violating its mandatory duty under Section 108 of the
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Clean Air Act. EPA denied the petition arguing that the Clean
Air Act did not authorize the agency to issue mandatory regulations to address global warming, and that even if the EPA did
have such authority, the agency believed it would be neither
“effective or appropriate” to establish GHG emissions standards
for motor vehicles at this time.41
After EPA denied the petition to regulate CO2, a coalition
of twelve states led by Massachusetts; the cities of New York,
Washington, DC, and Baltimore; and thirteen environmental
groups filed appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in October 2003.42 The three-judge panel
faced three issues: the standing of the petitioners, EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions, and the agency’s decision not to
establish GHG standards for new vehicles. On July 15, 2005, the
court of appeals issued three opinions in the case. Two of the
judges agreed, although on differing grounds, to let stand EPA’s
position that it lacked the requisite authority. However Judge
David Tatel issued a lengthy dissent, agreeing with the Massachusetts position on all grounds. Following the petitioners’
request, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari directing the Appeals Court to forward the case record for its review;
The Supreme Court heard arguments on November 29, 2006.
Two important criteria are required to have standing to sue
the federal government: that at least one petitioner must be able
to show injury from an actual or imminent action traceable to a
federal agency and that the injury is one that a court can address.43
Hence the real underlying issue was whether the impacts of climate change on a state serve as justification for a suit in federal
court. A positive finding on this question would mean any state
could petition the federal government for national action.44
The Supreme Court decision affirmed that, “The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.” 45
Massachusetts declared that its harm includes prospective loss
of coastline that would be caused by the rise in sea level resulting from global warming. Because EPA “does not dispute the
existence of a causal connection between man-made gas emissions and global warming,” and “EPA’s refusal to regulate such
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries,” the Plaintiffs satisfied the traceability requirements.46
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens summarized three important holdings: (1) As quasi-sovereigns, states
are entitled to an elevated level of deference on standing issues;
(2) CO2 and other GHGs are “air pollutants”; and (3) EPA’s
reasons for not regulating GHG emissions were insufficient.47
Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito),
arguing that states did not have any special rights of status and
that nothing the Court could do would address the injuries complained of because “any decrease in emissions here will be overwhelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in
the world.” 48
In his assessment, Justice Stevens quoted climate scientist
Michael MacCraken who argued that the harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized. Also citing a
National Research Council assessment, which EPA itself regards
as an “objective and independent assessment of the relevant
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science,” a number of environmental changes that have already
inflicted significant harms were identified, including:
. . . the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in
snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers
and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels
during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years [and] petitioners allege that this only hints
at the environmental damage yet to come. According
to the climate scientist MacCracken, “qualified scientific experts involved in climate change research” have
reached a “strong consensus” that global warming
threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea
levels by the end of the century, and severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems.49
The Court’s decision changed the legal and political landscape. President Bush issued an Executive Order in May 2007
that directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation,
Energy, and Agriculture to coordinate in developing possible
regulatory actions to address emissions from mobile sources
contributing to global climate change.50 This is a complicated
process requiring that the EPA assert that the carbon emissions
endanger public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act.
While it might seem that this federal-state battle is over, that
is not the case. Battles between federal agencies, again reflecting economic concerns, were clearly evident in an agency public comment on the proposed greenhouse gas rulemaking under
the Clean Air Act. Comments received from the Secretaries of
Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation—underscoring economic concerns—noted:
The EPA staff now has prepared a draft suggesting the
Clean Air Act can be both workable and effective for
addressing global climate change by regulating emissions from stationary and mobile sources of virtually
every kind. Our agencies have serious concerns with
this suggestion because it does not fairly recognize the
enormous—and we believe insurmountable—burdens,
difficulties and costs and likely limited benefits of using
the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions.51
Consequently OMB advised EPA Administrator Johnson
that: “The issues raised during interagency review are so significant that we have been unable to reach interagency consensus
in a timely way, and as a result, this draft cannot be considered
Administration policy.” 52 EPA action to implement the Supreme
Court decision has been deferred to the new Administration.53

Resolving the Climate War
The climate wars of the past decades between business and
government and between federal and state governments have
inhibited the convergence of four critical factors needed to
address climate change: (1) advances in science and technology;
(2) effective application of government regulations and policies;
(3) adoption of green business practices; and (4) new foreign
policy initiatives. Overcoming these conflicts requires a different government and business approach. Federal interactions with
business should include GHG regulations, market incentives,
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and collaborative programs; cooperation with state and local
governments should focus on promoting alternate energy systems and mitigation and adaptation to climate change; and new
foreign policies should highlight the need for an energy-climate
economy, especially with China.
The use of science as a tool in fueling the climate wars must
end. Scientific consensus on human-induced climate change is
now stronger than ever and efforts to undermine, edit, or otherwise discredit scientific reports should end. The focus should
be on the value of science in helping decision-makers make the
right decisions. Now more than ever the interface of physical
and behavior science and economics will be needed to rebuild
the economy and move society toward more sustainable energy
systems. Anticipating the importance of this goal, the 1998
House Committee on Science argued in the report Unlocking
Our Future:
While acknowledging the continuing need for science
and engineering in national security, health, and the
economy, the challenges we face today cause us to propose that the scientific and engineering enterprise ought
to move towards center stage in a fourth role: that of
helping society make good decisions. We believe this
role for science will take on increasing importance,
particularly as we face difficult decisions related to the
environment.54
Preparing for the presidential election in 2008, dozens of
organizations prepared hundreds of recommendations for action
by the new Administration. Overall all of these actions should be
judged on how well they advance a consensus among business
and government and end the climate wars of the past decades.
Three strategic directions for future actions stand out and are
detailed below.

New Business and Government Approaches on
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Effective national climate regulations and policies are needed
to mitigate GHG emissions. A key challenge for the new
administration will be to launch a new era of governmentindustry partnerships.
Historically, industry has met every new proposed environmental or health regulation with declarations of impending economic disaster. In remarks following EPA’s creation in 1970 the
director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned of the potential collapse of entire industries from pollution regulations.55
Given the current economic crisis in the auto sector, it is ironic to
recall Lee Iacocca’s 1972 prediction (quoted by Thomas Friedman) that, “If EPA does not suspend the catalytic converter rule,
it will cause Ford to shut down and would result in reduction of
GDP by $17 billion, increase unemployment by 800,000, and
decrease tax receipts of $5 billion all levels of government.” 56
U.S. electric utilities claimed that the cost of meeting the 1990
Clean Air Act would reach $4–5 billion per year. But by 1996,
utilities were actually saving $150 million per year due to the
act. When EPA announced a phase-out of substances that damage the ozone layer, many industries claimed that alternative
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substances did not exist or were too expensive. In 1993, automobile manufacturers warned that regulation of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) would increase the price of new cars by up to
$1,200. Just four years later, the industry admitted that costs of
following the new rules had declined to as little as $40.57 More
recently, studies by Roland Hwang and Matt Peak (as quoted by
Thomas Friedman) “found that the target industries dramatically
and consistently overestimate the costs that regulations would
impose on them and dramatically underestimate the innovation
they would inspire.” 58
In all of these cases the costs of complying with environmental regulations were far lower than industry—and even
government—estimated that they would be. More recently a
second perspective on regulations has emerged emphasizing
potential economic advantages. General Electric’s (“GE’s”)
2005 “ecomagination” initiative launched the notion that “green
is green.” 59 The GE initiative is part of a broader greening of
industry as demonstrated by interviews with dozens of key
industrial leaders60 and a convergence of government and business policies moving toward more sustainable behavior.61 For
example, GE is one of a number of large companies that for the
first time are energetically advocating national legislation to
address GHG emissions.62
The formation of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership
(“USCAP”) and its proposal for GHG controls further illustrate the change of some company attitudes. USCAP members include dozens of the world’s largest companies who now
argue for a mandatory cap-and-trade program and market based
incentives.63
Broader support from industry for the USCAP’s business
approach will depend on exactly how GHG regulations are formulated and implemented. Many companies will want credit for
their past carbon-reducing actions, many others will be looking
for incentives before moving forward and many will want equitable economic impacts across all business sectors. USCAP’s
member support for mandatory approaches to GHG reduction is
at odds with historic business models. Smart business strategies
will be needed to achieve that goal.
The costs of GHG reductions—and who will bear them—
have always been a concern for policy makers. In 2002, the Bush
administration saw an economy with a meager 1.6% growth rate
in GDP as the nation struggled to recover from bursting of the
high tech bubble and the 9/11 attacks. Even by 2007 the U.S.
GDP growth rate was only 2.2%. In response to declining housing markets, GDP growth projections of just 1.9% per year prevailed in 2007. Today in 2009, with the U.S. and international
economies adjusting to financial collapse in many financial sectors, any scheme for taxing or capping carbon emissions will
need to include energy-economic models such as those envisioned by green business advocates. But despite a significant
downturn in the economy, the time is right to launch a new era
of government-business cooperation whereby GHG regulations
and green energy initiatives both stimulate the economy while
reducing GHG emissions, and protect human health and ecosystems for ecological services.
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The new government-business strategy must include
advancing new technologies, setting carbon limits, facilitating implementation of other new regulations, and creating
new incentives for industry. Corporations must put aside tired
refrains of resisting federal regulations as inherently anti-business. Strong federal support to regulate existing GHG emissions
and to support Research & Development on new technologies
to reduce GHG emissions is essential. Incentives to do both can
enhance economic competitiveness and protect the environment. Both government and business must see the role of environmental regulations in a new light recognizing the fallacies of
past actions. Both government and business, with support from
non-government organizations and the public, must agree on the
sense of urgency and work together to implement a new business strategy.
Given today’s economic downturn, former CEA chair
Michael Boskin’s comment (cited earlier) that an international
treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy decision”
might in fact be right if viewed as a step toward economic recovery and the launching of a new era of a green economy.

Federal-State Cooperation on Reducing GHG and
Adapting to Climate Change
States and cities have been in the lead in developing policies
to reduce GHG. Past federal-state conflicts need to end and
new partnerships developed.
Worldwide power generation is the largest GHG emitter
generating nearly 10 billion tons of CO2 per year.64 With over
8,000 power plants (out of more than 50,000 globally), the U.S.
accounts for about 2.8 billion tons of CO2 annually—about
25% of worldwide emissions.65 The U.S. power plants that
produce the most CO2 are all coal-fired and are located in the
states with the largest GHG emissions (including the top five of
Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana).66 These states
(and many others), through the use of renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”), are on the front lines in efforts to reduce GHG
emissions.
Around the country many states are requiring utilities to
provide specific amounts of power from renewable energy
sources. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia established RPSs by mid-2007.67 By the same time, forty-seven states
were engaged in state or regional energy planning, forty-one
had established standards to allow rooftop solar systems and
other distributed-generation technology to connect to the electric grid, ten had created energy-efficiency portfolio standards,
and sixteen had implemented public benefit funds to support
clean energy programs.68 According to a Pew Center review of
state RPS programs, while these standards range from modest
to ambitious, “the use of renewable energy does deliver significant GHG reductions. For instance, Texas is expected to
avoid 3.3 million tons of CO2 emissions annually with its RPS,
which requires 2000 megawatts of new renewable generation by
2009. Increasing a state’s use of renewable energy brings other
benefits as well, including job creation, energy security, and
cleaner air.” 69
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Public and investor support for renewable energy is growing
as is evident by the 2007 $32 billion buyout of the Texas power
company TXU Corp. by private equity firms Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co. (“KKR”) and the Texas Pacific Group. TXU had
been battling environmentalists and others who had been working to prevent the company from
more than doubling its fleet of
coal-fired power plants in Texas.
Opponents to the expansion
claimed the new plants would
drastically increase emissions of
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
mercury, and carbon dioxide.
As part of their plan to purchase
Texas electricity provider TXU
Corp., Texas Pacific Group and
KKR have agreed to terminate
the applications for eight of
TXU’s eleven proposed coal
plants in Texas and will adopt a
platform of initiatives that will
significantly reduce the company’s environmental impact in
Texas.70
A short time after the TXU buyout, Kansas became the first
state to reject a coal-fired power plant solely because of potential impacts of climate change. Since then, the state has become
ground zero for a nationwide battle pitting environmental concerns against powerful economic and political interests. Kansas
now faces legal actions to reverse this decision.71
Initiation of RPS programs is not the only way that states are
seeking to reduce GHG emissions and expand economic development. Many states have petitioned the federal government for
action on transportation fuel standards. On the basis of federal
Clean Air Act provisions that allow California, subject to EPA
approval, to set anti-pollution standards stricter than those of the
federal government, the state petitioned EPA for a Clean Air Act
waiver so that it could require stricter automobile regulations for
carbon emissions. In December 2007, after the passage of federal legislation establishing national automotive fuel efficiency
at 35 mpg, EPA denied the California petition.72 California and
other states plan to appeal the EPA decision; more legal battles
are likely in 2009 and beyond.
Other actions by California underscore the business side
of GHG reductions. Because of its early commitment to energy
efficiency and renewable energy, California expected to develop
nearly 95,600 new jobs and $21 billion in investment to manufacture the components of renewable energy systems.73 While
such forecasts may be delayed by the current economic crises,
they are nonetheless inevitable as the economy rebounds. Cities (in the United States and around the world) are also leading
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Members of the C-40 group
of the world’s largest cities are committed to tackling climate
change and have committed to investing over $1 billion to
finance energy-saving measures in municipal buildings.74

Looking ahead, federal-state cooperation must build on two
key factors: (1) passing appropriate legislation and policies to
coordinate and reduce GHG emission and (2) developing strategies needed to adapt to climate change. These city and state
actions highlight shifting environmental and economic base that
is pushing the United States
toward “a de facto national
RPS through a tapestry of
state-based programs.” 75
These state actions are challenging the federal government to find constructive and
supportive ways to help. It is
therefore not surprising that
the bipartisan Presidential
Climate Action Project has
recommended the creation
of “a federal-state partnership with $1 billion annual in
grants to states and communities to implement climate
action plans, reform utility
rates to encourage energy efficiency, and adapt to climate
76
change. Anticipating the need for federal-state cooperation, a
new think tank has been launched at Georgetown University’s
Law Center to develop policies and positions and recommendations related to state-federal issues.
Federal-state partnerships must also focus on giving state
and local leaders the information they need to anticipate and
adapt to impacts of climate change. A better understanding
of regional and local impacts of climate change is critical for
effective decision-making. Given the projected IPCC business
as usual scenarios for CO2 emissions and recognizing how long
it might take to implement new mitigation strategies to reduce
GHG emissions, adaptation may be the most immediate need to
avoid potential serious impacts. Recognizing this, the National
Research Council (“NRC”) in 2007 evaluated the many federal
climate assessments and emphasized the need for better understanding of local impacts, better communication of scientific
results, and more focus on social science issues.77
These are important conclusions and should impact the
scope and direction of federal research programs. As the NRC
evaluation noted, “only $25 million to $30 million of CCSP’s
[U.S. Climate Change Science Program] $1.7 billion annual
budget is devoted to such research.” 78 “In addition, few social
scientists are in leadership positions at the participating federal
agencies, making it difficult for CCSP to increase emphasis in
this area or to establish links with the academic social science
community.” 79
The NRC report recognized the importance of communicating scientific results to decision makers and urged a closer
examination of the impact of climate change at regional and
local scales.80 “More accurate models, better regional observations, and the development of impact scenarios will be required
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to improve predictions of how climate change will affect smaller
spatial scales.” 81 The preparation by CCSP of twenty-one separate assessment reports prompted Pew Center Director Eileen
Claussen to note that everything is fragmented “so we never
get a clear picture.” 82 Anticipating the extra financial burden on
states, cities, and the general population necessary to regulate
greenhouse emissions, decision makers at all levels are going to
need a clear understanding of potential impacts.83
One recent EPA study highlights the economic impact on
states of anticipating and adapting to climate change. Mundane as it might be, wastewater-collection systems or combined
sewer systems (“CSSs”) are major systems designed to collect
municipal wastewater and storm water runoff. These systems
are prevalent in older cities, particularly in the Midwest, the
Great Lakes, and the eastern United States. These systems can
overflow if they lack adequate capacity to transport the combined volume of municipal wastewater and storm water during
extreme or frequent storm events, resulting in combined sewer
overflow (“CSO”) events. Current regulatory standards allow
for four CSO incidents per year.84 With predicted enhanced precipitation patterns in the Great Lakes, this number of overflow
events is likely to be exceeded. This is important because today
states face the issues of how to strategically invest billions of
dollars into developing more robust and sustainable urban water
and wastewater systems. The answer is clearly related to developing an integrated urban sustainability approach that includes
climate-change scenarios. EPA is currently assessing how such
climate change can impact future urban water and wastewater
systems. This kind of analysis is essential to help decision makers at state and local levels make better decisions. The above
example underscores the impact of climate changes at state
and local levels and highlights the need for a major infusion of
research to better quantify potential impacts and the most appropriate adaptation measures.

International Cooperation and a New United
States-China Partnership
Overcoming historical barriers between developed and
developing countries will require new ways of identifying
those barriers and proposing solutions. The timing may be
right for a U.S.–China initiative targeting specific reductions
of GHG emissions. Such a bilateral agreement would change
the international landscape for climate negotiations.
The negotiations that led to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change in 1992 were tortuous, as the developing nations
blamed the rich nations for the existing problems and demanded
compensation. But in the end an agreement was reached based
on the principle of differential responsibilities among nations:
each country would act according to its own needs but industrial countries would do more than developing ones. The Kyoto
Protocol set binding GHG emission reductions targets for thirtyseven industrialized countries and the European Community.
These targets averaged five percent below 1990 levels over the
five-year period 2008–2012. Arguing that China, India, and
other critical emitters should make firm commitments as well
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as the more industrialized countries, the United States did not
sign the protocol, contributing to a stalemate that still exists. In
a 2008 policy paper, China reiterated its position that developed
nations have done the most damage to the planet historically
and should therefore bear the most responsibility.85 Recognizing that its reliance on coal for energy makes GHG emission
reductions especially difficult, China argues for the transfer to
developing nations of high-technology equipment for reducing
GHG emissions.
While its economy today is in turmoil, China is expected to
possess the world’s largest economy by 2050, followed by the
EU, the United States, and India.86 As economic forces drive a
good deal of the climate debate, it is clear that the United States
and Chinese economies will shape future international agreements. China already surpasses the United States as the greatest
GHG emitter.87 Since more than fifty percent of global GHG
emissions are produced by the United States, China, and the
EU—with another fifteen percent coming from Russia, India,
and Japan—these countries can effectively determine future
global energy and climate policies.
Although the United States and other industrialized countries bear historic responsibility for existing GHG concentrations, as Joshua Bushy notes, China “will be increasingly
fingered as a climate culprit in the future,” potentially creating a
common interest between the United States and China in avoiding global condemnation as “climate villains. Today’s economic
and environmental stresses present an opportunity for mutually
reinforcing, positive outcomes if the United States and China
help each other tackle immediate environmental problems and
longer-term GHG emissions. A creative U.S.-China energy and
security policy could benefit both countries.” 88
China’s leaders know that their nation’s current path is not
sustainable and are keenly aware of the need to advance science
and technology and to develop a green economy. China recognizes the public health benefits of reducing GHGs and air pollutants (such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and fine particles).
Citing data obtained from Chinese officials, Elizabeth Economy
and Kenneth Lieberthal report that environmental degradation
and pollution cost the Chinese economy the equivalent of ten
percent of its GDP annually—as much as US$36 billion from
lack of water to run factories, US$13 billion from the degradation of health impact of acid rain, and US$6 billion from the
spread of desert regions.89
It is also apparent to China’s leaders that the impacts of climate change within China could exacerbate internal political and
social stresses and hence tend to undermine the nation’s political
stability.90 Not only is China in transition from being a developing to becoming a developed nation, but it is also moving from
a centrally directed economy to one strongly driven by market
forces. In the words of Economy and Lieberthal, Chinese officials have the daunting task of shifting “from a planned socialist
economy to an entrepreneurial market economy while maintaining one-party rule.” 91
For the United States, a bilateral agreement with China
could serve to foster other cooperative actions among developed
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and developing nations while helping to avoid potential trade
and other economic conflicts. But if not handled wisely, climate
change could be a source of serious U.S.-China conflict. Joshua
Busby has pointed to relevant strategic issues: “A climate bill
currently before Congress would allow the president, if he or she
deems a country’s climate efforts to be inadequate, to impose
tariff-like fees on carbon-intensive imports such as steel beginning in 2019. Such legislation, if passed, would probably be used
against China, adding to existing frictions over trade, intellectual
property, and the level of China’s currency.” 92
Given the available benefits for both the United States and
China, what strategy would best serve the United States? Jonathan Wiener has recently argued that the United States should
appeal to China’s national interest as the best way forward in
advancing a new partnership.93 Wiener argues that demanding
that China fulfill a perceived moral obligation to limit its GHG
emissions would be ineffective, and that the United States would
be wiser to emphasize China’s own interests—the possibility of
reducing climate change damages to itself and its allies, securing
public health benefits from reducing air pollution, and avoiding
domestic political upheaval that may be associated with extreme
climate events.94
A new U.S.-China partnership should therefore first focus
on actions and new technologies that address a broad range of
gases and pollutants that are both short-lived (days to weeks)
and long-lived (years and decades) in the atmosphere and of gasses that will likely contribute to greenhouse warming. Different
GHGs impact the environment in different manners: for example, the impact of methane on global warming is 62 times the
impact of CO2 and that of nitrous oxide is 116 times that of CO2.
Regulating these gases must therefore be a crucial aspect of any
climate change strategy, especially for China. Based on data in
EPA’s Global Anthropogenic Emissions of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases report, in 2005, China’s estimated anthropogenic
methane emissions ranked first in the world. Approximately
twenty-five percent of its anthropogenic methane emissions—
209.9 MMTCO2E—come from agriculture (manure management), coal mines, landfills, and natural gas and oil systems.95
China is also the world’s biggest emitter of sulfur dioxide.
According to China’s own data, coal and oil-fired power stations
were responsible for twenty-five million tons sulfide dioxide that
it discharged in 2005, contributing to acid rain that affected a
third of the country.96
Wiener suggests that these considerations point to an
ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy and to the possibility
that an international climate treaty could offer positive incentives to engage China in cooperative action. The United States
thus has an opportunity and an imperative to engage China in
what Wiener describes as “effective action on climate change
through realist persuasion—appeal to global and national
interests, and global and national net benefits.” 97 In political and
environmental terms, a new U.S.–China initiative with objectives of developing and testing new technologies to control a
wide range of pollutants and GHGs could advance new alternate technologies, sharing the economic costs and benefits of a
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new strategy for climate and energy. With both countries poised
to invest hundreds billions in economic recovery, the timing
is right for mutually re-enforcing efforts on promoting green
infrastructure.

Conclusions
Future GHG emission and climate change scenarios are not
optimistic. Global emissions of carbon dioxide grew at a rate
of about 1.4% per year in the 1992 to 2002 time period. Recent
data show an acceleration of emission: 3.3% in the 2000 to 2006
period. China’s major expansion of its coal-fired power generation capacity has been the key factor in this unexpected acceleration in growth rate. Looking ahead it is impossible to have an
effective global mitigation program without a serious commitment by the major economies like the United States and China.
If current emission trends continue at three percent per year
for the next twenty-two years, the projected warming will yield
a best-guess average warming, relative to 1990, of 1.8°C in
2050 and 4.4°C in 2100. Since it is too late to prevent substantial additional warming, the world community has no alternative
other than to pursue both mitigation and adaptation approaches
aggressively.
Effectively pursing a mitigation and adaptation strategy
requires resolution of past climate wars. Fortunately many if
not all of the climate wars of the 2001–2008 period are moving
toward resolution. To be sure, the cost and methods of reducing GHG emissions will continue to raise contentious questions,
especially in the current stage of global financial and economic
distress. However, a positive vision of the future is possible: it
would include enhanced support for technology research and
development, collaboration between government and business,
cooperation among different levels of government, and foreign
policy initiatives that combine environmental concerns and
economic goals to build an innovative and resilient economy.
By taking such actions and ending the climate wars, the United
States can lead the way to protect the world’s environment and
stimulate the global economy.
The author is grateful to Michael MacCracken, Rob Brenner,
Frank Princiotta, Gordon Binder, Jonathan Wiener, and Edward
Fallon for their helpful comments.

Endnotes: Resolving the Climate Wars
continued on page 65
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Poznań Climate Conference 2008
by Kyle Ingram* & Matt Irwin**

T

he United Nations Climate Change Conference in Poznań, Poland (“Poznań Conference”) lasted from December 1–12, 2008.
The Poznań Conference included the fourteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP 14”) to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and fourth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(“COP/MOP 4”).1 The Conference was intended to be a significant milestone in global cooperation on climate change, marking the
progress between the start of negotiations in Bali in 2007 and the conclusion of negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009.2 These
negotiations are meant to develop a framework for the international community to combat climate change in the post-Kyoto Protocol
world, as Kyoto expires in 2012.3 Commentators have given varying accounts of the degree to which the Poznań Conference solidified
the chance for a successful climate agreement in Copenhagen. Some argue that the Poznań Conference was a productive point in the
negotiation process, while others contend that it signified a failure of the developed world to take a serious step towards lowering greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and cooperate with the developing world.4

Adaptation Fund

Emissions Reduction and Deforestation

The Adaptation Fund negotiations are considered the
only concrete achievement to come out of the Poznań Conference.5 The Adaptation Fund distributes money to poorer,
developing countries for use to guard against the adverse
effects of climate change.6 The Adaptation Fund has been
considered a success because developing countries will have
access to funds by the next year.7 However, at $80 million the
fund is currently too small to fully accomplish the imposing
task of protecting poorer countries from the harmful environmental and economic impacts of climate change.8
To increase the size of the Fund, developing countries
proposed that money should be added to the fund not only
from the current two percent levy on carbon trading under
the UN Clean Development Mechanism, but also other forms
of carbon trading not currently covered by the Clean Development Mechanism.9 Developed and developing countries
could not reach a compromise to increase funding sources for
the Adaptation Fund at the Poznań Conference, so the issue
remains for resolution in Copenhagen.10

Parties came to Poznań with hopes of advancing the
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plan, or REDD.14 Unfortunately, no official agreement
on the subject was reached.15 There were, however, several
promising statements made by individual countries regarding both emissions reduction and reducing deforestation. For
example, Mexico agreed to cut emissions fifty percent below
2002 levels by 2050; Brazil promised a seventy percent cut in
its annual deforestation rate by 2017; South Africa initiated a
program to cap its carbon emissions by 2025, and the European Union said it will increase its commitment to cut GHG
emissions from a twenty percent reduction to a thirty percent
reduction by 2020 if a global agreement is reached.16

Technology Transfer and Finance
Delegates adopted the Global Environment Facility’s
Poznań Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer for
developing countries, which will be funded by =C 50 million
from the UN Global Environmental Facility.11 This program
will increase the level of investment by leveraging private
investments necessary for developing countries to implement
both mitigation and adaptation technologies.12 Without technology transfer programs such as this, the developing world
would not be able to afford meaningful advances in meeting
the climate change challenge.13

Foundation for Copenhagen
Many important issues that could have been resolved in
Poznań, including the division of responsibilities to cut GHG
emissions between rich and poor nations, tropical deforestation, and sharing clean technology with developing countries, were left to be decided at the Copenhagen Conference
of the Parties.17 Thus, the negotiations in Copenhagen will
have no firm basis from Poznań to build upon. Despite the
lack of concrete agreements or achievements resulting from
the Poznań Conference, it remains vitally important to create
a global commitment to combat climate change in Copenhagen later this year. The urgency of such an agreement can
be best summarized by Amjad Abdulla, a delegate from the
Maldives in Poznań, “We are really disappointed with the
progress we are seeing in Poznań . . . . We are drowning, and
there is this huge gap in commitment.”18
Endnotes: Pozna ń Climate Conference 2008 continued on page 67
*Kyle Ingram is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, and **Matt Irwin is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Assessing the Challenges of Geologic Carbon
Capture and Sequestration:
A California Guide to the Cost of Reducing CO2 Emissions
by Les Lo Baugh* & William L. Troutman**

C

Introduction

arbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is receiving new and intense focus globally, driven by climate
change and potential economic benefits. At an energy
symposium this past December, the Australian Government
announced its $100 million commitment to the Global Carbon
Capture and Storage Institute.1
In so doing, Australia noted
that by 2030, global energy
demand is estimated to rise by
fifty-five percent, with emissions of sixty-two gigatons
(“GT”) globally, thus emphasizing the need for an increase
in CCS efforts worldwide.2
Echoing these sentiments,
a number of research initiatives have begun in the United
States, highlighted by the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, sponsored by the Department of Energy (“DOE”).3
President Barack Obama has also emphasized the need for
CCS, including in his energy plan the intent to “instruct DOE
to enter into public-private partnerships to develop 5 ‘first-of-akind’ commercial scale coal-fired plants with carbon capture and
sequestration.”4 While this research is identifying effective technologies to make CCS a practical reality, it has not yet broached
the legal and regulatory challenges associated with large-scale
CCS projects to substantively reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions.
That these questions remained unanswered reveals the complicated legal truths regarding CCS—any project must navigate
a complicated web of state and federal property rights issues,
address public safety concerns, and develop risk mitigation
measures to ensure long-term efficacy. Thus far, no one in the
United States has taken the lead to establish a legal and regulatory framework for CCS.
As one of the largest producers of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
emissions in the United States, California is prominently positioned to lead the way in setting CCS precedents on a regional
basis. Given California’s historical position on the vanguard of
environmental issues, it is likely that its involvement in the CCS
discussion will also have a formative effect on establishing the
national legal and regulatory framework necessary for efficient,
effective, and successful geologic CCS (“GCCS”).

Accordingly, this article considers the legal risks inherent
in CCS projects through the lens of California law, focusing
on GCCS.5 Because the law of GCCS is undeveloped, many of
the considerations discussed are directly applicable to assessing
legal risk in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, surveying the many
issues that impact such risk may help eliminate barriers to largescale, commercially viable GCCS
projects that are necessary to
meaningfully reduce GHG emissions, regionally, nationally, and
internationally.
First, the article provides a
brief overview of the mechanics
of GCCS. Then the article identifies and discusses one of the
fundamentals to assessing GCCS
risk—ownership. Next, it analyzes
potential liabilities confronting
any GCCS project in California, drawing on legal principles that
are readily analogous to other jurisdictions. Finally, it proposes
some mechanisms to manage the risks associated with GCCS.

California is prominently
positioned to lead the way
in setting CCS precedents
on a regional basis.
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The Basics of Geologic Carbon Capture
and Sequestration
As the name implies, GCCS involves the capture and
sequestration of CO2 for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.
Simply put, CO2 must first be captured, pre-combustion, postcombustion, or by oxy-firing combustion.6 It then must be stored
permanently (in contrast to enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”), in
which CO2 is not sequestered permanently).
Three basic forms of CCS exist: (1) terrestrial sequestration,
involving trees, grasses, soils, or algae; (2) deep-sea sequestration, involving containment and dissolving in deep oceans; and
(3) geologic CCS. GCCS utilizes underground reservoirs, such
as depleted oil and gas fields, saline aquifers, and un-mineable
coal seams. Research efforts thus far show that GCCS in saline
formations has the greatest near-term potential to reduce GHG
emissions, although the legal and regulatory challenges are
*Les Lo Baugh (llobaugh@fulbright.com) is the head of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.’s West Coast Environmental Practice Group, based in Los Angeles. He
advises clients on energy, environmental, and corporate matters. **William L.
Troutman (wtroutman@fulbright.com) is an associate in the Environmental Practice Group of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. in Los Angeles. His practice focuses on
a wide range of environmental regulatory, transactional, and litigation matters.
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great.7 However, geologic sequestration is not new. Millions of
tons of CO2 are injected each year. Projects such as Statoil at
Sleipner, BP at In Salah, and the EnCana EOR project have been
operating for years.
The process of GCCS begins with capturing CO2 from fossilfuel power plants, cement plants, petroleum refineries, etc.8 The
gas stream is then scrubbed, resulting in virtually pure CO2.9 It
is then compressed and cooled to
a supercritical state, during which
it exhibits characteristics of both
liquid and gas.10 Once supercritical, the CO2 is transported to the
injection site by truck (pipelines
are expected once commercial
projects get started).11
Once at the injection site,
the captured, purified, and compressed CO2 is injected through
wells into “pore space” deep
below the surface of one or more
cap rock formations.12 Pore space
consists of porous sedimentary
rock layers, formed from sand,
mud, or ancient shells, that allow
the passage of fluids.13 Sedimentary rock occurs in layers, flanked
by other layers of impermeable rock, such as mudstone and
clay.14 These impermeable layers trap water, oil, and gas beneath
and between them.15 Depths of between 3,000 and 15,000 feet
are generally considered ideal for GCCS because pore space
at that depth is often comprised of saline aquifers, containing
ancient, trapped saltwater with high levels of dissolved solids.16
The water in these deep saline reservoirs is considered commercially “useless” because of its depth and contamination.17 In
deep saline formations, it is theorized that supercritical CO2 will
flow as a distinct liquid on top, displacing and compressing the
saline water below it.18 When injection ceases, scientific models predict that the CO2 will remain hydro-dynamically trapped
at the top of the aquifer by the cap rock or other impermeable
layer, remaining in place for thousands of years.19
Estimates put the geologic storage capacity in saline formations in the United States at a vast 3,300 to 12,000 billion metric
tons.20 In California alone, DOE estimates the storage space in
deep saline formations to be between 76 and 303 billion metric
tons.21 To put this in perspective, California emits an estimated
104 million metric tons of CO2 per year.22 Thus, the potential impact on reducing these emissions into the atmosphere is
great—but not without legal challenges.

as to the ownership of pore space.24 This issue is slowly being
addressed at the state level, as Wyoming, Texas, and Illinois
have recently enacted statutory provisions regarding pore space
and liability, but only for specific CCS purposes.25 The application of the concept of the “negative rule of capture,” and its
associated statutory provisions, are also untested in the GCCS
context.26
In California, the surface
owner generally owns the
rights to property below the
surface, “to the center of the
earth, and above the surface
to the heavens.”27 Thus, if the
surface and subsurface rights
have not been severed, the pore
space should remain with the
surface owner. However, circumstances exist in which the
perceived public interest is substantial and the potential property use is limited by practical
considerations. For instance,
airplanes enter airspace above
property at a safe altitude without it constituting a trespass.
Access to navigable water
and shorelines is treated similarly. As such, the public interest
aspects of GCCS may affect ownership as GCCS becomes a
more integral part of climate change solutions.
Similarly, the issue of ownership of pore space for CCS
purposes has not been determined by either legislative action
or express judicial decisions. The recent report and model rules
released by the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, as
well as numerous statements by various parties, including California state entities, have taken the position that the ownership
of such pore space, particularly in saline formations as opposed
to hydrocarbon formations, is undetermined.28
While no California court has explicitly vested pore space
ownership in the surface owner of a severed estate for CCS purposes, absent legislative action or “judicial activism,” it appears
that the better argument is that pore space ownership resides
with the surface owner and generally remains so even if mineral
rights are severed. A surface owner who has conveyed its mineral rights and severed the estate,
own[s] nearly all rights in the land except for the exclusive right to drill for and produce oil, gas and other
hydrocarbons. The owners of the mineral estate . . .
typically hold only the very limited right . . . to drill
and capture subsurface oil and gas, and the incidental
rights necessary to accomplish this. Thus . . . the lessee generally obtains only a nonpossessory interest in
real property to capture such substances, which is in the
nature of an easement.29
Accordingly, absent express language in the mineral grant,
pore space ownership “should” likely remain with the surface

Because of the
long-term nature of GCCS,
ownership issues
regarding real property
interests and long-term
liability are critical
and unique, centered on
the question of pore space.

GCCS Ownership Issues
Because of the long-term nature of GCCS, ownership issues
regarding real property interests and long-term liability are critical and unique, centered on the question of pore space.23 In many
regions, the law of ownership regarding subsurface mineral and
water rights is well developed. However, no clear answers exist
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owner despite severance; however, the wording of the operative agreements must be evaluated to determine whether or not
a broader conveyance occurred than is typical. This conclusion
is supported by a number of cases in other jurisdictions addressing ownership of storage space for natural gas.30 Gas storage
cases in Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Michigan have all stated that the surface owner, and not a mineral
rights holder, retains ownership of pore space.31 Nonetheless,
even assuming a court of first instance applied the above logic
to GCCS, a risk of tort liability remains on severed estates if the
mineral rights are not also acquired prior to injection, as migrating or escaping CO2 could allegedly interfere with the mineral
rights, as discussed below.

Risks of Ownership and Operation of a
CCS Project in California
The focus of the experimental and pilot GCCS projects is
the validation of the scientific models. While awaiting this validation, however, various risks must be evaluated. The first concern for a developer, for obvious reasons, is what happens if it
is alleged that injected CO2 does not remain sequestered in the
manner expected. At the same time, a number of non-release
legal risks also exist, even if captured CO2 behaves as theorized.
Whatever the cause, a GCCS project may encounter tort, nuisance, negligence, and/or strict liability claims. The more litigious the culture of the jurisdiction, the more likely such issues
will be raised even in circumstances where GCCS performs to
optimal expectations.

Liability from Release Events
In most circumstances, these liabilities will likely result if
there is unexpected behavior of captured CO2, such as migration offsite from the saline injection reservoir into a linked adjacent subsurface saline reservoir, where the pore space is located
within a larger saline reservoir that extends to other estates.
Theoretically, in some circumstances, CO2 could also migrate
through new faults or fractures into an unlinked adjacent subsurface saline reservoir; an adjacent hydrocarbon or mineral formation; groundwater; other adjacent subsurface strata; or onto the
surface itself.32
If a GCCS site was not selected properly, theoretically,
captured CO2 might also react unexpectedly in the designated
property, leading to potential liability if all surface and subsurface rights for the injection area had not been acquired. In those
circumstances, CO2 might migrate into other unacquired saline,
hydrocarbon, or other mineral formations under the designated
property. CO2 might also migrate into other subsurface strata or
groundwater stores under the designated property, or onto the
unacquired surface at or near the injection point.33
While all of these possibilities might result in allegations
of liability, the area of greatest concern would likely be from
allegations of migration into hydrocarbon or other mineral formations, groundwater,34 and onto the surface,35 rather than from
migration within the deep saline aquifer under adjacent property.
This is due to the likely absence of any provable legal damages
resulting from a theoretical CO2 migration, as discussed below.
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If a release of CO2 from the injection reservoir did occur for
whatever reason, this could theoretically expose a GCCS project
to allegations for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for operation of an ultrahazardous activity. While no California court has addressed these issues for GCCS, analogues exist
within other subject areas, as well as in other jurisdictions.

Trespass
Trespass is the “‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of
another,” regardless of motive.36 A trespass may be permanent
or continuing, with a continuing trespass constituting a series of
separate injuries that can be discontinued or abated.37 The classification as one or the other impacts statute of limitations issues,
as well as potential damages amounts.38
While no California court has addressed subsurface trespass
in the GCCS context, when injecting waste fluids, “causing subsurface migration of fluids into a mineral estate without consent
constitutes a trespass.”39 However, courts may not hold CO2
injection directly analogous to waste fluid injection, and migration into a saline aquifer may not be treated the same as a migration into a mineral estate. More importantly, as discussed below,
because deep saline aquifers have no value for mineral extraction or groundwater use, courts may find no damages.
In the event damages are found, the general measure is that
“which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby whether it could have been anticipated or not.”40 If a trespass is permanent, all past and future damages are recoverable
in one action.41 In instances of trespass for subsurface migration of fluids into a mineral estate, a normal measure of damages
for trespass is the reasonable rental value of the property during
the course of the trespass.42 However, courts have flexibility and
award the deterioration in the market value of the mineral estate,
the costs of disposing of the substances causing the trespass, and
the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the injector.43

Nuisance
Under California law, a nuisance is an interference with the
use and enjoyment of a property right.44 This interference must
constitute unreasonable conduct that causes substantial harm.45
As with trespass, a nuisance can be permanent or continuing.46
If a nuisance is permanent, a party may only bring one action to
recover all damages, including anticipated future damages.47
A plaintiff may seek either injunctive relief or damages in
connection with a nuisance.48 The measure of damages, like
those for trespass, is “the amount which will compensate for all
the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have
been anticipated or not.”49 A plaintiff may recover damages for
annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, and mental suffering,
even absent physical damage.50 If a nuisance is intentional, a
court may award punitive or exemplary damages.51 Damages
may also consider diminution of the property value.52 If a nuisance is continuing and can be abated, a plaintiff may seek an
injunction and damages accruing prior to the abatement. If the
nuisance continues, a plaintiff may bring successive actions for
additional damages, so long as any prior award of damages did
not include anticipated future damages.53
18

Negligence
A party is liable in California for negligence for injuries
caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care given the circumstances.54 Damages can be compensatory to “[restore] the
plaintiff as nearly as possible to his or her former position,
or [give] some pecuniary equivalent,” as well as punitive.55
Although the reasonable care standard is not judicially developed, it is expected that a court will consider the public benefit
of sequestration in imposing a duty, in addition to the traditional
negligence considerations of foreseeability, extent of harm, and
causation.56 This consideration will analyze the consequences to
the public of the imposed duty, as well as the social utility of the
activity.57 The public policy aspects of CCS are in an evolutionary stage.

Strict Liability
Under California law, strict liability is imposed for ultrahazardous activities (“UHA”), defined as “certain activities [that]
create such a serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place
liability for the loss on the person engaging in them, regardless
of lack of culpability.”58 Classification of UHAs differs from
nuisance activities because UHAs are lawful and cannot be abated.59 Strict liability for UHAs is limited only to harm within the
scope of the abnormal risk created, and applies only to the class
of persons exposed to the abnormal risk.60
Because of these factors, a court must individually analyze
the factual scenario for a claim to determine if the “risk created
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the
circumstances . . . as to justify the imposition of strict liability
from the harm that results . . . even though it is carried on with
all reasonable care.”61 Because strict liability is a theory of tort
recovery, compensatory and punitive damages are the appropriate remedies, as applicable.62
Thus, the question of GCCS as a UHA is unique to each
project. GCCS by its nature does not appear to pose an abnormal
risk. However, as is commonly said, “bad facts make bad law.”
If unfortunate circumstances occurred, potential exists for the
law to evolve in an unanticipated manner.

Select Considerations Impacting Liability
Released CO2 : The Question of Damages
Although unexpected migration of CO2 may technically
constitute a tort, an open question exists as to proving damages.
While no California court has directly addressed damages in
CO2 sequestration, courts have decided the issue in the context
of subsurface injection of fluids, which has analogues in oil,
gas, and hazardous waste injection case law, both in California
and in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, if no identifiable damage exists, a claim for unauthorized subsurface migration may
fail. In the controlling California case on subsurface migration,
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of California, injected waste water
ultimately migrated into plaintiff’s mineral estate, resulting in
“widespread damage throughout a large oil, gas and mineral
field.”63 Because this injection interfered with plaintiff’s right
to extract commodities, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
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court’s award of rental value for the trespass—the market price
for the cost of wastewater injection.64
If courts adopt this reasoning, which seems most appropriate, no damages should exist absent interference with another’s
mineral rights. Given that GCCS injects CO2 into deep saline
reservoirs, presumed to be devoid of any extractable minerals of
value, the resulting encroachment within the saline reservoir on
an adjoining estate should fail for lack of damages. Similarly, if
the injected CO2 migrates into unacquired strata on the acquired
property containing no commodities, no damage should result.
These conclusions are consistent with the Ohio case Chance
v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,65 which establishes the precedent oft cited
by GCCS prognosticators that no damage exists for subsurface
migration of materials into adjacent landowners property absent
a reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface by the adjacent landowner.66

GCCS Permitting Probably Will Not Yield a Permit
Shield Defense
Currently, the injection of CO2 will require a permit under
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water
Act (“SDWA”).67 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) has recently proposed a new class of well under SDWA
(Class VI) and minimum technical criteria for injection of
CO2.68 This new permit would require adherence to a number
of regulations aimed at preventing CO2-related contamination of
underground drinking water.69 This begs the question of whether
permitting of GCCS projects will protect an operator from
liability in the event of a release with a “permit shield.” 70 An
examination of SDWA reveals that operators should expect no
such defense, as SDWA does not contain the required specific
language providing for a permit shield defense. Even if such a
defense was clearly articulated in the statute, courts generally
interpret permit shields to protect a permittee only from civil
and criminal penalties assessed through a citizen suit or government action, and not common law claims such as trespass and
nuisance.71

Liabilities for Non-Release Events
Unlike the risks of release of CO2, these liabilities represent
possible costs to a GCCS project before initiation and/or even if
captured CO2 remains sequestered as expected.

Environmental Permitting Challenges
In efforts to obtain appropriate permits and regulatory clearance on the state and federal level, a GCCS project may face
significant and costly litigation before getting off of the ground.
These costs most likely will come by way of challenges to permits required for compliance with SDWA and the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) on the federal level, the
California Environmental Quality Action (“CEQA”) on the state
level, and other local regulations.
It is difficult to predict the form of a challenge to a GCCS
project’s SDWA permitting, as EPA issued proposed rules for
GCCS that have not yet been finalized (discussed above). In the
interim, a challenge to a GCCS permit could come pursuant to
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a formal EPA guidance document issued to EPA staff and all
EPA Regions covering issuance of permits for geologic sequestration under the existing SDWA regulations for underground
injection.72 While it is arguable that noncompliance with such a
document could support some action by EPA, it is unlikely that
a private party could avail itself of noncompliance with the guidance documents.73
The more likely challenge to a CO2 injection permit would
come directly from NEPA claims in federal court and CEQA
claims in state court. This is a particularly perilous aspect of the
process, as the analysis of the environmental impact of the injection plan will come under public scrutiny for the first time when
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), under NEPA,
or the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”), under CEQA, is
prepared. Given the developing
nature of GCCS, a project may
be particularly vulnerable, especially in litigious jurisdictions,
during the EIS/EIR process in the
event that a litigious private party
or environmental group desires to
slow or prevent the development
of GCCS technology and projects.74 These costs and/or delays
are certainly possible even if an
operator meticulously adheres to
NEPA or CEQA requirements, such as the adequate discussion
of alternatives and cumulative impacts, and avoidance of project
segmentation.
Similarly, it is not unusual for the construction of a well
to require a permit pursuant to county or city ordinances. For
instance, under the Police Powers provisions of the California
State Constitution and in other jurisdictions, local agencies may
require permit conditions that have a reasonable relationship to
the purpose of the permit.75 Thus, methods of construction, as
long as they are consistent with the requirements of the State
Department of Gas, Oil & Geothermal Resources, may be part
of the local permit. A challenge to these permits would also
likely come under CEQA.

California is subject to notable seismic activities and no nexus
need be proven before litigation is commenced. While the frequency of seismic activity in California could provide opportunities for plaintiffs to allege a nexus between GCCS activities
and any specific seismicity, the historic background of recurrent
seismic activity in California may make it difficult for a plaintiff
to establish causation. If litigated, the general concepts of tort
liability discussed above would apply.

Looking Forward: The Need for Certainty
At a minimum, this survey of California law shows that
given the unknowns, the question of litigation over a project is
one of “when” and “on what grounds.” However, many potential GCCS operators may not view themselves as pioneers.
While prudent contracting and
operations, along with adequate
insurance, typically reduce risk
exposure, the long time horizon
of sequestration poses unique
liabilities and responsibilities
that industry and current legal
systems appear ill-equipped to
address. But the chorus of government, industry, and environmental voices emphasizing
GCCS as a climate change solution seems to argue that allowing a protracted period for courts
to the develop the applicable law is inconsistent with the public
interest. Notably, the recently proposed Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, which contains the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act, began forcing these issues by providing GCCS
tax incentives and requiring the Secretary of the Treasury, in
conjunction with EPA, to establish regulations setting security
measures to ensure CO2 remains sequestered.77 This first step
hopefully will evolve into a substantial and expeditious resolution of these issues. Nevertheless, a number of precedents
may provide a conceptual basis to address the unique issues of
sequestration including post-operational issues.
Programs like the Acute Orphan Well Account, the Hazardous and Idle-Deserted Well Abatement Fund, and the Methane Gas Hazards Reduction Assistance programs may prove as
stepping stones to addressing GCCS liability over the expected
timeline, but they do not provide a shared solution when the
injector, operator, or owner of the stored substance is financially
viable.78 These programs also only involve discovery of releases
during the operational life of a project. Further, they do not cut
off an operator’s liability after well closure.
Other precedents may serve as more useful models, including the Price Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and
the National Flood Insurance Program. The former is similar to
an industry liability pooling plan.79 On the other hand, the latter
guarantees insurance to at-risk communities.80 Similarly, many
GCCS commentators have called for government assumption of
monitoring and liability after a reasonable time, such as 10 years
following the end of injections.81

A GCCS project may
encounter tort, nuisance,
negligence, and/or strict
liability claims.

Geologic Sequestration and Injection Versus
Allegedly Induced Seismic Activity
A number of reported instances of seismic activity induced
by large scale human activities exist, such as underground
nuclear explosions and construction projects.76 Allegations of
geothermal plant activity resulting in seismic activity during
the 1990s in California did not apparently result in any financial awards to potential plaintiffs. In addition, in the 1960s some
believed injected waste fluid triggered seismic activity in the
Rocky Mountains, although this was not substantiated. However, this should not be viewed as a shield to such allegations
in the future.
Although the depth of the target saline aquifer is generally
substantially below the level of any seismic activity associated
with the circumstances above, litigation risk exists because
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20

Another important matter for consideration is granting
operators some form of eminent domain, similar to grants by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or state public utility
commissions for gas pipelines.82 This would presumably require
new federal or state legislation, but would greatly reduce liability risks, project costs, and expedite development of GCCS
(the lack of such power when it comes to alternative energy
power lines is an analogous failure of the legal system to adapt
to changing needs). Of course, much of the concern would dissipate if the migration of CO2 is treated similarly to the state’s
basis for water regulation and air traffic—that is, absent some
reasonable expectation of use or actual damage, no claim lies for
a property owner.

Conclusion
In light of the enormous potential for GCCS to be a useful
tool in the battle against climate change, thoughtful but expeditious resolution of these issues is clearly in the public interest,
both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, legislative
gridlock and political partisanship have too often been part of
recent legislative processes. However, the generally accepted
need to aggressively address the continued massive infusion of
CO2 into our atmosphere should provide focus and incentives to
our leaders. Given the need to address GCCS and its associated
legal obstacles, one can only hope lawmakers move faster than
hydro-dynamically trapped CO2.
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Human Rights and Climate Change:
Shifting the Burden to the State?
by Anne Parsons*

I

n March 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council
passed Resolution 7/23 requesting intergovernmental and
international organizations to conduct “a detailed analytical study on the relationship between climate change and human
rights.”1 Resolution 7/23 is indicative of the recent global trend
that incorporates a human rights framework in climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies.2
Underlying the human rights approach to climate change is
the notion that vulnerable populations that contributed little to
the stocks of carbon emissions that cause global warming, should
not have to bear the brunt of the burden in addressing global
climate change.3 Correspondingly, protecting human rights
will better enable individuals and communities to take steps to
adapt on their own.4 Under a human rights framework, the state
is traditionally the duty-bearer, and advocates of a rights-based
approach to climate change urge governments to integrate climate change concerns into existing development policies and set
minimum human rights thresholds around which new mitigation
and adaptation policies can be developed.5 While the rightsbased approach to climate change raises many useful methodological insights, it also raises a fundamental question: how will
states that currently lack the resources or political will to fulfill
basic human rights tackle the problem of climate change?
The essential hope of orienting climate policy around human
rights is that this orientation will generate moral and legal force
within the global climate change regime.6 To start, it distinguishes between “perpetrators” of climate change and “victims”
of climate change.7 This framing of the relationship has two key
advantages from a human rights perspective. First, it highlights
litigation as a viable mechanism for holding reluctant-to-change
developed nations accountable to their climate change commitments.8 Second, it also helps provide new impetus for wealthier
nations to assist vulnerable states to adapt by providing resources
and technology.9 For example, to date, few wealthy countries
have met the agreed international aid target for adaption funding, which currently stands at 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product.10 In contrast, one study estimated the financing needed for
“immediate ‘climate proofing’” at between US$1.1 billion and
US$2.2 billion for least developed countries.11
At the national level, the logistics of implementing a rightsbased climate change policy are tricky. A rights-based approach
to climate change takes universally accepted human rights
norms as minimum thresholds by which to gauge the effects of
climate change and direct adaptation funding to where it is most
needed.12 At the same time, these thresholds ensure that the
policies implemented by governments to address the effect of
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climate change do not themselves infringe upon human rights.13
A recent total ban on charcoal in the West African country of
Chad exemplifies the latter point: the government’s response
to the pressing problem of deforestation has been widely criticized as overly harsh by the public and human rights activists
alike.14 Paradoxically, then, a human rights approach to climate
change may be hardest to implement in the countries that need it
most.15 If a government of a resource-poor state faces a pressing
environmental concern, the state’s only viable option within the
human rights framework may be to appeal to the international
community for aid.
Ultimately then, whether the human rights framework for
climate change offers anything new to the states most vulnerable
to climate change depends on those states’ ability to leverage
this discourse in negotiations vis-à-vis the international community. This will require these states to invoke human rights
discourses in new ways, since human rights have traditionally
been concerned with the state-individual relationship.16 In the
past, climate change negotiations have marginalized resourcepoor countries in need of adaptation funding.17 Resource-poor
states may be able to invoke procedural rights (right to participation, right to information) as a means of gaining access to these
negotiations.18 Similarly, asserting the right to development
may help developing nations articulate their concerns about the
impacts of climate change on their ability to protect their citizens’ human rights.19 Integral to the human rights framework
on climate change is the notion that powerful nations should
recognize developing states’ right to actively participate in the
development of a global strategy on climate change as both an
ethical obligation and the only means of attaining a sustainable
solution.
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Could Litigation Help Torres Strait
Islanders Deal with Climate Impacts?
by Dr. Donna Green* & Kirsty Ruddock**

Introduction

International Context

ver the last fifteen years, Torres Strait Islanders have
successfully fought to obtain native title rights over
their land. Some Islanders are now concerned that these
rights may disappear due to the impacts of climate change. The
very existence of Ailan Kastom (island custom) may be threatened if projected sea level rise in combination with extreme
weather events increases the frequency or severity of inundation
and necessitates relocation from the islands.
This paper explores the legal remedies that may assist Torres
Strait Islanders in dealing with adaptation to climate change.
We use the Torres Strait Islands as a case study to examine the
question of whether it is possible
to hold a party responsible for
physical damage to Torres Strait
Islands, and cultural damage to
Islander society. The paper outlines several areas of law that
could assist Torres Strait Islanders including native title law,
human rights laws, tort laws, and
environmental protection laws.
The paper begins by briefly
identifying what is known about
the biophysical impacts of climate change for the Torres Strait.
These direct biophysical impacts
and indirect effects from climate change are discussed in the
context of pre-existing social and economic disadvantages found
in these communities. We also address a variety of philosophical and legal questions regarding the fact that some Torres Strait
communities suffer a disproportionate share of the consequences
of climate change. As we discuss these issues we must keep in
mind that environmental protection laws in many countries seek
to ensure that people are held accountable for damage they cause
to the environment. Should this be the case with greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions as it is with other pollutants? Is the rest of
Australia obligated to assist communities in the Torres Strait
to ensure their culture and way of life is preserved? What legal
actions and alternatives are available to enable the Islanders to
preserve their way of life and ensure adequate compensation
for any harm from climate change effects? By considering a
combination of legal strategies, as well as adaptative lifestyle
responses including the possibility of relocation, we assess the
ability of the Torres Strait community to react to impending climate change.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
has long acknowledged that Small Island States are disproportionately impacted by climate change due to their susceptibility to rising sea levels, storm surges, and their limited resources
and infrastructure.1 As a response to these challenges, and
with international support, several small Pacific Island nations
are currently engaging in anticipatory adaptation—from hard
engineering strategies, e.g. building sea walls, to radical social
upheaval planning, e.g. international emigration.2 Questions of
equity surrounding who should pay for these costs remain due
to the recognition of Pacific Island Nations’ minimal current,
and virtually non-existent past,
GHG emissions. The polluter
pays principle suggests that
costs of adaptation should not
exclusively be borne by these
countries.3
Similar concerns are now
being raised about how climate
change will affect the lives of
people living on remote, lowlying Australian islands in the
Torres Strait. As part of the
wealthy, industrialized nation
Australia, the situation of
these islands is different than
most Small Island States. There are, however, many parallels
between the widely reported concerns of Pacific Islanders about
loss of land and sovereignty due to climate impacts combined
with natural variability and changing land use, and those of the
Torres Strait. For the first time, in 2007, the impacts of climate
change on Islanders were specifically noted in the IPCC’s Fourth
Assessment Report.4

O

Small Island States
are disproportionately
impacted by climate
change due to
their susceptibility to
rising sea levels.
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Case study: The Torres Strait Region
The Torres Strait region encompasses about forty-eight
thousand square kilometers of open sea, comprised of a shallow
*Dr. Donna Green is a researcher at the Climate Change Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Australia. Her research focuses on human-environment
interactions, specifically on social and economic vulnerability, adaptation, and
risk. She leads the Sharingknowledge.net.au program that uses Indigenous and
non-Indigenous knowledge to understand climate impacts on remote communities
in northern Australia. **Kirsty Ruddock is the Principal Solicitor of the Environmental Defender’s Office, New South Wales. The Environmental Defender’s Office
is a community legal center that specializes in public interest environmental law.
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continental shelf between Papua New Guinea and mainland
Australia. Torres Strait Islanders are the lesser known of the two
Indigenous Australian people. The majority of Islanders live on
mainland Australia, however, approximately eight thousand people still live on seventeen of the over 150 islands in the Torres
Strait region.5 There is significant inter-island cultural difference, demonstrated by language and cultural practices varying across the islands. Islander culture, or Ailan Kastom, refers
to a distinctive Torres Strait Islander culture and way of life,
incorporating together traditional elements of Islander beliefs
with Christianity. This unique culture permeates all aspects of
island life and is recognized by State and Commonwealth agencies through enshrinement in the Torres Strait Islander Land Act
1991 (Queensl.).6
Although the impacts of climate change are already being
felt across Australia, the legal responsibilities for climate change
are not as clear. At present, there are no Australian laws that specifically deal with protecting communities from climate change
impacts.7 The policy response in Australia to climate change has
not yet addressed issues of responsibility and protection, instead
mostly focusing on designing an emissions trading system.8
Australia’s policy response has also ignored the need for
climate justice. Principles of climate justice redefine climate
change from a scientific issue to one of human rights and environmental justice. The principles include the concept of “ecological debt” which focuses
on redressing inequalities of
wealth, power, and access to
the earth’s resources.9 In Australia, climate justice initiatives
aim to ensure that Indigenous
Australians, who are traditionally more vulnerable members of society, are protected
from the impacts of climate
change.10
Public interest litigation
has always played a key role in
ensuring that citizens are heard
and their rights are protected.
The Torres Strait has a proud tradition of public interest litigation, being the home of Eddie Mabo, whose case in the High
Court brought about the recognition of native title and the Native
Title Act 1993 (Cth).11
One way of ensuring that policymakers become aware
of the need to protect the rights and interests of Torres Strait
Islanders is to use the law to highlight these issues and to seek
to hold both governments and corporations responsible for their
contribution to climate impacts felt there. Litigation can focus
public attention on a particular issue through media exposure,
and encourage society to debate public values and the need to
protect our environment.12 Even unsuccessful cases can expose
weaknesses in the law and highlight the need for law reform and
the development of the law, allowing subsequent cases to build
on the legal arguments and scientific evidence presented.13

Map of Torres Strait Islands.
Although to date there have been no Australian cases that
have sought to address climate change by holding governments
and corporations responsible for
their climate impacts, there are a
number of different laws explored
below that could assist if Torres
Strait Islanders wished to pursue
the matter.14 The types of laws
that could be used fall into two
broad categories: laws that are
aimed at protecting human rights
like the Native Title Act 1993
(Cth) and laws that are directed at
finding persons liable for damage
to the environment, such as tort
laws and specific environmental
statutes. Before these options are
discussed in more detail, we briefly outline the projected climate
impacts for the region.

Principles of climate
justice redefine climate
change from a
scientific issue to one of
human rights and
environmental justice.
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Biophysical Impacts in the
Torres Strait
No published research has yet specifically focused on biophysical climate impacts in the Torres Strait.15 Some climate
change projections have, however, been calculated for a wider
area encompassing the region.16 These reports project increases
in average temperature, relative to the climate of 1990 for the
Cape York region of Queensland, of 0.5–1.2°C by 2030 and
1.0–4.2°C by 2070. The average dry-season rainfall for this
region is projected to decrease by 1–6% by 2030 and by 2–23%
by 2070. The average wet-season rainfall is projected to increase
by 0–4% by 2030 and by 1–13% by 2070.17 However, it is
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possible that these ranges may underestimate the magnitudes of
likely changes.
Increasing sea surface temperature threatens corals, with
regular coral bleaching anticipated just south of the Torres Strait,
in the Great Barrier Marine Park, within one to two decades.18
The average global sea level rise indicates increases of up to
seventy-nine centimeters by 2100, with regional variation adding five centimeters to this global average.19
Changes in the intensity and frequency of weather and
climate extremes (rather than average changes) are likely to be
a major concern for the Torres Strait. However, there are limited climate extremes data available for the region for validating
climate models. Future projections for Australia as a whole show
that changes in temperature and precipitation extremes, such as
heat waves and rainfall intensity, will increase.20 In the northeast of Australia, tropical cyclones tend to center south of the
Torres Strait Islands (around latitudes of 14°–15°C south), in the
Gulf of Carpentaria and off the northern Queensland mainland
coast. However, even low intensity, relatively distant cyclones
or tropical lows in the Gulf of Carpentaria can cause problems
when they occur in conjunction with the season of prevailing
northwest winds, during January and February, and at high tide.

Indirect Impacts and Cultural Damage
Climate impacts, such as more extreme weather or an
increase in the intensity of storm tides, are likely to result in
the need for more maintenance of basic infrastructure, including roads, culverts, jetties, airstrips, water piping, fencing, and
sea walls.21 Such maintenance is more difficult and expensive
for island communities than for less remote communities on
the Australian mainland, particularly due to extra transportation costs and time involved with bringing all hardware into the
Torres Strait by barge or air. Finding these additional resources
is extremely difficult with numerous reports detailing the existing extreme socio-economic disadvantage in the region.22
Climate change will also likely impact surface and ground
water resources, making resource management in the dry season difficult. In the past, many islands depended on fresh water
lenses to provide drinking water, but high demand for water
(particularly since the introduction of reticulated sewage systems) has caused supply problems for many islands.23 Rainwater
tanks and large lined dams are used to trap and store water for
use in the dry season on all islands with many islands already
reaching the limits of their drinking water supply and relying on
mobile or permanent desalination plants to meet demand.24
Climate change also affects plant and animal biodiversity.
Beach and mangrove areas are important habitats and nurseries
for several significant species of marine animals. With increasing sea surface temperatures and ocean acidification, the viability of sea grass beds, which are important feeding grounds for
turtles and dugongs and a nursery area for prawns and tropical
rock lobster, is an area of significant concern.25 Many animals
including turtles, dugongs, crocodiles, stingrays, and sharks
have a significant cultural role for many Islanders. However, any
major impacts on the lifecycles of these animals would reduce
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the availability of a nutritious source of fresh food for many
coastal communities that traditionally hunt these animals.26
It is likely that changes in natural systems will cause economic, social, and psychological damage, especially if these
impacts affect totemic fauna, e.g. turtle and dugong, other important seafood, e.g. crayfish and turtle, or culturally important
flora, e.g. Wongai and almond trees. Such problems are likely
to add to difficulties of Islanders attempting to revive traditional
gardening practices.27
For many Torres Strait Islanders, a connection with their
island—a place of ancestry, identity, language, livelihood, and
community connection—is the largest determinant of their individual and community “health.” Therefore, biophysical changes
affecting the “health” of natural ecosystems are likely to also
impact human systems: both individuals’ physical and psychological well-being, as well as the “health” of a community’s
cultural cohesion. The impacts of more extreme weather events
on sacred sites have not been researched to date, despite the
expressed concern of several Torres Strait Islander elders and
leaders that such impacts would have serious negative psychological effects.28

Who is Liable for Climate Change?
There are a number of legal responses that Islanders could
use to protect their rights and interests from the impacts of
climate change using the common law of torts, or by bringing claims under specific statutes that protect the environment,
native title, and human rights. As climate change litigation is a
new phenomenon, only time will tell whether any of these areas
of law could be successfully used to address their concerns.

Human Rights Laws
As the scientific evidence indicates, climate change threatens the lives, health, culture, and livelihood of many Small Island
States and low-lying coastal communities. It is therefore necessary to consider how human rights laws may provide protection
to these communities. There are three types of laws that could be
of assistance: native title, discrimination, or international human
rights laws.

Native Title
Native title is recognized as an important form of customary
land law for Indigenous Australians. The Native Title Act 1993
(Cth) (“NT Act”) provides for the protection and recognition of
native title.29 Native title rights are particularly important to the
Torres Strait Islanders. Not only did the Mabo decision establish those rights, but all communities in the Torres Strait have
their native title rights and interests legally recognized.30 Of the
thirty-nine native title determinations made in Queensland as of
July 2007, twenty-six are related to Torres Strait communities.31
This is the opposite situation to most mainland Indigenous communities which are still fighting in the Courts to have their native
title rights recognized.32 Such claims can take ten to fifteen years
to finalize.33 Those who hold exclusive determinations of native
title, such as the Traditional Owners of the Mer Island group,
obtain the right to control and manage land, similar to freehold
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landowners. The High Court recently extended exclusive native
title rights to the inter-tidal zone in the Northern Territory.34
One of the real risks posed by climate change is that sea
level rise or other storm events may impact and damage land
held by Torres Strait Islanders under the NT Act, as well as
the rights over the sea and inter-tidal zones. Native title cannot be extinguished except in accordance with the NT Act so
the question is whether the NT Act effectively protects Torres
Strait Islander’s land rights from the impacts of climate change.
There is an argument that sea level rise is an “act” in the sense
contemplated by and protected under the legislation. Relevantly,
section 226 of the NT Act defines “acts that affect native title” to
include not only positive acts such as the making of legislation
or granting of a license, but the “creation, variation, extension,
renewal, or extinguishment of any interest in relation to land or
waters.” Sea level rise will extinguish certain rights and interests
over land because it will be inundated.
The question will be whether the flooding of land will be
interpreted as an “act.” The act is not one undertaken by the Australian Government, but rather by those producing GHG emissions. Yet, insufficient action by the Australian Government to
mitigate the impacts of
those gases on Torres
Strait Islanders native
title rights could arguably be an “act.”
One other option
available to native title
holders is to bring a
compensation claim for
the impacts of climate
change on extinguishing or impairing their
native title rights. The
NT Act provides for a
regime to award compensation to traditional owners for the impairment of their native
title rights over an area of land or water.35 It could be argued that
the failure to take steps to mitigate climate change means that
the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments, in particular,
have contributed to the extinguishment or impairment of native
title rights.
To date, there have been no successful compensation claims
under the NT Act. This is partly because native title must be
proved before an application for compensation can be determined under the NT Act, and native title is difficult to prove.36
Compensation can be no more than what would result from a
compulsory acquisition and enshrines the concept of “just
terms.”37 Compensation would be based on market value plus
any amount to reflect the cultural value of the land. In the case
of the Torres Strait, the market values could be considerable.
Therefore, Torres Strait Islanders could lodge claims for compensation on the basis of the extinguishment of their rights as a
result of climate change, which could result in significant compensation payments.

Discrimination Laws
Traditionally climate change has been viewed as an environmental, rather than a human rights issue. However there is
an increasing recognition that climate change has severe human
rights implications and is worsening poverty and vulnerability in
communities least responsible for the problem.38 In the absence
of a bill or charter of rights in Australia, Australia’s current
human rights laws do not provide adequate protection to Torres
Strait Islanders faced with damage to their culture and possible
relocation as a result of climate change.39
In 2005, the Inuit, who are the Indigenous inhabitants of
the Arctic region of North America and Greenland, brought a
petition to the Inter American Commission of Human Rights
(“IACHR”).40 The petition requested IACHR’s assistance in
obtaining relief from human rights violations resulting from
the impacts of climate change caused by the acts and omissions of the United States. In particular, the petition argued that
the United States had violated a number of rights set out in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,41 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),42
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”).43 Climate change
is impacting and will continue to impact
the Inuit people’s right to enjoy their
traditional lands, to maintain their cultural property, as well as their rights to
health and life, residence, the inviolability of their home, and right to means of
subsistence.44 The petition has yet to be
determined but it shows that international
human rights are being violated by climate change and litigation is serving to
highlight these issues.45
It is possible that Torres Strait Islanders could similarly bring their complaints
to United Nations bodies. In particular,
the UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) can receive individual complaints and actively investigate and rule upon those
complaints.46 Some commentators have argued that this system
is the oldest, most utilized, and most authoritative within the
UN regime.47 While the UN Human Rights Committee cannot
make binding decisions, its recommendations can highlight the
problem and place moral and political pressure on Governments
to act.48
Torres Strait Islanders may be able to utilize the power of
the UNHRC and argue before the Committee that the right to
life (article 6), freedom of movement and choice of residence
(article 12), and prohibition of interference with privacy, family,
and home (article 17) of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights have been breached. International tribunals
have previously recognized the link between environmental
health and the right to life.49 Similarly, international tribunals
have recognized that harm to the environment from pollution
can impact the right to home and family life.50 In particular,
Torres Islanders, parallel to the Inuits, could argue that climate

There are a number
of legal responses that
Islanders could use to
protect their rights and
interests from the impacts
of climate change.
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change threatens the life and health of Torres Strait Islanders.
The potential impacts are more than mosquito-borne illnesses
and water quality issues in the islands; they also pose risks to
basic island infrastructure such as roads, wharves, airstrips, and
buildings.51
Furthermore, the right to freedom of movement in article
12 of the ICCPR also covers the situation of internally displaced
persons who are forced to move or are restricted by environmental issues.52 This may be an argument that could be used
under Australian law to protect Torres Strait Islanders from
being forcibly relocated. In Kruger v. Commonwealth, Justice
Gaudron gave some support to the concept of the right to freedom of movement under Australian law. The Justice found that
freedom of movement was part of the implied political communications under the that could restrict state powers, and on this
basis laws restricting the freedom of movement of Aboriginal
people, with no lawful purpose of protecting Aboriginal persons,
were invalid.53 Any laws or policies that are developed to relocate Torres Strait Islanders affected by climate change will need
to be carefully considered to ensure they do not infringe on such
protections.
Before lodging a communication with the UN Human
Rights Committee, an individual must have exhausted all of
the domestic remedies available to deal with the breach of the
ICCPR.54 Although violation of the ICCPR may be used as evidence of violation of domestic law, in this case, there are no
domestic remedies within Australia to address these breaches of
the ICCPR. Consequently, it would be possible for Torres Strait
Islanders to lodge such a complaint directly with the UNHRC at
any time.
However, domestic law may be used as a tool to address
the fact that climate change will have a disproportionate impact
on Torres Strait communities and other Indigenous communities
in Northern Australia. Obviously climate change is not directly
targeting these communities but is indirectly doing so. It is arguable that the Government’s failure to act to prevent the impact
of climate change on these communities is indirectly discriminatory. In particular, Australia’s failure to date to commit to
strict emission targets is impacting disproportionately on these
communities.
Australia has in place laws to protect persons against indirect
discrimination on the basis of their race.55 These laws prohibit
policies or rules that put at a disadvantage people of a particular
race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin more than people of another race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
Cases have often highlighted provisions that are “fair in form
and intention but discriminatory in impact and outcome,”56 for
example, provisions that are race neutral but affect a particular
group disproportionately. Again, the issue here is that the problem relates to inaction rather than, in many cases, direct actions.
Arguably the failure of Governments to introduce strong laws to
reduce GHG emissions is indirectly discriminatory, but proving
this at law may be more difficult.
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Tort Laws
Traditionally, tort laws are aimed at redressing harms to
individuals and their property caused by the actions of others.
These laws could be used by individuals to bring actions against
large GHG emitters or Governments. Indigenous communities
in the United States have commenced bringing cases for physical damage to their homes and culture as a result of climate
change.57

Public Nuisance
To date most of the climate change litigation in the United
States has used the tort of public nuisance. No such cases have
been commenced in Australia. Nuisance focuses on interference with the right to use and enjoy land.58 Public nuisance is
defined as an unlawful act, the effect of which is to endanger
the life, health, property, or comfort of the public at large.59 It
is a defense to an action of public nuisance that the actions are
an inevitable consequence of the conduct of work that is authorized by a statute and therefore reasonable, and reasonable steps
have been taken to prevent the nuisance. It is no defense to a
nuisance action based on pollution for the polluter to prove that
the environment was already polluted from another source or
that the polluter’s individual actions were not the sole cause of
the nuisance.60 Public nuisance is better suited to climate change
actions than negligence because causation issues are likely to be
less complex.
Two relevant nuisance actions have recently been considered in the United States. In Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co.61 the plaintiffs sought broad forms of judicial relief
from the court to abate the “public nuisance” of “global warming” including holding the defendants liable for creating and
contributing to a public nuisance and requiring the defendants to
abate its contribution to the nuisance through a cap on its carbon
dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade. The plaintiffs argued that
U.S. residents faced injuries to public health (heat deaths and
respiratory illnesses), increased smog levels, damage to coastal
resources from rising sea levels, increases in droughts and flooding, and widespread loss of species and biodiversity as a result
of the defendants’ actions.62 The state of California also sued a
number of automobile manufacturers for public nuisance, seeking monetary damages in connection with global warming.63
Both cases were dismissed by the District Court and are
currently on appeal.64 The Courts viewed the climate change
argument as based on non-justiciable political questions with
implications for the U.S. economy, foreign relations, and
national security, partly due to the extensive nature of the remedies sought in this case. In Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil, the Native
Inuit village of Kivalina has commenced a public nuisance
action as well as a conspiracy case against nine oil companies,
fourteen power companies, and a coal company for damages it is
suffering from the melting Artic ice.65 At the time of writing, the
case has yet to be heard.
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Negligence
The most common tort is that of negligence. The essence of
negligence is that there has been a failure to take reasonable care
to prevent injury to others.66 To establish a case of negligence, a
litigant has to prove that the defendant owed them a duty of care;
that the duty of care was breached; and the breach was the cause
of their loss or damage.67
The scientific evidence suggests that some damage is already
occurring to parts of the Torres Strait, and despite adequate
observational records in this region, it is reasonable to consider
that slow onset sea level rise will play an ever increasing role in
raising the frequency of inundations on low-lying islands in the
future. As noted supra, more frequent inundations from storm
tides may also result if there is an increase in the incidence or
frequency of tropical cyclones. Some scientists are suggesting
that they may soon be able to judge the role climate change is
playing in these extreme weather events.68
There is an argument that Governments at all levels owe
a duty of care to protect the land and culture of Torres Strait
Islanders, by acting to prevent harm to communities from climate change, and are therefore liable for the damage to those
communities.69 The High Court in Australia has suggested that
the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper
exercise by the authority of its power may be owed a duty of
care.70 If a duty of care could be established, it may also be possible to apply such an argument to large emitters of greenhouse
gases.
The consensus among practitioners and academics seems to
be that local Councils will owe a duty of care to landowners with
regard to their consideration of individual development applications in coastal areas that are most at risk of climate change.71
The amalgamated Island Council will owe a duty of care to residents when considering development applications in the coastal
zone, as they have extensive powers to control planning, knowledge of the impacts of climate change, and the community in
which they work is extremely vulnerable to such events. There
are provisions introduced in recent years to limit the scope of
public authorities in negligence to circumstances where they are
acting so unreasonably.72 Over time, as the impacts of climate
change become more severe in some communities and areas,
failure to prevent damage caused by climate change may come
to be considered sufficiently unreasonable to overcome such a
restriction.
The greatest obstacle to people seeking to establish negligence is the issue of causation. Even large GHG emitters can
argue that they have not substantially or significantly contributed to the harm suffered by a plaintiff, and their emissions are
just a very insignificant amount in comparison to current global
and historical emissions. The decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA accepted that incremental small
steps from GHG emitters should still be regulated despite not
being the only cause of these emissions in the global context.73
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens stated:
“[The EPA’s] argument rests on the erroneous assumption that
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a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be
attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise
would doom most challenges to regulatory action.” 74
However, the tests of causation will need to evolve to determine who is liable for climate change and will depend on developments in science enabling such predictions to occur, as well
as the courts accepting that they should determine the issues, as
opposed to Governments.75 Some commentators have suggested
a more suitable test for determining liability in negligence will be
a test that asks “does climate change lead to a material increase
in risk to persons?” instead of proving that it is a substantial
factor in causing the damage.76 Public interest cases about climate change impacts could be fundamental in bringing about
developments in the law of negligence to provide remedies for
the impacts of climate change. A comparison has been made to
asbestos or tobacco litigation, suggesting that over time the law
will provide remedies as the effects of climate change become
more severe.77

Statutory Offenses Under Queensland
Environmental Protection Legislation
In Queensland, the principal law dealing with environment
protection is the Environment Protection Act 1994 (“EP Act”).78
In a recent paper, Dr. Chris McGrath discussed the potential for
this legislation to be used by third parties to challenge major
greenhouse polluters.79 One of the advantages of the EP Act
is that it has wide standing provisions that provide significant
opportunities for people to bring proceedings in the Queensland
Planning and Environment Court.80 Usually parties can do so
without facing the risks of an adverse costs order.81 The EP Act
creates the offense of causing serious or material environmental
harm. The notion of “environmental harm” is widely defined82
under the legislation and, although it has not been judicially
tested, could foreseeably encompass the emission of greenhouse
gases and consequential climate change.83
The EP Act clarifies some of the complexities of causation
by stating that environmental harm may be caused by an activity
whether the harm “is a direct or indirect result of the activity,”
or “results from the activity alone or from the combined effects
of the activity and other activities or factors.”84 Public interest
litigation could be brought on behalf of Torres Strait communities against a corporation operating a number of coal-fired power
stations in Queensland for contributing to greater storm tides in
the Torres Strait. One of the main barriers to such a case would
be that power stations operate under particular environmental
authorities. If the court interpreted those authorities broadly they
may find they cover all harms that result from power stations
operations. It is also a defense to take all reasonable and practical measures to prevent or minimize environmental harm arising
from any activity that causes or is likely to cause environmental
harm.85

Conclusion
Alongside the direct biophysical impacts, such as storm
surge inundation, it is the myriad of multiple and concomitant
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non-climate stresses—limited availability of drinking water,
constraints on land available to build on, and the high costs of
living—that will be exacerbated by climate impacts on many of
the Torres Strait Islands over the next generations.
It is likely that the confluence of existing economic and
social constraints with these additional climate impacts, in
particular extreme weather events, will create the most vulnerability for low-lying island communities in the medium to long
term. The lack of adaptive capacity and resources in these communities is likely to be one of the key factors in reducing their
resilience to future climate impacts. In developing resiliencebuilding activities, it is crucial that the socio-economic factors
that have caused existing disadvantages in these communities be
addressed. In the short term, built infrastructure such as roads,
houses, water and electricity services, airstrips, and public buildings will need to be planned with “climate-proofing” in mind. In
the longer term, new sources of money to pay for larger projects
will need to be found.
Other Pacific islands are already dealing with the vexing
issue of relocation by advancing long-term relocation strategies.86 Some Islanders may want institutional support to understand the ramifications of different alternative options including

how to provide longer term “climate proofing” as well as planning for relocation off low-lying islands. Due to the expense of
relocation and the impacts on culture in the entire Torres Strait
region that would result even if only a couple of communities
were to decide to relocate, significant forewarning is imperative
to reduce associated cultural, social, and economic damage.
There are a number of ways that Torres Strait Islanders
could exercise their legal rights to seek to address the impacts of
climate change. Although they are unlikely to be able to mitigate
projected impacts, they may serve as a potential source of additional funds either directly or indirectly. While any legal actions
will be long and difficult under current laws, it is imperative that
Governments at all levels begin to address and understand the
issues they are facing and urgently develop strategies to protect
Torres Strait Islanders’ rights and culture.
Thanks to Justine Conaty and Jemilah Hallinan who assisted
with the research and editing of the legal section of this article.
While much insight to the scientific aspects of this paper was
given by Lisa Alexander, John Church, Kathy McInnes, Neville
Nicholls, and Neil White, any interpretations are the responsibility of the authors.
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Is the Endangered Species Act the Right
Place to Set U.S. Climate Change Policy?
by Chris Logan*

T

he Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was enacted in
1973 to prevent extinction of species caused by human
impacts on natural ecosystems.1 On December 11, 2008,
the Bush Administration finalized a rule change to the ESA,
which relieves the Department of the Interior of a duty to assess
the impact of climate change on endangered species, and further
allows federal agencies to bypass consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) when determining whether federal actions might
threaten protected species.2
Prior to the eleventh-hour rule changes, the ESA arguably
allowed the consideration of climate change impacts during the
consultation process with FWS and NMFS scientists to assess
the potential threats to endangered species.3 Under the new rule,
which took effect on January 15, 2009, federal agency actions
no longer require scientific review if “the effects of such action
[on a species] are manifested through global processes” and “are
not capable of being measured or detected in a manner that permits meaningful evaluation.”4
The rule change has engendered fervent debate between
those who believe that the ESA should not determine U.S. climate change policy and those who believe that the rule changes
will further harm endangered species already threatened by
global warming. In April 2008, President Bush stated that the
ESA, the Clean Air Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act “were never meant to regulate global climate change.”5
Former Secretary of the Interior, Dick Kempthorne, echoed the
president’s sentiment after listing the polar bear as a threatened
species under the ESA, stating, “Listing the polar bear as threatened can reduce avoidable losses of polar bears. But it should
not open the door to use the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions . . . . The ESA is not the right tool to set U.S. climate
policy.” 6 The proponents of the change argue that investments
in wind and solar energy and clean coal technology, instead
of federal regulations, will foster greenhouse gas emissions
reduction.7
Supporters of the amended ESA emphasize that the new
rules are a narrow regulatory change which will provide clarity
and certainty to a broad and ambiguous issue.8 Further, they contend that the new regulations give FWS and NMFS scientists the
ability to focus their resources on evaluating projects that pose a
greater risk of harm to endangered species instead of attempting
to evaluate hard-to-measure threats such as climate change. In
December 2008, the Washington Post editorialized, “Where Mr.
Kempthorne got it right is in preventing the effects of ‘global
processes’ ([or] climate change) from triggering consultation
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‘because of the inability to separate out the effect of a specific
Federal action from a multitude of other factors that contribute
through global processes.’” 9 Proponents of the ESA rule-change
believe that the direct impact on endangered species by climate
change cannot be measured in a “meaningful” way that shows
that the federal agency actions are directly responsible for the
adverse effects on all species.
On the other side, Congress and environmental groups have
opposed the Bush Administration’s last minute amendments to
the ESA, seeing it as a last ditch attempt to reduce ESA protections for species threatened by global warming. Bob Irvin, the
Defenders of Wildlife Senior Vice President for Conservation
Programs, argues that the new rule “means that consideration of
the impacts of global warming is completely off limits,” calling
it a narrow definition that will affect all listed species and further
keep critical habitat from being protected from indirect effects
resulting from federal actions.10 Environmentalists are specifically concerned about the new rule’s impact on the polar bear
and other arctic species. Advocates construe the rule change as
an admission by the Bush Administration that “greenhouse gas
emissions are driving species like the polar bear to extinction.”11
Many environmental groups see this as a final attempt by the
Bush Administration to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions
are not regulated or reduced.
The Obama Administration may be able to appease both
sides of this debate. Passing a climate change statute to ensure
that greenhouse gas emissions are reduced and regulated could
eliminate the need to use the ESA as a vehicle for setting domestic climate change policy. Such a statute would provide the
reductions sought by environmentalists through another channel
thus allowing the ESA to continue protecting endangered species, as it has for over thirty years, safely distanced from the
heated politics of climate change.

Endnotes:
As this article went to press, the Obama Administration was considering
repealing the ESA rule change.
1

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2009).

2

Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, Final Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 402).
3

Endangered Species Act, supra note 1, § 1536.

Endnotes: Is the Endangered Species Act the Right Place to Set U.S.
Climate Change Policy? continued on page 70
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Case Study: Climate Change Adaptation Planning Guidance
for

Local Governments in the United States

by Edna Sussman *
Introduction
“A hundred years after we are gone and forgotten, those
who never heard of us will be living with the results of our
actions.” — Oliver Wendell Holmes, U.S. Supreme Court Justice (1841–1935)

T

hese words by Oliver Wendell Holmes, prophetic in light
of the current threat to our planet, speak to the urgency
of addressing climate change risks with both mitigation
and adaptation measures for the benefit of unborn generations.
An aggressive planning strategy designed with a broad scope to
meet the needs of this century is required. The United States has
a long tradition of long range national planning harking back
to the 1808 Gallatin Plan, which envisioned selling federal
lands to produce a society of independent farmers connected
to thriving cities by a federally financed system of roads and
canals (and later railroads) to form the United States’ productive society.1 This vision dominated the nineteenth century. One
hundred years later, in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt’s great conservation initiatives followed after the continent’s hasty development had laid waste to many of its natural resources. Theodore
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism established a new emphasis on
the common good in planning and launched an effort to protect
forests, restrain flooding, minimize soil erosion, build dams for
hydro power and irrigation, and create a navigable inland waterway system.2 His vision ultimately culminated in the New Deal
programs creating rural highways, dams, electrification, and the
national highway system, ultimately funded under President
Eisenhower.3
Another hundred years later, the 2008 centennial year came
and went without a new national vision of such broad scope. The
Obama Administration may forge a parallel and equally powerful
new national vision and implementation program, of which the
stimulus package enacted by Congress in February of 2009 may
play a significant part. However, faced with relative inaction at
the federal level and serious concerns about the dire impacts of
climate change, state, local, and municipal governments across
the country have embarked upon local planning efforts to address
the looming crisis without awaiting federal guidance and action.
The breadth of this local undertaking is exemplified by the commitment by over 900 U.S. mayors, who represent every state in
the union, to strive in their own communities to meet or beat
the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission reduction
target suggested for the United States—seven percent reduction
from 1990 levels by 2012.4
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This article will discuss concepts of adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in the context of these local initiatives.
After introducing the concepts, it will focus on the adaptation
initiative launched by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives—Local Governments for Sustainability
(“ICLEI”) and the implementation of that initiative by Keene,
New Hampshire, the first U.S. community to engage in and complete a comprehensive adaptation planning process. This article
will also provide an overview of the seminal guidebook for U.S.
communities planning for adaptation.5

Adaptation or Mitigation?
The principal focus of these local climate change initiatives
to date has been on mitigation, which is the reduction of GHGs
to avoid the most extreme projected climate change impacts.
Communities have been slow to address adaptation, however,
which focuses on building resiliency to the impacts of climate
change.6 This is largely due to the fear that turning to adaptation measures would divert resources from the essential need
to mitigate by reducing GHG emissions.7 However, as achievement of the requisite reduction in global GHGs remains elusive
and as the scientific certainty grows and provides ever more
cautionary predictions as to climate change impacts, communities are beginning to address adaptation along with mitigation.
Moreover, many communities have concluded that rather than
discouraging a commitment to mitigation, calling attention to
adaptation can actually inspire a greater commitment to mitigation as the specter of future consequences is highlighted.8
Despite local communities’ hesitancy to embrace adaptation
strategies, it has long been recognized as essential in countering
the impacts of climate change and has been part of global climate commitments since the inception of the worldwide effort.
For example, the 1992 United Nations Framework on Climate
Change (“UNFCC”), which the United States signed, included a
commitment to formulate and implement “measures to mitigate
climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions . . . of all
greenhouse gases . . . and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”9 Despite its early inclusion, adaptation
remained the stepsister to the discussions about mitigation at the
*Edna Sussman, esussman@SussmanADR.com, is an experienced arbitrator and
mediator and serves on the panels of many of the leading dispute resolution institutions as well as on court mediation panels. She has had extensive experience
related to climate change law and policy and was appointed by Mayor Bloomberg
to serve on the New York City Panel on Climate Change and by County Executive
Andy Spano to chair the Business Sector Committee of the Westchester County,
N.Y. Global Warming Task Force.
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ICLEI and Keene, New Hampshire
A leader in guiding communities in their climate change
efforts, ICLEI is working to foster adaptation planning. Founded
in 1990, ICLEI is a membership association of local governments committed to advancing climate protection and sustainable development and includes
nearly 1,000 cities world-wide,
more than 500 of which are in the
United States.14 In 2006, ICLEI
members unanimously resolved
to expand the organization’s climate protection campaign from
strictly climate change mitigation to also include climate
adaptation. Accordingly, ICLEI
launched its Climate Resilient
Communities (“CRC”) Program
to assist local governments in
enhancing community resiliency to the impacts and costs
associated with projected climate change.15
The framework for adaptation work established by ICLEI
is set forth in its adaptation milestones, a recommended series of
steps for adaptation planning. The milestones are:
1. Conduct a Climate Resiliency Study
2. Prioritize Areas for Action and Set Goals
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international climate change negotiations for many years. However, discussions as to how to address adaptation, particularly
with respect to assistance to developing countries, which are
likely to suffer the most severe damage, have become a central
and ongoing part of the Kyoto negotiations.10
It is critical that adaptation planning commence now, as
many of the measures necessary for adaptation require numerous years of planning and implementation and call for major
shifts by governments, businesses, and the population at large.11
Moreover, many of the required measures serve both mitigation and adaptation objectives. The co-benefits of both energy
and water mitigation/adaptation strategies are readily apparent. For example, energy efficiency measures both mitigate
GHGs by reducing energy demands and adapt by reducing the
increased demand for electricity caused by projected warmer
weather. Water conservation also mitigates by reducing energy
demand for the electricity generation utilized in water distribution and adapts by reducing demand for projected scarce water
resources.12 As another example, green roofs mitigate GHGs as
they reduce energy demand and adapt by addressing projected
increased flooding and severe storm events by absorbing more
water on site. In addition, many adaptation measures can be
implemented today at minimal additional expense during initial
construction when those same measures will cost considerably
more to retrofit in the future.13 This is an important factor which
should be considered in current decision making.

New England covered bridge.
3. Develop a Climate Resilient Action Plan
4. Implement the Plan
5. Monitor and Reevaluate16
Keene, New Hampshire was an early participant in developing a climate action plan and has committed to meeting a GHG
reduction goal of ten percent from 1990 levels by 2015. Keene
was invited to be the pilot community for ICLEI’s CRC program
and was the first ICLEI CRC community to complete Milestone
3 with the release of its adaptation plan.17 The town of Keene was
motivated to address adaptation as well as mitigation because
it had been subjected to more frequent and more severe flooding and had already seen changes in annual snowfall, infestation
of non-native plant and animal species, an increase in the total
number of high index heat days, and more numerous poor air
quality days.18 Tourism, a major
source of income in New Hampshire, relies on several sources—
snow cover, fall foliage, and cold
water fishing19—all of which
would be adversely impacted by
climate change. Health impact
concerns were also a motivating factor.20 Moreover, Keene
was developing a new comprehensive plan and a new capital
plan including stormwater and
road infrastructure. The adaptation plan was to be incorporated
into this planning process and
used to make land use decisions
to identify capital improvement
projects, and to establish funding
priorities.21
The effort, led and supported by the dedicated town planning staff, commenced with the creation of a CRC committee.
Over the course of eighteen months the CRC committee met
and began the process of identifying Keene’s vulnerabilities

It is critical that
adaptation planning
commence now, as
many of the measures
necessary for adaptation
require numerous
years of planning and
implementation.
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to climate change. The committee concluded that the vulnerabilities could best be grouped into three main categories, which
overlapped somewhat: (a) the built environment, which consists of man-made infrastructure such as buildings, transportation, and stormwater infrastructure; (b) the natural environment,
which consists of naturally occurring resources such as wetlands,
flora, and fauna; and (c) the social environment, which focuses
on areas that impact human life such as the economy and public health.22 The committee found that it had difficulty strictly
separating mitigation from adaptation measures and concluded
that the best approach was “to build adaptive capacity” with a
“strong mitigation component.”23
The vulnerabilities identified in Keene are illustrative of
the wide ranging impacts of climate change in all of the categories. For the built environment, not only were buildings
identified as being at risk from
flooding, but road flooding and
uneven freeze thaw cycles could
cause roads to buckle and bridges
to become vulnerable to failure.
These failures in the transportation infrastructure could leave
people stranded in the event of an
extreme weather event and make
delivery of emergency services
difficult, if not impossible. Flooding could compromise wastewater treatment plants, leading to
the possibility of health related
dangers. Energy systems could be
disrupted in severe storm events,
and with today’s reliance on cell
phones, may leave members in
the community without access to emergency notifications.24
For the natural environment, the committee identified a
number of areas that are vulnerable to the effects of climate
change.25 The committee found that wetlands are vulnerable to
damage from intense storm events and drought; the degradation
of wetlands would decrease the efficacy of these natural systems
to assist in stormwater filtration and flood control.26 Changes in
temperature threaten the sugar maple and other species. Invasive
species may drive out native plants causing dislocation of local
animal species.27 Moreover, the local food supply is threatened
by drought. Accordingly, the committee advised self-reliance
because other communities from which Keene imports much of
its food will be affected by climate change and unable to continue supply.28
For the social environment, the committee identified threats
to the local economy, public health, and emergency services.29
For instance, the threat to the sugar maple endangers the fall foliage that attracts so many tourist dollars and jeopardizes the source
of traditional maple syrup.30 The increase in winter temperatures
will reduce snowfall causing a reduction in the number of tourists who come to the state for skiing.31 In addition, several public

health concerns were identified resulting from: (a) the increased
number of poor air quality days; (b) the increased number of
excessively hot days causing heat stress; (c) the introduction of
new pests to the area bearing vector born diseases; and (d) flooding, which can impair potable water sources and leave stagnant
water that breeds bacteria laden runoff.32 Climate change could
also spike demands for various aspects of emergency services
and overwhelm available personnel, especially when routes are
blocked and communication systems compromised by extreme
weather events.33
After identifying vulnerabilities and goals and targets for
each vulnerability, the CRC committee used a set of criteria
to set priorities by examining: (a) the sectors impacted—local
business, environment, or community; (b) potential influence—
visibility and whether it supported existing initiatives; and
(c) investment—availability of
funding, the ease of implementation, the time sensitivity and
the cost effectiveness.34 The
Keene Adaptation Opportunities Goals and Targets, released
as part of the adaptation plan,
lists multiple opportunities for
adaptation for each category
and identifies specific goals and
action items designed to capture each “opportunity.”35
Since the completion of
its climate adaptation plan,
Keene has launched a broad
scale public visioning effort to
engage the community in the
development of its new comprehensive plan. The hope is that the comprehensive plan will be
informed by the work completed by the CRC committee. Examples of action items already in the process of being implemented
include the revision of the building code, the commencement of
a major water infrastructure project that will consider climate
change science in watershed modeling and the development of a
food coop by a community group which will help address food
security in the wake of a changing climate.36 Keene is well on its
way to beginning to meet the threat of climate change and foster
adaptation measures.

Energy efficiency
measures both mitigate
GHGs by reducing energy
demands and adapt by
reducing the increased
demand for electricity
caused by projected
warmer weather.
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Comprehensive Adaptation Guidance
King County, Washington, long a leader in climate change
mitigation and adaptation activities, spearheaded a project in
association with ICLEI and released Preparing for Climate
Change: Guidebook for Local Regional and State Governments (“The Guidebook”), a comprehensive guidebook to assist
communities in planning for adaptation.37 The Guidebook is
intended to provide a road map that will enable communities to
tailor their adaptation plans to their unique circumstances as the
impacts of climate change vary from locale to locale. It is at the
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

local level that climate change impacts will be felt and at which
they can be best understood. The Guidebook sets out a series of
steps consistent with the ICLEI adaptation milestones and offers
practical advice to maximize success in implementation.
The Guidebook identifies and offers advice on how to overcome the most common barriers to action on adaptation. Those
who have attempted to launch an adaptation initiative will recognize many of these objections:
• “I don’t know how climate change will affect my com
munity.”
• “Climate change action should happen at higher levels of
government.”
• “I’ll deal with climate change when I see that it is hap
pening.”
• “My community wants to focus only on reducing greenhouse gases.”
• “I’ll deal with climate change when you can tell me exactly
what I need to plan for.”
• “I’ll wait until I see other communities planning for climate
change.”
• “I don’t have time or money to deal with climate change
right now.”
• “I don’t have the resources or political support to act.”
• “Our operations are based on historical statistics, not future
modeling.”38
The Guidebook further provides a detailed step-by-step
review of the recommended process for adaptation planning:
• Scope the Climate Change Impacts to Your Major Sectors: This step calls for collecting information about
how climate is expected to
change in the region with
attention to such factors as
temperature, precipitation,
storm events, and seasonal
changes, including a range
of possible scenarios and
an analysis of the degree of
confidence for each prediction. This effort culminates
in a decision as to whether
impacts are significant
enough to begin preparing
for climate change.39
• Build and Maintain Support to Prepare for Climate
Change: This step recognizes the importance of outreach in
building and supporting the planning effort and the central
role of recruiting committed individuals who can also play
an important role in implementation after the plan is developed. It is recommended that a “champion” in government
committed to the process be identified and that the involvement of the public sector, the private sector, non-profit
organizations, and the media be sought and a preparedness
message developed.40

• Build Your Climate Change Preparedness Team: This step
recognizes the need to coordinate activities across departments and sectors and calls for identifying leaders and a
working team to spearhead the effort.41
• Identify Your Planning Areas and Sectors Relevant to Climate Change: This step calls for developing an inventory
of planning areas associated with built, natural and human,
systems that are of significance to the community. These
could include water supply, wastewater treatment, land use
planning, energy supply, public health, roads and bridges,
forestry, agriculture, biodiversity, recreation, business, and
emergency response.42
• Conduct a Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment: With
this step the process of analyzing the sensitivity of each
planning area or system to climate change begins with a
determination of how significant the impact of climate
change will be on each. The analysis includes, with respect
to each planning area or system, an evaluation of the adaptive capacity, the ability to accommodate changes in climate
with minimum disruption or minimum additional cost. This
step concludes with an assessment of vulnerability, which
combines the sensitivity and adaptability findings. Areas
that are sensitive to climate change but less able to adapt are
considered vulnerable.43
• Conduct a Climate Change Risk Assessment: With this step
a traditional risk assessment analysis is performed to prioritize action steps. Using the vulnerability assessment results,
an analysis is conducted of the consequence of a climate
impact (such as the cost of a sea
level rise). This is multiplied by
the probability or likelihood that
the projected impact will occur.
As new data becomes available,
the risk assessment may change
over time, calling for a periodic
reassessment.44
• Set Preparedness Goals and
Develop Your Preparedness
Plan: This step calls for establishing a vision for a climate
resilient community and guiding principles that will inform
the process of setting preparedness goals in the priority planning areas. This step includes
increasing public awareness,
increasing technical capacity to prepare for climate impacts,
developing systematic ways to include climate change
considerations in planning decisions, increasing adaptive
capacity, and strengthening community partnerships. Goals
are set, recognizing that regular reevaluations will be necessary, and action steps are established and prioritized.45
• Implement Your Preparedness Plan: Many action steps
can be implemented through existing tools such as zoning
regulations, building codes, public safety rules, taxes, and

Tourism, a major source
of income in
New Hampshire, relies on
several sources all
of which would be
adversely impacted by
climate change.
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tax incentives, as well as permitting, infrastructure development, emergency management powers, and education.
Other new tools for implementation are to be explored.46
• Measure Your Progress and Update Your Plan: The development of new resiliency measures is recommended to be
used to assess progress. The results of these assessments
and new information is to be used to modify assumptions
and update the plan. Results should be shared in an open
and transparent manner.47
The Guidebook includes numerous checklists and charts,
examples from communities around the world, and extensive resources. It is an indispensable tool for planning for
adaptation.

Conclusion
As the years left to accomplish the level of GHG mitigation
the scientists advise is necessary slip away without a clear path
to achieving the requisite targets and as actual conditions indicate climate changes even more rapid and of greater magnitude
than predicted, adaptation efforts will become an increasingly
central aspect of planning.48 While there are gaps in the data
available to individual communities which impede more precise
adaptation planning, communities are nonetheless beginning to
consider adaptation measures in their planning decisions. Such
progress on adaptation is both essential if communities are to be
protected from harm and smart government as adaptation measures provide opportunities for job creation and foster energy
security for the United States.
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What Happens in Vegas. . . Needs Legislative
Backup by Ursula Kazarian*

T

he U.S. Southwest currently faces a water crisis that
experts have projected will only get worse, due to
regional effects of climate change.1 Nevada, the state
with the fewest guaranteed water rights to the Colorado River,2
has experienced unprecedented population growth in Las Vegas
amidst an equally unprecedented economic boom over the past
few decades.3 While its economy may currently be languishing,4
population forecasts still project a significant increase in demand
in the next several decades,5 even as water sources are projected
to diminish and even disappear.6 This article examines the current legislative and policy responses to climate change projections in the state of Nevada, and particularly the Las Vegas
metropolitan area, concluding that such responses are in urgent
need of development and expansion.
Federal climate change legislation has been introduced in
previous years, but none has passed.7 State legislative action in
the region to address the potential looming crisis has been slow
to form.8 Unlike California, Arizona and Nevada, the two other
Lower Basin states that share the same portion of Colorado River
water resources with California, have not adopted their own climate change plans. Arizona, however, has published a Climate
Action Plan9 and has launched the Southwestern Climate Initiative together with New Mexico.10 In contrast, Nevada’s Climate
Action Committee only just published its report to Governor Jim
Gibbons in 2008, recommending in part that a state action plan
be drafted.11
Additionally, California and Arizona are active members of
the Western Climate Initiative, a group of U.S. governors and
Canadian premiers “created to identify, evaluate, and implement
. . . ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” while Nevada
is merely an observer state.12 Nevada’s Governor has, however,
taken a more active role as a participating member of the Western
Governors’ Association (“WGA”), which has declared its intention to combat climate change by increasing energy efficiency
and developing cleaner energy sources.13 WGA’s effectiveness
will be measured by its ability to translate policy positions to
implementation strategies.
Fortunately, basic Nevada legislation does exist upon which
more extensive climate change legislation could be built, including statutes encouraging renewable energy technologies as well
as regulating a greenhouse gas registry to counter air pollution.14
In addition, Nevada has more traditional statutes outlining the
state’s responsibility in governing natural resources, including
water planning. However, no overarching legislative framework
currently exists that incorporates these various interests with
climate change issues. Such a broad framework would be an
immensely useful tool to address the various causes and effects
of climate change.
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While Nevada develops the legislative capacity to govern
water planning in a projected climate of extreme drought, the
Southern Nevada Water Authority (“SNWA”) has taken an
aggressive and proactive stance on finding new sources of water
to satiate the needs of the Las Vegas metropolitan area. In 2008,
SNWA chief Patricia Mulroy cited climate change impacts
and lowered Colorado River water levels as impediments to a
previously-considered system of water transfers employing
desalination plants in California.15 One year later, Mulroy has
proposed an even more extreme concept: to pipe floodwaters in
to Nevada from the Mississippi River.16 The Mississippi proposal is in addition to another multimillion dollar project SNWA
is currently studying to pipe water from rural Eastern Nevada to
Las Vegas, which has drawn much criticism from ecologists and
rural ranchers.17 The audacity of these ideas conveys the exigency of the situation and the seriousness with which officials
are addressing future water supply. It will be interesting to see
if such massive water pipeline proposals will be implemented
in the future; and, if not, what long-term solutions will feed the
growing water needs in Las Vegas and the rest of the Southwest.
The Nevada state government and water managers clearly
realize the severity of projected climate change impacts on the
local water supply. Plans for a network of water pipelines are
currently underway to provide a solution to what could be an
extreme water shortage for Las Vegas as well as the entire U.S.
Southwest region. However, without a comprehensive legal and
policy framework, such piecemeal projects will not address the
implications of climate change. Such a framework is needed to
ensure compliance with any future federal climate change legislation, and further would ensure efficient policy planning by linking the causes of global warming with responses to the effects
of localized climate change. In a time of increasing uncertainty
regarding future water supply exacerbated by climate change,
Nevada cannot afford a timid response to local and regional
climate projections. Only time will tell whether Las Vegas and
other cities in the Southwest will effectively address these issues
before the water supply runs out.

Endnotes:
1

Lake Mead, Key Water Source for Southwestern US, Could Be Dry By
2021, ScienceDaily, Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/02/080212141424.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).

Endnotes: What Happens in Vegas . . . Needs Legislative Backup
continued on page 71
*Ursula Kazarian is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law.

36

Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change:
Landmark Cases from Australia
by Jacqueline Peel* & Lee Godden**
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Introduction

ith all attention fixed on the post-Kyoto negotiations
for new greenhouse emissions targets it can be easy
to overlook actions in the area of climate change
adaptation. Indeed, adaptation is often regarded by environmentalists as an excuse for inaction on climate change that could
exacerbate adverse environmental impacts.1 While leading
scientific bodies, like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”), agree on the
urgent need for intervention to
slow emissions in order to avoid
“dangerous climate change,”
research also confirms that some
degree of climate change is inescapable.2 Working alongside
mitigation efforts, measures to
adapt to the resulting environmental modifications are thus
“both urgent and imperative.”3
Within many countries the
momentum to adapt to climate
change is growing. Australia
is a prominent example in this
regard, with the importance of adaptation efforts heightened by
scientific reports predicting severe impacts on Australia’s many
coastal cities with sea level rise.4 This article reviews two recent,
landmark cases in Australia which show how the courts have
supported adaptation to climate change through their interpretation of planning laws. These cases also reveal the scope for the
international principles of sustainable development to be translated into legal measures that seek to better prepare coastal communities for the advent of climate change and its environmental
impacts.

that “[s]ea level rise under warming is inevitable” and will “continue for many centuries after [greenhouse] concentrations have
stabilized.”7
Countries and regions with significant stretches of coastline
and low-lying lands—such as Australia, the river delta areas of
Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, as well as many
parts of the United States—are
very vulnerable to the effects
of climate change-induced sea
level rise. 8 Although future
warming and its likely effects
may be reduced if an effective agreement on deep emissions cuts emerges from the
current post-Kyoto negotiation
process,9 it is becoming increasingly clear that climate change
impacts cannot be entirely prevented. In this context, climate
change mitigation, in the sense
of “implementing policies to
reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions and enhance sinks,” will
not be sufficient to avert serious
environmental damage. Instead
there is a need for adaptation “initiatives and measures to reduce
the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or
expected climate change effects.”10
The potential for residential and other coastal development
to be adversely affected by climate change has important ramifications for the associated responsibilities of planning authorities,
which act as “the stewards of the coast.”11 In Australia, planning
is primarily the responsibility of state governments pursuant to
state planning laws and policies, although decision-making on
approvals for individual projects is generally delegated to local
governments.12 State governments may become directly involved

The impact of climate
change is discernible
already: Australia has
experienced major
droughts, extreme water
shortages, and faces
widespread
biodiversity loss.

The Adaptation Imperative
Australia, like the continental United States, occupies a
vast area of territory covered by a diverse range of ecological
systems. To some extent, the impact of climate change on this
environment is discernible already: Australia has experienced
major droughts, extreme water shortages, and faces widespread
biodiversity loss.5 In the future, additional threats are likely to be
posed to coastal cities and towns that face problems of erosion,
ocean surge, increased storm severity, and flooding if sea levels rise significantly.6 In its latest assessment, the IPCC advises
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in the environmental assessment and approval of development
proposals, as may the federal government in the case of major
projects (e.g. a large-scale coastal residential development)13
and/or ones with a likelihood of significant environmental
impact.14 State governments also
have responsibility for coastal
management and planning under
various pieces of legislation.15
Over the longer-term, if
planning authorities in coastal
regions ignore the imperative of
adapting to climate change they
may face the risk of civil liability
for developments approved without adequate regard for future
impacts like flooding or land erosion.16 One leading Australian
commentator describes the threat
of litigation against local governments in such circumstances as
“increasingly more real.”17 Indeed, local governments may be
particularly vulnerable to litigation brought by property owners affected by climate change as these bodies will generally be
easier to identify and link to the harm suffered than the entities
whose pollution contributed to particular impacts.18 In light of
this, “the only sensible strategy for local governments is to start
incorporating climate change considerations into a wide range of
their decisions and activities.”19

For instance, the Redland Shire Council operating on the
northeast coast of Australia in the State of Queensland has
included a provision in its Strategic Plan that makes the “consideration of sea level changes which may result from changes in
climatic conditions” a relevant
decision-making factor for proposed urban development.23
On this basis, the Council has
imposed conditions on new
developments restricting the
areas of land that can be built on
to those above a one in one hundred year flood level.24 Similar
development control provisions
are appearing in some areas of
the United States. An example
is the Coastal Sand Dune Rules
issued under the Maine Natural
Resources Protection Act, which require an anticipated sea level
rise of two feet in the next one hundred years to be considered in
determining size, density, and location restrictions for proposed
development.25 Some planning authorities have contemplated
more drastic measures to adapt to climate change-induced sea
level rise such as instituting a policy of planned retreat where
human settlements are relocated away from the coastline.26
Bryon Shire Council on the central eastern coast of Australia is
one such local government that is implementing a policy of this
kind with mixed results.27
Unsurprisingly, local adaptation measures that restrict
development in the coastal zone have not gone unchallenged. In
Australia, this has resulted in a number of cases coming before
planning and environmental tribunals and courts.28 These cases
have necessitated judicial consideration (at varying levels of
detail) of the risks of sea level rise with climate change and the
legal scope for adaptation measures to respond to such risks.
The decisions contribute to a growing body of climate change
jurisprudence in Australia dealing with the permissible nature of
global warming mitigation and adaptation strategies taken at the
local, state, or national level.29

Climate change
adaptation is a topic
naturally suited to
consideration at a more
local level.

Climate Change Adaptation and
Planning Law
Compared with greenhouse emissions mitigation that tends
to be a focus of national and international regulation, climate
change adaptation is a topic naturally suited to consideration at a
more local level. For a start, the benefits of adaptation measures
tend to be quite localized (e.g. construction of a sea wall or levee
to reduce coastal erosion at a given beach with rising sea levels). In addition, high levels of variability in the manifestation of
impacts across different areas, even within the same country or
region, militate in favor of tailored, local responses. As a consequence, local and state governments have been at the forefront
of climate change adaptation in Australia,20 as well as in other
jurisdictions.21 In turn, local decision-making and policy development with respect to climate change adaptation are beginning
to generate institutional and organizational change outside the
government sector amongst development agencies, property
developers, financiers, and insurers.
At the level of local government in Australia, many municipal councils around the country have introduced, or are in the
process of formulating, planning measures and development
conditions designed to ensure adaptation to climate change
impacts. These planning measures target a range of potential
impacts, from rising sea levels and increased coastal erosion,
to a greater frequency of cyclones and bushfires.22 Such measures may limit, quite substantially in some cases, the capacity
of property owners to develop their land as they wish.
Winter 2009

Climate Change Adaptation Litigation
Two recent landmark decisions of Australian courts illustrate the way in which litigation through the planning system
is shaping actions to respond to the challenge of impending climate change. The two cases originated in different coastal areas
of Australia: the New South Wales south coast (the Walker case)
and the low-lying South Gippsland coast in the State of Victoria (the Gippsland Coastal Board case). Consequently, different
local government and state laws were applicable in each case.
Yet, an interesting link between the decisions is their shared
reliance on the principles of sustainable development to interpret planning laws in a way that supports the implementation of
adaptation measures.
In Australia, the internationally-derived concept of sustainable development (known as ecologically sustainable
38

development or “ESD”) is a central policy goal of planning and
environmental law requiring the integration of environmental
considerations into development-related decision-making.30
It is embodied in the objectives of multiple statutes spanning
all Australian jurisdictions.31 ESD is generally underpinned in
such legislation by a series of environmental principles whose
function is to guide the development of specific environmental
rules and to provide a framework for making individual decisions that balance environmental and development considerations. Important principles of ESD in Australia (that mirror
international sustainable development principles)32 include the
principle of inter-generational equity (requiring regard to be had
to the environmental needs and interests of future generations)
and the precautionary principle (advising caution in the face of
scientific uncertainty over potential environmental impacts).33
ESD and its principles thus provide a common framework for
environmental law and decision-making in Australia, superimposed over the requirements of specific, local legal and policy
requirements.

Walker Case
The Walker case was a judicial review action in which a
challenge was brought to approval of a concept plan for a residential subdivision and retirement village. 34 The proposed
development was located at Sandon Point, near Wollongong
on the coast just south of Sydney.35 The Sandon Point proposal
attracted strong public opposition on the basis of its potential
environmental impacts, including effects on three watercourses
crossing the site that were prone to flooding.36
Approval powers for the development had been transferred
from the local authority to the New South Wales Planning Minister under state legislation following the designation of the
proposal as a “major infrastructure project.”37 The relevant legislation was the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (“EPA Act”), which under Part 3A, makes special provision for the assessment of projects designated as major infrastructure. Pursuant to Part 3A of the EPA Act, in approving the
concept plan the Minister was obliged to take into account an
environmental assessment prepared by his department. In turn
this assessment was required to identify any relevant aspect of
“the public interest,”38 a category which has been judicially
interpreted to encompass the principles of ESD such as intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle.39 Accordingly, one of the principal grounds for review in the Walker case
was that the Planning Minister had failed to take into account
principles of ESD in making his decision.40 The factual basis for
this claim was the absence of any consideration by the Minister
or his department of the potential for the flooding risk on the
Sandon Point site to be exacerbated by climate change.41
Justice Biscoe of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court began by considering whether, under Part 3A of the
EPA Act, ESD principles were a mandatory consideration in
decision-making and, if so, whether the Minister was bound to
consider the relevance of climate change flood risk to the development.42 The answers to these questions turned on construction
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of the subject matter, scope, and purpose of the EPA Act. The
court noted that the objects of the Act included the encouragement of ESD as well as protection of the environment, “defined
broadly and non-exhaustively in s[ection] 4(1) to include ‘all
aspects of the surroundings of humans, whether affecting any
human as an individual or in his or her social groupings.’”43
Moreover, Justice Biscoe held:
There may be found in the subject matter, scope and
purpose of this legislative scheme, as with nearly every
statute conferring power to make an administrative
decision, an implication that the decision is to be made
on the basis of the most current material available to
the decision-maker which has a direct bearing on the
justice of the decision . . . . So too, in my opinion, with
the deadly serious issue of climate change, which has
loomed ever larger in the public and political eye for
years.44
In the context of the project at issue, the court found that
climate change flood risk could be described as “an aspect of
the public interest that potentially has a direct bearing on the
justice of the decision.”45 In Justice Biscoe’s view, therefore,
climate change flood risk was appropriately designated as a necessary consideration for environmental assessment of a floodconstrained, coastal plan development like that under review.
Flowing from the objective of encouraging ESD in the objects of
the EPA Act, the consideration of climate change flood risk thus
became a relevant, mandatory consideration for the Minister in
deciding whether to approve the concept plan. His failure to do
so rendered that approval void and of no effect.46
The importance of the Walker decision in the context of the
adaptation imperative for climate change is twofold. First, the
case illustrates how general principles of environmental law,
such as principles of (ecologically) sustainable development,
can be employed as a framework for importing specific considerations pertinent to climate change risks into decision-making.
The court’s reliance on ESD principles—rather than particular
legislative or policy directives—as a basis for finding climate
change flood risk to be a mandatory consideration in the case
may have far-reaching ramifications “for all kinds of economic
activities.”47 The reasoning employed in the Walker judgment
may be applicable to many types of development potentially
impacted by climate change. This might include developments
that are affected by increased drought risk, decreased snowfall,
coral bleaching, or coastal erosion.
The second major contribution made by the case is the way
it highlights how local development assessment and approvals must increasingly be made in terms of a holistic and global
context that includes global warming risks. As Justice Briscoe
stated:
Climate change presents a risk to the survival of the
human race and other species. Consequently, it is a
deadly serious issue. It has been increasingly under
public scrutiny for some years. No doubt that is because
of global scientific support for the existence and risks
of climate change and its anthropogenic causes.48
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Such judicial statements point to an acceptance of a global
scale for risk assessment when it comes to considering the potential impacts of climate change, even though the focus remains on
local measures for adaptation. This view is precipitating a change
in thinking on the part of developers and planning authorities
in coastal regions. For instance, following the Walker decision,
one Australian law firm advised that in relation to future project
applications:
[I]t is recommended that proponents and councils make
an assumption that there is the potential for greater
flooding or inundation than is presently the case (i.e.
due to climate change), and that proponents should consider whether any mitigation measures can be designed
to alleviate any future flooding impacts.49

Gippsland Coastal Board Case
The wide-ranging consequences of the Walker case were
echoed in another Australian climate change flooding case
decided in 2008, although in this instance it was sea level rise
rather than extreme weather events that were the cause for concern. The Gippsland Coastal Board case50 has been regarded as
a watershed decision in relation to
coastal development adaptation
and climate change. In its decision,
which was based on a reappraisal
of all the relevant scientific and
planning evidence,51 the Victorian
Civil and Administrative Tribunal determined to refuse consent
for residential developments in a
low-lying coastal region.52
The local South Gippsland
Shire Council had previously
approved permits for six residential developments in the Grip
Road area of Toora, an area
zoned for agricultural and mixed land uses.53 The grant of permits was opposed by the Gippsland Coastal Board, a regional
coastal board set up under the Victorian Coastal Management
Act 1995.54 In its application to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for merits review of the approvals, one of the
principal objections raised by the Gippsland Coastal Board was
that the proposed dwelling developments were inappropriate in
light of projected sea level rises as a result of climate change.55
In elaborating this argument, the Board relied on preliminary
studies of potential sea level rise and wind surge undertaken by
Australia’s premier scientific research organization, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.56
The Tribunal ultimately determined to refuse approvals for
the proposed development based on inconsistency with zoning
and planning controls.57 Importantly also, the Tribunal applied
the precautionary principle as a component of ESD to find that
development consent should not be granted in view of the likelihood of inundation of the land and proposed dwellings, due to
sea level rise induced by climate change.58

In the circumstances of the Gippsland Coastal Board decision, there were no specific provisions in the relevant planning
laws mandating either consideration of the precautionary principle or the potential for sea level rise. However, the Tribunal
noted the general scientific consensus “that some level of climate change will result in extreme weather conditions beyond
the historical record that planners and others rely on in assessing
future potential impacts.”59 According to the Tribunal there thus
existed “a reasonably foreseeable risk of inundation” to the land
and proposed dwellings that was judged to be unacceptable.60
This threat was considered an adequate basis for invocation
of the precautionary principle notwithstanding the Tribunal’s
acceptance that there was a degree of scientific uncertainty as to
the level of projected sea rise on the Gippsland coast. Indeed, the
Tribunal endorsed a precautionary approach on the issue of climate change adaptation while clearly acknowledging that “[t]he
range of impacts may well be beyond the predictive capability
of current assessment techniques.”61 The Tribunal also emphasized that for effective risk assessment, it was not acceptable to
rely upon historical data and previous flood model predictions in
assessing future climate change induced risks.62
Like the Walker case before it, the Gippsland Coastal
Board decision illustrates the
broad potential for ESD concepts to be relied upon in fashioning planning approaches for
climate change adaptation. In
particular, adoption of a precautionary approach to evaluating the effects of potential sea
level rise signals an important
development where the limits
of existing risk assessment and
predictive capability are clearly
acknowledged.63 The Tribunal’s reasoning suggests that the necessity for precautionary
action in coastal planning and decision-making flows from the
general scientific consensus regarding the likelihood of inundation from rising seas as this risk is now one which is “reasonably
foreseeable.” In this regard, one consequence of the Gippsland
Coastal Board decision may be the routine inclusion of climate
change considerations via the importation of ESD principles in
decision-making and merits review under planning and environment legislation across relevant Australian jurisdictions.

There is also the specter
of litigation facing
those governmental
authorities that act
without regard to future
climate change risks.
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Conclusion
Cases like the Walker and Gippsland Coastal Board decisions are still few and far between and the imperative for climate
change adaptation planning and development has certainly not
been accepted by all governments and planning authorities in
Australia. Clear tensions remain between pressures for development approval in coastal regions and the need to adapt to climate
change impacts through state and local planning regimes. Nevertheless, the currency of global warming issues and the firming
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of scientific data on future impacts are encouraging many local
governments and coastal planning authorities in Australia and
elsewhere in the world to give serious thought to planning for and
implementing precautionary measures to respond to expected
effects like sea level rise and inundation. As climate change
considerations come to be seen as relevant, if not essential, to
environmental assessment processes, there is also the specter of
litigation facing those governmental authorities that act without
regard to future climate change risks.64
The emerging trend evidenced in the Australian cases of
Walker and Gippsland Coastal Board to consider climate change
risks within the broader ambit of sustainable development could
also have far-reaching significance. In Australia, as in many
other jurisdictions, the policy and principles of sustainable
development play an overarching, strategic role in planning and
environmental laws. The Australian cases illustrate how general
concepts of sustainability can be translated into specific requirements for planning and decision-making in areas at risk from
the effects of climate change. The precautionary principle, in

particular, appears well-suited as a basis for measures to ensure
coastal development adapts to climate change over the longerterm, at least in circumstances where there is clear supporting
scientific evidence at the general level of climate change risks
such as flooding or sea level rise.65 Therefore, despite the wellacknowledged limitations of sustainable development as a guiding objective for environmental law,66 it seems the concept may
progressively be given real purchase in a practical way through
its implementation in the evolving climate law jurisprudence.
The Australian cases on adaptation also illustrate the multiple scales relevant for actions to address climate change. Both
the Walker case and the Gippsland Coastal Board case see climate change as a global problem but one that poses risks at the
local as well as the global level. Although the focus of countries
and many in the environmental community will remain (rightly)
on preventing dangerous global warming, the law is also beginning to embrace a role for local adaptation measures to prepare
for climate change effects. This gives new meaning to the old
environmental adage “think globally, act locally.”

Endnotes: P lanning for Adaptation to Climate Change
Reference note: All Australian cases are available at http://www.austlii.edu.au.
1

See Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a
Warmer World, 34 Ecology L. Q. 61, 64 (2007).
2

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change
2007 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policy-makers 19-20 (2007).
3

See Janet McDonald, The Adaptation Imperative: Managing the Legal
Risks of Climate Change Impacts, in Climate Law in Austl. 124, 124 (Tim
Bonyhady & Peter Christoff eds., 2007); see also Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to
Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 23 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1 (2007).
4

See, e.g., B.L. Preston & R.N. Jones, Commonwealth Scientific & Indus.
Research Org., Climate Change Impacts on Austl. and the Benefits of Early
Action to Reduce Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions 22 (2006), available at
http://csiro.au/files/files/p6fy.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
5

See generally R.J.S. Beeton et al. (2006 Austl. State of the Env’t.
Comm.), Austl. State of the Env’t 2006, available at http://www.environment.
gov.au/soe/2006/publications/report/index.html.
6

See Zinn, supra note 1, at 67-81 (noting that similar problems face coastal
regions in the United States).
7

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 2, at 20.

8

See generally Kelley M. Jancaitis, Florida on the Coast of Climate Change:
Responding to Rising Seas 31 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 157 (noting that
Florida is a case in point in the United States).
9

Australian Gov’t, Dep’t of Climate Change, White Paper on Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme: Austl.’s Low Pollution Future 21 (2008),
available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/whitepaper/foreword.html (finding the Australian government is pessimistic on the prospects for international
negotiations to achieve a comprehensive global agreement to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at safe levels).
10

See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment
Report, Working Group III Report, Annex I (Aviel Verbruggen ed., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-annex1.pdf (outlining the definitions of mitigation and adaptation as drawn from
the work of the IPCC).

11

See Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level
Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access along the California Coast, 34
Ecology L. Q. 533, 535 (2007).
12

Australian local governments are similar to municipal governments in the
United States. They are not mentioned in the Australian Constitution but are
established and given powers pursuant to state laws.
13

See, e.g., Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, No. 203, pt.
3A (N.S.W.) [hereinafter EPA] available at http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/
viewtop/inforce/act+203+1979+FIRST+0+N; see also Environmental Effects
Act, 1978, No. 9135 (Vict.), available at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/
(select “Victorian Law Today” hyperlink, select “acts” and click E, scroll down
to Environmental Effects Act of 1978).
14

See, e.g., Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999
(Austl.), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/index.html (providing that federal involvement is limited to projects with likely significant impacts
on designated “matters of national environmental significance,” e.g. endangered
species or World Heritage properties).
15

See, e.g., Coastal Management Act, 1995 (Vict.) (establishing regional
coastal boards, such as the Gippsland Coastal Board, discussed in the case note
below).
16

See McDonald, supra note 3, at 134.

17

See Philippa England, Heating Up: Climate Change Law and the Evolving
Responsibilities of Local Government, 13 Loc. Gov’t L. J. 209, 210 (2008).
18

See McDonald, supra note 3, at 134.

19

England, supra note 17, at 210.

20

See, e.g., Australian Gov’t, Dep’t of the Env’t, Cities for Climate Protection
(“CCP”) Austl., available at http://www.environment.gov.au/settlements/local/
ccp/ (noting local governments played a prominent role in the CCP Australia
program, part of the ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability: http://www.
iclei.org).

Endnotes: Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change
continued on page 71

41

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Dirty Fuel Incentives in the Bailout Bill
By Rand Robins & Janet M. Hager*

T

he current dependence on oil in the United States cannot
be supported in the future. The issue is how the United
States will confront the growing problem of meeting its
need for transportation fuel. One option is to develop unconventional fossil fuels derived from oil sands, oil shale, and liquid coal. However, this is an option that could come at a great
cost to the environment. The question facing Congress and the
American people is whether, and to what extent, the government should subsidize these environmentally devastating energy
sources with tax incentives, direct financing, loan guarantees, or
purchasing agreements.
The rate of consumption of oil in the United States is unsustainable.1 The world uses twelve billion more barrels of oil each
year than is discovered.2 Yet, the United States is expected to
continue to increase its consumption of oil by forty-four percent by the year 2025.3 Thus, there will not be enough supply
to match the world’s demands for oil.4 Furthermore, the United
States consumes eleven percent of the world’s production of
oil, but only has three percent of the world’s oil reserves.5 This
dependence on foreign oil threatens the country’s economy and
national security.6 It is estimated that the oil dependence results
in a penalty to the economy of $297 to $305 billion each year, so
the threat to the economy is great.7 The threat to national security is also substantial, considering that much of the oil that is
imported into the United States comes from hostile areas of the
world.8
Because of these widespread problems with oil, it is not
surprising that the United States is looking for new solutions.
However, a transition to unconventional fossil fuels will only
exacerbate the devastating problem of climate change. The
threat to the global environment as a result of the continuing
widespread use of fossil fuels is great.9 The global increase
in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is primarily the result of
the increase in the use of fossil fuels like oil, and potentially
these new unconventional fuels.10 The effect of the increase of
greenhouse gases from fossil fuels has already been felt.11 The
sea level is rising, glaciers are decreasing, and extreme weather
events have become more frequent.12 It is expected that the surface temperature will increase by 3.2 to 7.2°F beyond levels in
the 1990s by the end of the century.13 The United States must
decrease, not increase, its use of fossil fuels if it is to combat the
growing problem of climate change.14
There is evidence that unconventional fossil fuels will not
just maintain the status quo, but will actually increase the rate
of emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States.15 The
two most viable unconventional fossil fuels are synthetic crude
oil derived from oil sand (“SCO”) and fuel made from coal liquefaction (“CTL”).16 The production of these fuels emits more
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greenhouse gases than conventional oil.17 The use of SCO emits
twenty percent more carbon dioxide than lighter crude oils.18
The use of CTL would result in twice the emissions of conventional fuel.19 Additionally, mining for oil sand is similar to
mining coal; these operations will require the addition of roads,
pipelines, and other infrastructure, and will displace plant and
animal life.20
Despite the questionable nature of these unconventional
fuels, Congress has still taken steps to promote them. The tax
code has been modified by the recent financial bailout bill,
enacted in October of 2008, to subsidize CTL in three ways.
First, the code reduces the cost of constructing expensive CTL
plants by providing tax credits for capital investment.21 Second,
the code reduces the cost of operating dirty fuel facilities by providing tax deductions for the operating costs of oil shale and tar
sands refineries.22 Third, the code reduces the risk that falling oil
prices will suffocate the market for non-traditional transportation
fuels by applying the alternative fuel credit (originally intended
for ethanol production facilities) to coal-based facilities.23
Although advocates for these unconventional fossil fuels
promise energy independence, economic development, and
improving environmental impacts, there is scant evidence
to determine the likelihood of success on any of these prom
ises.24 Moving forward with commercialization of any of these
unconventional fossil fuels will lock the United States into more
dependence on carbon-based transportation fuel at a time when
the nation should be focusing on clean forms of energy.25 Lawmakers presented with this energy legislation in the recent bailout bill found themselves between a rock and a hard place: to
vote for a bill with broad public backing that also gives support to dirty fuels, or to risk their political position by voting
against the legislation.26 In the end, lawmakers chose to support
the bill, despite its shortcomings in energy policy.27 In future
legislation Congress should focus its efforts on deploying clean
fuels, clean vehicles, and sustainable patterns of growth, rather
than subsidizing fuels that contribute to global environmental
problems.
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European Union Coherence in UNFCCC
Negotiations Under the New Treaty of Lisbon
(Reform Treaty)
by Stavros Afionis*

T

Introduction

he historic December 2008 European Council meeting in
Brussels resulted inter alia in the endorsement by European Union (“EU”) leaders of a plan to revive the Lisbon Treaty, following the treaty’s rejection by the Irish people
in June 2008. Both the 2005 European Constitution and its successor, the 2007 Lisbon or Reform Treaty,1 are aimed at improving lingering shortcomings in the
institutional operation of the EU
in a number of policy fields.2 To
this end, the EU’s Member States
had decided inter alia to appoint
a full-time European Council
President,3 promote a clearer and
fairer voting system in the Council of Ministers,4 create a more
powerful EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and,5
finally, introduce majority voting
on a number of internal security
policy areas.6
This article focuses exclusively on the extent to which this
new amending treaty will have
an improving effect on the EU’s
performance when negotiating
in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Authors have been unanimous
in identifying the rotating Presidency system, the predominance
of environment ministries in climate change negotiations, and
the complexity of internal EU coordination, as being the three
main causes undermining the negotiating performance of the
EU in international climate talks. Following an analysis of the
climate-related changes instituted by the Reform Treaty, this
article concludes that it will not significantly improve the current
situation, as EU leaders proved largely unwilling to weaken the
powers of the Member States vis-à-vis the Community in that
particular policy area.7

new treaty amended the existing treaties of the EU by carrying
out most of the reforms previously proposed in the rejected European Constitution. The Constitution, signed in October 2004 and
ratified by eighteen Member States, was prevented from entering into force by its rejection in referenda held in France and
the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively. The resulting ratification crisis led to a period of “reflection, clarification
and discussion,”8 ending only
when the European summit
held in Brussels in June 2007
abandoned the idea of a European Constitution and decided
to replace it with a new amending treaty in the manner of previous treaties (i.e. the Single
European Act, the Maastricht or
Nice treaties).
Unexpectedly, Ireland—
the only Member State to hold a
referendum—turned its back on
the Lisbon Treaty and voted it
down in June 2008. This unexpected development prompted
the vast majority of journalists9 to prejudge the “death” of
the Lisbon Treaty, followed by
Václav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic and the only
EU leader to state that “the Lisbon project is finished.”10 However, this pessimism was not shared by other European leaders
who, following the initial shock, initiated negotiations on how to
bypass the Irish problem. As a matter of fact, one of the top priorities of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the French Presidency
of the EU (France took over the six-month rotating presidency
on July 1, 2008) was to come up with a plan for somehow salvaging the Lisbon Treaty.11
The European Council met in Brussels on June 19–20, 2008
and decided to delay any decision until the next summit in October 2008.12 As a result of the unexpected financial meltdown, the
issue of the treaty was pushed to the sidelines, as Europe’s leaders had far more pressing and urgent concerns to occupy their
attention during October’s European Council summit. Decisions

There exist a number
of problems that result
from the EU’s current
institutional set-up,
which involves too many
actors in the whole
climate change
negotiation process.

Background
On December 13, 2007, the heads of government and state
of the EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon (also
known as the Reform Treaty) at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal.
Expected at the time to enter into force sometime in 2009, this
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were postponed for the next Council meeting in December 2008,
where European governments eventually approved a package of
concessions to Ireland, aiming at addressing the concerns about
sovereignty that led Irish voters to reject the Lisbon Treaty.13 It
is of interest to note that the EU Presidency had, from the very
outset, the firmly expressed commitment of the Irish government to producing a plan that would facilitate a “Yes” vote in
a future second referendum.14 These concessions were offered
with the proviso that Ireland would ratify the Lisbon Treaty by
October 2009. Of course, it remains to be seen whether these
measures will be enough to convince the Irish people to endorse
the Lisbon Treaty a second time around. In any case, at the time
of writing, the Lisbon Treaty is far from dead and may soon be a
reality in the lives of European citizens. It would therefore be of
usefulness to academics, policy-makers, and all interested parties to be aware in advance of what this treaty actually entails
for Europe.
The main objectives of both the European Constitution and
the Reform Treaty that replaced it were inter alia to establish
simpler and clearer rules for decision-making in a continuously
enlarging EU of (currently) twenty-seven Member States and to
“ensure that the EU’s institutions operate in a more effective and
efficient manner.”15 The present study focuses only on one particular policy area, investigating specifically the extent to which
the new Reform Treaty will ensure a more effective and efficient operation of the EU when negotiating in the context of the
UNFCCC. The relevant EU climate policy literature has long
ago identified a number of problematic features in the EU’s climate decision-making machinery and has offered possible remedies. Groundbreaking as they were, European leaders proved
unwilling to incorporate the bulk of these remedies in the 2007
Lisbon Treaty.

Criticisms of the Current
Institutional Set-Up
Unlike other areas, such as trade, water quality, or hazardous waste disposal, where competence16 lies with the Community, climate change is an area in which a situation of “shared
competence” pertains. In international climate change negotiations, therefore, common EU positions have been agreed upon
in advance “by the Member States, with the participation of the
Commission. The country holding the Presidency of the EU—a
position that rotates every six months—coordinates the members
and presents the EU position at the international negotiations.”17
In other words, the Presidency, assisted by the previous and next
Member State to hold that position (the “troika”), has assumed
the leadership role.
There exist a number of problems that result from the EU’s
current institutional set-up, which involves too many actors in
the whole climate change negotiation process (currently the
twenty-seven Member States plus the Commission). The first
problem is the system of the half-yearly rotating presidency.
Authors argue/criticize that not only does it not allow for continuity in the EU’s negotiating strategy and the formulation of a
long-term strategic perspective, but that it also results in a loss
Winter 2009

of “institutional memory.”18 As Van Schaik and Egenhofer note,
“since the Presidency is changing every half year, there is a relatively high chance of inconsistencies in performance and actual
positions. This semi-annual change in leadership can also be
a constraining factor regarding the formulation of a long-term
strategic perspective.”19
A second complication confronting the EU during the
course of international climate change negotiations is known
as the “EU Bunker.” Changing positions and agreeing on new
proposals by other international actors requires the assent of
the majority of Member States. This, however, is very difficult
to achieve during the course of the negotiations and it can be
a “major source of delay and frustration, with endless co-ordination meetings and the inflexibility of Council Mandates.”20
Investing much (precious) time in bridging internal differences
may also result in EU Member States being practically unable
to react to outside developments. Creatively put, the amount of
time and diplomatic effort that is required for these intra-bloc
negotiations often means that the EU is conducting “a conference within a conference.”21
It is well known, for example, that in the final dramatic
night at Kyoto the EU ministers “were still locked in internal consultations while the plenary was in session: Chairman
Estrada gavelled through the critical text on the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) while EU ministers were still trying
to establish a common position in another room.”22 When they
informed the Chairman of their opposition to the pre-budget
crediting of emission reductions, the decision had already been
made and could not be reopened.23 The same situation recurred
during the sixth Conference of Parties (“COP”) at The Hague in
2000, when EU ministers were still debating amendments they
wished to propose to Chairman Pronk’s compromise paper after
amendments from all the other groups, even the much larger and
under-resourced Group of 77 (underdeveloped countries) plus
China (“G-77/China”), had been circulated and the final night’s
crucial negotiations had begun.24
Finally, a third problem relates to the predominance of
environment ministries and the under-representation of economics and trade ministries in climate change negotiations. Several
authors agree that climate talks have somewhat “outgrown”
the environmental ministries, as they involve not only environmental but also—and increasingly so—economic, trade, development, energy, and transport issues and concerns.25 It is thus
felt that closer cooperation between the environment, trade, and
economic ministries “would do more justice to the economic
realities of climate change policy.”26 In the United States, for
example, it is the State Department that takes the lead in the
negotiations, with the Department of Commerce being responsible for the overall coordination of the U.S. position.27 Following the flawed performance of the EU at The Hague COP in
2000, the EU did try to address this issue by allowing for greater
flexibility in the common position, strengthening the role of the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (“COREPER”), and
having economic, trade, and foreign ministries more involved
in the whole process.28 These changes did lead to improvements
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in the performance of the EU in COP-6bis (Bonn) and COP-7
(Marrakech), but did not “fundamentally alter the way the EU
position [was] formulated.”29

Suggestions for Improvement
Commentators over the years have made a number of proposals aiming at improving the EU’s operational functioning. It
has been widely suggested, for instance, that the performance
of the EU would improve dramatically if the Member States
allowed the European Commission to take over the coordination of the EU negotiating position from the Presidency.30 This,
however, is a highly unlikely future prospect, as several Member States (i.e. the UK) are vehemently opposed to any further
expansion of the competencies of the Commission.31 As we
shall see, such a prospect becomes even slimmer now with the
new Reform Treaty.
Another proposal, by Lacasta et al., involves delegating
authority to a number of “lead countries” that would prepare,
in close cooperation with the
Commission, “draft common
negotiating positions to be
decided by the Council.”32
Grubb and Gupta share this
proposal, noting in turn that
such a move would “reflect
the nature of the EU as a
strong intergovernmental
rather than supranational
institution.” 33 These “lead
countries”—or the Commission in the first case—would
also be responsible for the
formulation beforehand of
commonly agreed “fallback” positions that would
allow for greater EU flexibility in the decisive phases
of UNFCCC talks.34 Currently, the inflexibility of the
Council mandates results in
the EU having neither such fall-backs nor the necessary mechanisms for coming up with them in the midst of the negotiations.35
However, given the political and economic implications of climate change, the extent to which some Member States would be
willing to allow for decisions to be taken for them without their
express approval and input is subject to debate.
Finally, regarding the issue of the predominance of environment ministries, a possible suggestion by some authors provides
for climate policy to become part of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (“CFSP”), thereby bringing “diplomatic
muscle (and, hopefully, finesse) to the Community actions.”36
Similar is one of many proposals by Van Schaik and Egenhofer, who propose that the Foreign Affairs Council would be
responsible for the formulation of climate policy, thus “offering
a possibility for more integration of the EU’s position in climate

negotiations with other external policies of the EU.” 37 In this
case, Environment Ministers, whose expertise is deemed essential, could second their Foreign Ministers during sessions of the
Foreign Affairs Council in which external climate policy negotiating positions are debated.38 Another option in this regard
would be for Foreign and Environment Ministers to hold joint
meetings, for instance every half a year.39

Changes Instituted by the
Reform Treaty
Before attempting to explain the benefits the Reform Treaty
will have for the EU’s performance in UNFCCC negotiations,
a symbolic comment should be made. The new treaty, in the
amended Article 174, states that one of the aims of EU environmental policy will be to promote “measures at [the] international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental
problems, and in particular combating climate change.”40 It is
the first time the term “climate change” appears in the text of an
EU treaty. Provided that it
enters into force, the Reform
Treaty will introduce, as
already discussed, a number of institutional changes
meant to improve the efficient running of the EU.
How then, would this new
treaty strengthen EU performance in international climate change negotiations?
To begin with, the
European Parliament (“EP”)
will be able to veto international agreements, including
climate change-related ones.
Until now, the Council only
consulted the EP and could
ignore its judgement if acting unanimously. Pursuant
to the Reform Treaty, the
consent of the EP (as the
“voice of the people”) would be required for the ratification of
international environmental (including climate) agreements,
enhancing therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU.41 The
EP might never actually vote down an international environmental agreement, but it may become more demanding and insist
that its viewpoints on climate change issues be taken more seriously into consideration.42
Continuing on with the Presidency, the rotating system will
remain largely the same. Even though the European Council
will have its own President (in office for two and a half years),
the chairmanship of the other councils, except foreign affairs,
will continue to rotate every six months. The efficiency of the
Presidency, however, is expected to improve significantly with
the introduction—already in operation since 2007—of a new
enhanced “troika-like” system, known as the “triple presidency.”

It has been widely suggested
. . . that the performance
of the EU would improve
dramatically if the Member
States allowed the European
Commission to take over
the coordination of the EU
negotiating position from
the Presidency.
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According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
which never came into force, the Presidency would continue to
rotate every six months, but every eighteen months the three
Presidencies due to hold office would negotiate a common
agenda and work together over this one and half year period
to accomplish its objectives, always led by the Member State
holding the presidency at the time. Even though the aforementioned treaty is not legally binding, the September 2006 Council
of the European Union decided to adopt the concept of the presiding trio.43
This development will allow for greater coordination and
continuity, as it will put an end to the practice exercised up to
2006 of every successive Presidency re-writing the agenda every
six months in accordance with its own priorities. In the context of
climate politics, the new “troika-like” system will enable Member States with a greater interest in this policy area to relieve
smaller ones of the burden of conducting negotiations in which
they have no actual interest. As is obvious, not all Member States
are usually active in a particular
policy area. In most Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(“MEAs”), less than half a dozen
positions are likely to emerge,
as most small Member States do
not have a particular line to push.
Luxemburg, for example, cannot
employ more than a handful of
its officials to specialize in any
MEA when it holds the presidency.44 To give another example,
the Presidency during 1996—one
year prior to Kyoto’s crucial
COP-3—had been held by Italy
and Ireland, two countries known
for their lack of a progressive stance on climate change. The
position of the EU had remained practically unchanged since
Berlin’s 1995 COP-1, and it would not have been a hyperbole
to suggest that it had virtually stagnated.45 It is for cases such as
this that the Reform Treaty’s new presiding Trio concept could
prove a far more workable system. Of course, as promising as it
may seem, only time will demonstrate the extent to which this
new arrangement will indeed be an improvement.
A final related innovation is, as already mentioned, the
establishment by the Reform Treaty of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (the High Representative for Foreign Policy and
Security)—merging the existing roles of High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner
for External Affairs. The role, if any, of the High Representative
for Foreign Policy and Security in international climate change
negotiations is as yet unclear.46 According to Van Schaik and
Egenhofer, involvement of the Foreign Minister in EU activities
in the UNFCCC could “advance the integration of climate change
with other policy areas, notably with other external policies.”47
Such involvement, however, even if it does occur, will likely
remain limited or auxiliary, as only officials of environment

ministries command the immensely specialized knowledge on
technical aspects of the climate change policy area.48 Given
that the EU “Foreign Minister” will be mainly responsible for
the EU’s CFSP, Environment Ministers will in all probability
remain largely responsible for the formulation of the EU’s position on climate change, aided on occasion by their economic,
trade, and foreign counterparts. In other words, the current system is not expected to be altered significantly.

Conclusion
To conclude, despite the explicit acknowledgement of climate change in the Reform Treaty, actual climate-related changes
in the Treaty are limited. National governments prove to be adamant in their insistence to maintain control over their energy
policy, a key element of national security in the view of many
sovereigns. When it comes to energy, major disparities exist
within, between, and among the nations of the EU. Given their
vast differences in economic development, these twenty-seven
Member States have, in most
cases, widely different energy
matrices, greenhouse gas emission, and energy consumption
patterns. Internal EU negotiations for agreeing a common climate policy, therefore, are quite
strenuous and time-consuming,
as different Member States are
more willing and/or capable
to reduce their emissions than
others.49 Closely related to this
is the Euro-scepticism of some
Member States (e.g. the United
Kingdom) who are unwilling to
expand the competencies and
reach of the EU’s governing bodies. The Commission’s 1990s
proposal for an energy/carbon tax serving in this case as a prominent example.50
The extent, therefore, to which the new treaty would benefit
the performance of the EU in UNFCCC negotiations is likely
narrow. Contrary to expectations, the Reform Treaty does not
sufficiently address any of the three problems affecting the negotiating ability of the EU tentatively outlined earlier. The “EU
bunker” will continue to afflict the EU, as will most of the problems associated with the predominance of environment ministries. The same largely applies to the rotating Presidency, but in
this case the new enhanced “troika-like” system will definitely
result in some meaningful improvements in the current situation.
Undoubtedly, the big question remains whether the new EU Foreign Minister will become involved in EU climate activities and
what will be his/her exact role. As seen, such an involvement—in
all probability one of limited importance—can only benefit the
EU. In any case, such a discussion is highly hypothetical and the
questions posed will only be answered following the potential
entry into force of the Reform Treaty in 2009 or 2010. Several
authors have advocated a reform of EU institutions as the only

The extent . . . to which
the new treaty would
benefit the performance
of the EU in
UNFCCC negotiations
is likely narrow.
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practical solution for dealing with the current shortcomings of
the EU as a negotiator in policy areas of “shared competence.”
Unfortunately, such a reform of institutions—as far as climate

change policy is concerned—was not carried out by the Reform
Treaty, as it presented a choice not politically acceptable to the
majority of EU Member States.
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Creating a U.S. Carbon Market
by Alex Hoover*

P

resident Obama’s recent budget proposal is a strong indication that the current Administration will take the first
real steps towards realizing a nationwide cap-and-trade
system in the United States.1 Examining existing cap-and-trade
systems such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(“EUETS”), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),
and the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme
(“NSW Scheme”) illustrates the value of two increasingly common features that the United States should consider: auctions
and offset mechanisms. As this article shows, these mechanisms
can address major concerns with cap-and-trade by mitigating
price distortion and encouraging technological advances.
The EUETS consists of thirty member states2 and targets
carbon-fuel power plants and other industrial facilities.3 The system has been widely criticized due its failure to prevent market
price distortions in part because it uses an emission allocation
distribution system which allows nations to directly distribute
carbon allowances.4 However, in 2013 the EUETS will enter
Phase III (it is currently in Phase II)5 which will include a shift
from the current distribution system to an auction system.6 It
will also implement a single allowance allocation system that
sets common emissions caps for all member states, rather than
the current “national allocation plans.”7
RGGI consists of ten northeastern U.S. states and targets
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.8 RGGI requires a
ten percent reduction in GHG emissions from power plants by
2018.9 Individual states sell the majority of the carbon credits
offered through quarterly auctions.10 In addition to buying credits, installations may receive allowance offsets by undertaking
projects that reduce or sequester GHG.11
The NSW Scheme sets an emissions baseline and distributes
certificates for power generators that reduce GHG emissions.12
Power generators earn a certificate for each ton of emissions
reduction through low-emission electricity generation, activities
that reduce electricity consumption, and carbon sequestration
through forestry.13 These generators may then sell their certificates to other generators.14
In designing a national cap-and-trade system, U.S. lawmakers should learn from these examples to avoid market distortion
and encourage innovation. For example, an allowance auction
could create revenue to fund targeted tax breaks to mitigate
price distortion. The choice of allowance distribution is generally between auctions and direct distribution. In auctions, the
government collects the price of each bid as revenue. Under a
direct distribution system, the government gives companies carbon allowances, which they could potentially sell on the market
for a profit. The EUETS illustrated the problems of a direct distribution system15 where companies do not generally pass their
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savings to the consumer.16 Instead, they collect the difference
between the free carbon allowances and the market price as profit.17 The EUETS’s Phase II leaves the value of the initial carbon
allowances unavailable to correct potential price distortions.18
The use of auction revenue to fund targeted tax breaks
addresses the criticism that auctions would burden consumers
through increased carbon prices passed on by companies.19 For
instance, the European Commission will use the revenues from
Phase III auctions to invest in renewable energies that companies may utilize to improve energy efficiency and address the
impact of energy price increases to consumers.20 Effective use
of tax policy could significantly offset the costs of investing in
new technology or paying higher energy prices.
A U.S. cap-and-trade system should also include an offset
mechanism, like those in RGGI and the NSW Scheme, to encourage investment in efficient technologies. An offset mechanism
allows a company to earn allowances by undertaking projects
that reduce or sequester carbon emissions.21 The offsets can act
as subsidies when companies that earn offsets sell them on the
market to recover some of the project costs.22
Critics argue that an offset mechanism could increase emissions if the government distributes allowances for projects that
companies would have done even without the allowances.23
RGGI’s offset mechanism addresses this problem by disqualifying projects encouraged by other government action.24 For
instance, a company may not receive offset credits for projects
that the law already requires or receive funding or assistance
from other programs.25 Under the NSW Scheme’s Metered
Baseline Method (“MBM”), the government determines baseline energy use for each facility based on its historical energy
use.26 To ensure that offset allowances truly reduce emissions,
the MBM does not consider efficiency projects undertaken during the baseline period or projects anticipated while the facility
was collecting offset allowances.27
Examining policies and challenges of existing systems
provides valuable, real-world lessons for implementing a capand-trade program. As policymakers proceed with President
Obama’s ambitious charge, they must create an efficient system
that promotes the country’s best interests. As this article illustrates, including auctions and offset mechanisms to mitigate
price distortions, encourage true reductions in GHG emissions,
and support the development of efficient technology will be an
important aspect of any national cap-and-trade program.
Endnotes: Creating a U.S. Carbon Market
continued on page 73
*Alex Hoover is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington
College of Law.
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Climate Change, Energy, and Sustainable
Development in South Africa:
Developing the African Continent at the Crossroads
by Professor Edson L. Meyer* & Dr. Kola O. Odeku**

V

Introduction

arious scientific research has confirmed that climate
change has started affecting the atmosphere and, in particular, the African continent.1 International concerns
regarding climate change are now overwhelming as various governments of the world create policies and measures to reduce the
carbon dioxide emissions that cause climate change. The African
continent is likely to be severely affected by climate change if
the warming continues2 because
institutional capacities to combat the changing weather are
not in place.3 The irony is that
developing African countries are
more concerned with the issues
of access to energy (modern
fuels and electricity) in order to
improve and increase industrial
production and output, economic
growth,4 and development,5 as
opposed to policies that would
reduce carbon dioxide emissions
and halt climate change.6
There is ample consensus
that sustainable development involves an integration of environmental protection and economic growth.7 Economic growth can
still be attained through alternative energy sources as opposed
to fossil fuels. Due to the global nature of climate change and
the unpredictability of its likely impacts, the cooperation of all
countries is required to successfully address it. One approach that
should be considered in order for developing African countries
to grow their economies by utilizing their natural resources without contributing to climate change is encouraging more environmentally sustainable energy sector expansion. South Africa is
currently the first nation in Africa to utilize this approach, which
is the primary reason it has been chosen as a case study.
While developing countries are the most vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change, they do not perceive or consider climate change as a priority or serious matter to be handled with
levity.8 Instead, most African leaders and policy makers have
linked the issue of energy and natural resources to poverty
alleviation,9 which they consider the major challenge facing the
continent.10 They have consistently invoked the UN Millennium
Development Goals (“MDGs”) to support their positions and
validate their actions.11

Interestingly, it is not only African leaders who believe that
developing countries should vigorously pursue energy intensive
economic activities. Some African pundits and their collaborators have also supported this position by asserting that “whether
climate change proves benign or harmful, attempting to control
it through global regulation of emissions would be counterproductive” because it would not engage individuals in sustainable
development activities that improve their quality of life.12
There is a price to be paid
for this inaction and lackadaisical attitude. Any major catastrophe from climate change would
affect the natural resources and
economies of African nations.13
It might also result in “struggle
for food, energy, and water as
they lack resources and capacity to quickly adapt.”14 These
negative impacts may “undermine sustainable development,
increase poverty, and delay
or prevent the realization of
the Millennium Development
Goals.”15 This could lead to a situation where millions would be
forced to migrate to other regions of the world.16

Climate change is a grave
threat to South Africa
and a major obstacle
to continued poverty
reduction across its many
dimensions.
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South Africa as a Case Study
South Africa, as a developing country, is the most industrialized within the African region. It is well endowed with natural
resources such as coal, gold, diamonds, metals, and minerals.
Its overall economy is chiefly dependent on energy production
and use, with coal accounting for seventy-five percent of the fossil fuel demand and ninety-one percent of electricity generation.
The energy sector contributes approximately fifteen percent of
gross domestic product and provides around 250,000 jobs.17
Compared to other African countries, the South African economy is energy-intensive and the energy consumption rate is very
high. This is mainly due to the heavy mining industries, such
as iron and steel, cement, aluminum, etc. Furthermore, it is the
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most electrified country in Africa; electricity plays a pivotal role
in the economy and improves the quality of life of the previously
disadvantaged majority in addition to supporting large-scale
industrial development.18
South Africa is fully committed to growing its economy
through exploration and use of energy resources to meet its
development objectives.19 When the country attained independence in 1994, the issues of climate change and global warming were not a priority and the
perceived “linkages between
sustainable development and
climate change issues were very
weak.”20 Be that as it may, there
has been scientific evidence that
climate change is far more rapid
and dangerous than thought earlier.21 The government has now
realized that climate change is a
grave threat to South Africa and
a major obstacle to continued
poverty reduction across its many dimensions. This is a great
concern that calls for a change in attitude to make the issue of
climate change a major priority. Bearing this in mind, South
Africa is beginning to proactively link its objectives with climate
change priorities within a sustainable development framework.

impacts; and securing supply through diversity.25 However,
aggressive approaches to increasing access to affordable energy
services to stimulate economic growth have been without regard
to the environmental impacts.26
In South Africa, energy sector activities are the largest
sources of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, accounting for
about eighty-nine percent of the total emissions.27 More importantly, electricity is mainly supplied by Eskom, a public utility
company, based on coal-fired
systems; this accounts for ninety-one percent of all electricity
produced in the country, and
there is continuous increase in
demand.28 Increase in electricity
supply based on coal-fired systems has lead to increased carbon dioxide emissions.29
As a result of the high levels of energy production and
consumption, there are high levels of particulate concentrations in South Africa.30 High level of
particulate matter results in “serious environmental and health
problems because air quality, land, water, and forest resources
have been severely degraded.”31 The use of coal, wood, paraffin, and candles for cooking, heating, and lighting also exposes
households to hazardous levels of indoor air pollution and the
risk of fire. Illness and death can result.32
The aggressive drive by the South African government
to grow the economy by utilizing energy intensively without
regard to the negative consequences has put South Africa at a
crossroads. However, the government has now decided to live
up to its responsibility by implementing drastic measures to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions to mitigate the affect of potential catastrophes on what has been gained through economic
growth.

This was a clear
indication of political will
by governments worldwide
to combat climate change.

The Era of Turning Up the Heat in
South Africa
Since 1994, various government policies, legislation, and
regulations in South Africa have been primarily based on the
development paradigm that addresses the injustices of the past
and focuses on the provision of basic needs, equity, employment
creation, and economic growth for all South Africans by utilizing available natural resources, in particular energy from coal.
Consequently, the issue of integrating energy, economic growth,
and environment has not been a major concern. This deliberate oversight on the part of the government created a major barrier to integrating climate change into South Africa’s vision of
a sustainable development pathway. There has been a lack of an
adequate policy approach to consider energy and climate change
objectives alongside each other, as well as a lack of institutional,
human, legal, and financial capabilities.22 Furthermore, South
Africa’s ability to respond to concerns about climate change
are complicated by the fact that the greater majority of South
Africans live in varying degrees of poverty and want to increase
their living standards, leading to increased energy use per capita
and increased reliance on fossil fuels with high carbon dioxide
emissions.23
This scenario had the support of the government based on
the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (“1998 White Paper”).24
The 1998 White Paper sets the main objectives of the energy
sector in South Africa as follows: increasing access to affordable
energy services; stimulating economic development; improving energy governance; managing energy-related environmental
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The Era of Turning Down the Heat in
South Africa
The threat of global climate instability and its likely impacts
on countries worldwide led to the signing and subsequent ratification of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”). This was a clear indication of political will by
governments worldwide to combat climate change. Unfortunately, however, as clearly expressed in the UNFCCC, it will
be difficult for developing countries to avoid increasing emissions as they attempt to meet their needs through fossil fuel production.33 The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that there are
synergies between sustainable development goals and carbon
dioxide reduction strategies in order to avoid the impact of climate change. The South African government is now heeding the
clarion call by implementing various strategies that will lead to
massive reduction of carbon dioxide in the country. The most
potent of these is the synergy between achieving sustainable
development goals within the context of climate change.
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Policies to Fight Climate Change Through
Emission Reduction

Integrating Energy Policy and Sustainable
Development

It must be pointed out from the outset that South Africa
does not have emission reduction targets for the first commitment period of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, which runs from
2008–2012, because it is not an “Annex I” country.34 Even so,
the South African government recognizes that it needs to take
adequate measures as one of the highest emitting of the nonAnnex I countries.35
South Africa’s Environmental Affairs and Tourism Minister, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, described the overall approach
to climate change mitigation and adaptation as “progressive,
ambitious, and far-reaching” as well as focused on protecting
South Africa from the “onslaught” of global warming. 36 He
added that the goal is for carbon
dioxide emissions to “stop growing by 2020–2025 at the latest,
stabilize for up to ten years, and
then decline in absolute terms.”37
Towards this end, the government
has started implementing stringent policies and measures and
also enforcing the laws relating
to environment38 and pollution.39
This approach is now shifting the country’s development path
to become more sustainable and should gradually reduce carbon
dioxide emissions.40

Although the 1998 White Paper does not specifically refer
to sustainable development goals or objectives, it does contain
a number of provisions that refer to environmental, social, and
economic aspects of energy. For instance, it states that:
Fossil fuels such as coal, uranium, liquid fuels, biomass
and gas continue to play a central role in the socio-economic development of our country, while simultaneously providing the necessary infrastructural economic
base for the country to become an attractive host for
foreign investments in the energy sector . . . energy policy should balance the use of natural energy resources
with environmental considerations.49
It is in this regard that
the government published the
White Paper on Renewable
Energy in 2003 (“2003 White
Paper”)50 and established a
long-term goal to build an
energy industry that will offer
a fully non-subsidized alternative to fossil fuels.51 This
policy approach has been
concretized through significant financial support for renewable
energy research and development.52
A key challenge in the reform agenda is to make sure that
the public benefits of sustainable development are advanced.
The electricity industry can make a difference in the arena of
sustainable development through underpinning sustainable
economic growth, promoting social equity, and adopting more
environmentally-friendly technologies. The goal is an electricity industry that delivers secure, low-cost supplies that support
industrial competitiveness; provides widened access to affordable services; and encourages energy efficiency, increased use
of renewable energy technologies, and reduced emissions generally. These goals are now embedded in the on-going reform
processes and the government has started implementing crucial
policies that ensure reduction in emissions activities.53

South Africa has designed
a Renewable Energy
Strategy.

A National Agency to Promote CDM Projects
In 2005, the South Africa Department of Minerals and
Energy created a Designated National Authority to coordinate
CDM activities as required by the Kyoto Protocol.41 The agency
coordinates activities to attract investors and project developers to South Africa. Shortly after the agency was established,
it received information on four projects from the private sector, including one for the Kuyasa Low-Cost Housing Project in
Khayelitsha, Cape Town, the first CDM project in Africa.42 This
project includes the construction of energy-efficient houses.

A Carbon Tax on Businesses
One of the South African government’s most ambitious
proposals for dealing with climate change is considering the
passage of a carbon tax on carbon dioxide-emitting industries.43
The policy, which some consider “the point at which the government began steering the economy along a more sustainable
growth path,”44 imposes a 2 Rand cents per kilowatt-hour tax on
non-renewable electricity sources. 45 Of South African’s many
proposals on the table for cutting GHG emissions, a carbon tax
could have the most significant impact.46 The carbon tax proposal also includes stringent energy efficiency measures and
would begin at 100 Rand per ton on carbon dioxide equivalent
and increase to 250 Rand per ton by 2020.47 At the time of writing, the South African cabinet has endorsed the plan but it has
not achieved final parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, financial officials have begun discussing an effective implementation
framework.48
51

Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
In South Africa, energy efficiency was not really an issue
until recently; however, the situation has now changed. Stakeholders are now aware of the need to consume energy differently.
The CDM has mobilized several industrial players and sensitized
them on the need to modernize energy equipment. South Africa
has designed a Renewable Energy Strategy which sets a target of
10,000 GWh of renewable energies by 2013 (this would amount
to four percent of production in 2004). In addition, an energysaving framework by the Department of Minerals and Energy
has set its goal to save fifteen percent by 2015. Energy efficiency and renewable energies are the focus of the framework,
a first for Africa that may serve as a model for other countries.54
The government has started implementing policies on
energy efficiency, which is assuredly the most effective and eco
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The government has started implementing policies
on energy efficiency, which is assuredly the
most effective and economically advantageous means
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions and
other pollutants from energy production.
nomically advantageous means of reducing carbon dioxide emissions and other pollutants from energy production. Efficiency
measures have also drastically reduced the cost of electricity
bills to industry and individuals. This is producing substantial
economic benefits.55
In 2006, Environment Minister van Schalkwyk demonstrated the energy-efficiency conversion of his home, which consisted of the installation of “energy-efficient lighting, solar water
heating, better insulation, and a range of other measures.”56 Minister van Schalkwyk stressed that although government action
draws attention to these issues, individuals in South Africa must
also take steps to save energy in their homes.57 The Minister
also stated that replacing one normal light bulb with a compact
fluorescent bulb could result in savings of 18.50 South African
Rands per year, as well as a total of 430 kilograms of coal and
1,100 liters of water.58
There has also been an aggressive approach towards promotion and production of environmentally friendly biodiesel and
bioethanol fuels manufactured from crops such as canola, soya,
sunflower, sugar beet, maize, sorghum, wheat, and sugarcane.59
This will create new jobs, protect the country from volatile oil
prices, and decrease damage to the environment.60

Training and Capacity Development
South African universities are beginning to focus on the specialized educational needs for climate research and CDM project
implementation.61 Furthermore, National Research Foundation
funds research on climate change.62 The government is currently
investing in technology and upgrading existing institutions of
research and education by promoting courses on engineering,
science, agriculture, and forestry and also collaborating with
various institutions in developed countries.63 The government
has also started creating awareness and sensitizing entrepreneurs
and industrial sectors to embark on research into energy-efficient
activities.64

Monitoring for Adaptation
South Africa has embarked on a program for Monitoring,
Mapping and Analysis of Disaster Incidents known as MANDISA.65 It is a core activity for the Disaster Mitigation for Sustainable Livelihoods Programme of the University of Cape Town.66
MANDISA began as a pilot program from 1990 to 1999 in the
Cape Town Metropolitan Area.67 The program evaluates socioWinter 2009

economic and environmental risk factors that can affect the
impacts of disasters and allows for tracking of the conditions
that may cause disaster.68 This requires cooperation between
several agencies, “consultation and feedback, active sourcing of
emergency and disaster information, strategic consolidation of
information across agencies and robust geo-referencing.”69 The
project also includes an online database which provides information for disaster management workers, educational institutions,
and researchers.70

Non-Governmental Approaches
In addition to government policy, other major stakeholders
are also taking action to combat climate change in South Africa.
Two examples are discussed below.

Clinton Climate Initiatives
In 2008, the Clinton Climate Initiative (“CCI”) committed
funding and technical support to decrease energy consumption
in Johannesburg.71 This prompted the city to implement energy
efficiency measures, including the Rea Vaya bus rapid transit
system and the energy efficiency building retrofit program.72 The
initiative has also provided know-how, in the form of a technical
director for project support, to assist with joint projects between
the City of Johannesburg and CCI. Other initiatives include
drives to reduce energy consumption in the city by promoting
solar power and a project to convert methane gas generated by
landfills into energy used for electricity.73

The Kuyasa Project
South Africa has successfully developed a low-cost housing project known as the Kuyasa project, the first of its kind in
Africa and one of fewer than fifty in the world.74 It was developed by SouthSouthNorth, an international CDM non-governmental organization, and Cape Town. The city has committed
to use ten percent renewable energy sources by 2020, and have
ten percent of households with solar water heaters by 2010.75 It
is in recognition of this achievement that Kuyasa was awarded
gold standard recognition by the UNFCCC, allowing it to earn
certified emission credits. The price of these credits is calculated
according to the amount of carbon dioxide saved.76 Some of the
benefits of this project to South Africa are: retrofitted buildings
are five percent warmer in winter and five percent cooler in summer, allowing a savings of up to forty percent on electricity bills;
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the buildings reduce localized air pollution, helping prevent
pulmonary pneumonia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and other
respiratory illnesses which are major sources of health hazards
to poor people; and more importantly, a decrease in the deadly
fires common in high-density and low-income settlements. Apart
from the individual benefits of the program, the projects stand to
earn carbon credits equaling nine million tons of carbon a year,
with a value of US$253 million to the South African economy.
The projects have crediting periods lasting until at least 2015;
some extend until 2026.77

Conclusion
The effects of climate change are no longer limited to
predictions; temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are
melting, and extreme weather conditions are becoming more
frequent and more intense.78 Africa is both the continent most
vulnerable to climate change as well as the one with the least

capacity to adapt. For the developing continent, there exist multiple and concurrent stresses and development challenges, such
as endemic poverty, governance and institutional dimensions,
limited access to capital, ecosystem degradation, and complex
disasters and conflicts. These are obstacles to reducing carbon
dioxide emissions.
Realizing that economic growth, sustainable resource management, and climate change are closely connected, the executive and legislative arms of the government of South Africa
have agreed on a progressive policy on climate change. This will
ensure that the country reduces emissions to become a “low carbon” economy while also helping to limit the effects of global
warming. South Africa should serve as an example to the other
nations of Africa as the developing continent becomes a stronger
and more effective player in the fight against global climate
change.
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Mongolia: A Case for Economic Diversification
in the

Face of a Changing Climate

by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*
Introduction

I

n the past two decades Mongolia has experienced significant
environmental changes driven both by human action and
climate change. These changes have had considerable detrimental effects on Mongolia’s economy and people. Basic survival in this country of harsh climates requires a careful balance
with the environment.1 Climate change, which may exacerbate
climatic extremes, in combination with unsustainable land use
practices, have begun to change that balance and reveal Mongolia’s significant environmental vulnerabilities. In response to
these changing conditions, the Mongolian government instituted
a number of mitigating and adaptive measures to decrease its
vulnerability, but without further economic diversification the
success of these measures is limited.
Photo courtesy of Nathan Borgford-Parnell

Basic survival in this
country of harsh climates
requires a careful balance
with the environment.
In more recent years, Mongolia has begun to depend upon
its rich mineral resources to diversify its economy away from
a dependence on the more traditional vocations of herding and
animal husbandry. Although diversification is the key to Mon
golia’s future, these mining operations pose additional real
threats to Mongolia’s fragile environment and represent only
one economic alternative to animal husbandry. Mongolia’s economic diversification should include the development of renewable energy resources. Mongolia has strong, untapped wind and
solar resources in abundance and their development may help tilt
the environmental balancing act back towards sustainability.2

Climate Change on the Steppe
Climate change is making Mongolia both warmer and drier.3 Over the past sixty years, Mongolia’s mean temperature
has increased by 3.4ºF, compared to the global mean of 1ºF in
the past century.4 Rainfall is also more infrequent and heavier,
which is increasing erosion on already fragile pastureland. 5
Mongolia’s glaciers, which feed many of the country’s rivers,
have decreased in flow causing approximately fifty of the country’s rivers to vanish between 2004 and 2005.6
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The combination of these effects is causing a significant drying of Mongolia’s soil.7 Desertification has become so significant
that Mongolian dust storms are causing environmental impacts
on countries as far away as Japan.8 As of 2002, over seventy percent of Mongolia’s pastureland was considered degraded.9 This
has led to a decrease of pasture biomass of 20–30% over the past
twenty years.10 Livestock fodder production today is one third
that of 1986 production numbers.11
Mongolia’s livestock live on open pastures year-round,
making them susceptible to any severe changes in the weather,
climate, or changes in biomass. Typically, the animals build
up fat stores during the summer to help them get through the
harsh Mongolian winters. However, with the decrease in pasture
biomass it is much more difficult for the animals to build the
reserves they need.12
Mongolia depends upon the livestock industry both for
employment and basic food products. Almost fifty percent of
Mongolians are employed in animal husbandry or a related
field.13 Livestock accounts for thirty-four percent of annual gross
production and thirty percent of Mongolia’s total exports.14
However, pasture degradation brought on by climate change is
only partially to blame for these changes. Institutional and economic collapse of the Mongolian government in the early 1990s
conspired to exacerbate the damage that climate change was
already doing to Mongolia’s pasturelands.15
*Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University,
Washington College of Law. He is also the founder of Valkyrie Energy LLC, a
renewable energy development firm focusing on new and developing markets.
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The Fall of Communism and the Rise of the Herd
In 1990, Mongolia’s peaceful transition from a communist
regime to a democratic government signaled the dissolution of
the central planned economy and state-subsidized systems of
food distribution. As a result of this transition, virtually overnight thousands of Mongolians found themselves out of work.
Many Mongolian families, searching for a means of survival,
turned to traditional livestock herding to fill the economic void.
Between 1990 and 2001 the number of herding households in
Mongolia more than doubled, from 75,000 to 185,500.16 Many
of the new herding families had no experience in animal husbandry and were unaccustomed to the careful and balanced
nature of traditional nomadic herding.17
Prior to the 1990 transition, the communist government
limited the number of livestock in the country to about fifteen
million; with its dissolution and the introduction of a market
economy livestock populations grew unchecked.18 Without
centralized controls, livestock
populations ballooned until 1999
when herd populations reached
thirty-three million, more than
ten times the number of people
in Mongolia.19
The meteoric increase in
herd populations combined with
the decrease in biomass discussed
above left Mongolia supremely
vulnerable to any dramatic shift
in environmental conditions.
This vulnerability became most
evident between 1999 and 2002
when Mongolia was hit with
four historic droughts and abnormally severe winters.

Climate change deserves much of the blame for this tragic
convergence of events but its effects would have been much
more localized were it not for the unpreparedness of the Mon
golian state. The institutions of the new Mongolian state were
not prepared to manage the drastic increase in new herding families, or the dramatic changes brought about by the new market
economy. This left the government agencies unable to cope with
rapidly changing environmental conditions and the herders with
little to no capacity to adapt to the deteriorating environment.

New Institutions Not Up to the Task
In 1990 the new Mongolian state dismantled the communist
era herding collectives that had managed herd populations and
allocated pastureland for over half a century.27 The remaining
traditional and customary institutions for pasture management
could not cope with the influx of new herding families, and so
the responsibility fell to the new government.28 Stepping into
the void, the Mongolian government passed a battery of laws
and regulations seeking to lay
a foundation for environmental
protection, ease pressures on
pastureland, and strengthen the
capacities of herders to adapt to
changing conditions. Between
1990 and 2000 Mongolia passed
more than twenty laws regulating land rights and environmental standards.29
There is little question that
the Mongolian government
recognized the significance of
the problems and challenges it
faced. The real impediment is
not a lack of will, but institutional capacity. Overall coordination
between the agencies and institutions tasked with environmental
protection and pasture management was often limited.30 While
the laws were robust, the administrative procedures for implementation had no clear guidelines for dealing with administrative
overlaps.31 Agencies tasked with pasture management suffered
from a significant lack of resources, both in trained personnel and
budget.32 Nowhere was this more true than at the local level where
small community governments were tasked with the lion’s share
of environmental and pastureland management and oversight.33
Following the dzud, the Mongolian government, international donors, and multilateral institutions took action to combat
the worst effects of the disaster. In 2003 Mongolia passed the
Law on Disaster Protection, designed to improve coordination
between government and institutional actors within the context
of existing environmental and pastoral management laws.34 The
World Bank implemented the Sustainable Livelihoods Project,
designed to improve institutional capacity for pastoral risk management, develop funds for local development, and make microfinance more available to rural households.35
While significant effort has been made to mitigate and prevent future disasters, Mongolia has thus far only had limited

Desertification has
become so significant that
Mongolian dust storms
are causing environmental
impacts on countries as
far away as Japan.

Mongolia’s Longest Winter
In Mongolian dzud is a term for severe winter weather
conditions of the type that are so extreme they can prevent animals from grazing on open pastures.20 Dzud are quite common
in Mongolia, occurring typically once every seven years, but
always in localized areas.21 However, between 1999 and 2002
Mongolia experienced three dzud in sequence each covering
approximately seventy percent of the country.22 The dzud were
preceded by particularly dry summers where over three thousand water sources, including 680 rivers and 760 lakes, literally
disappeared, decimating the already stressed and low weight
livestock population.23
In four years, more than eleven million adult animals died
from the combination of extreme summer droughts and severe
winter weather.24 The loss of so many animals was devastating
to Mongolia’s herders as almost ten thousand families lost their
entire herd and seventy-five percent of the remaining families
were left with herds below maintenance levels.25 The economic
impact of the 1999–2002 dzud is estimated at over 200 million
U.S. dollars and dropped Gross Domestic Product growth to
1.1% from 3.2% in 1998.26
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success in changing the paradigm of environmental vulnerability
for its herding families. If any silver lining can be found from the
1999–2002 dzud, it is the fact that tens of thousands of herders
were forced out of the industry,
thereby decreasing pressure on
critically damaged pastureland.
Unfortunately, by 2008 herd
populations have climbed back
to their 1999 numbers, once
again threatening pastureland
with extreme overgrazing.36 As
of January 2009, 120,400 livestock have died from extreme
winter temperatures in Mongolia, nearly a seventy percent
increase from 2008; it remains
to be seen whether Mongolia’s
institutions are ready for another
hard winter.37

While mining has helped take some of the pressure off
herders, dependence on mining will only further stress Mon
golia’s fragile environment. However, under the right conditions
Mongolia’s mining growth can
be a windfall for the country,
especially if it is used to spur
new forms of development, particularly in the field of energy
generation. Mongolia should
use this opportunity to invest
in renewable energy, particularly in rural communities. As
a nation, Mongolia has strong,
proven wind and solar resources
that it has yet to tap on a commercial basis.41 The development of such resources can help
Mongolia adapt to changing
environmental conditions, spur new industry in rural communities and help shift the country away from an exclusive dependence on coal for power generation.42
Global experience has shown a strong positive correlation
between increases of stable electricity use and economic growth
in developing nations.43 Stable electrical distribution provides a
strong foundation for new commercial and industrial opportunities for small communities, as well as an increase in working
hours and productivity.44 In addition to creating a new economy
based on domestic, clean, and unlimited resources, renewable
energy development will create new jobs and facilitate development in rural communities.
Development of renewable energy will also strengthen
Mongolia’s commitment to environmental protection by
decreasing is own generation of greenhouse gasses. As energy
services come on-line in Mongolia’s rural communities, families
will have a broader range of choices in securing their economic
future. Economic diversification will strengthen local communities and local institutions, thereby improving capacity to protect
pastureland and bringing herding practices back into equilibrium with the environment. While Mongolia’s actions alone
cannot reverse the effects of climate change, giving its citizens
the economic flexibility to adapt to those changes without overburdening its already fragile, harsh environment will go a long
way towards preventing the kind of catastrophic disaster that
occurred between 1999 and 2002.

The dzud were preceded
by particularly dry
summers where over 3000
water sources, including
680 rivers and 760 lakes,
literally disappeared.

Conclusions: Economic Diversification,
the Key to Mongolia’s Future & a Role
for Renewable Energy
There are two general means of addressing the human vulnerabilities to climate change in developing countries: mitigation and adaptation.38 While the Mongolian government must
continue its progress in institution-building and environmental
protection to help mitigate human impact on the environment
it must also focus on diversifying its economy away from a
dependence on one or two industries. For Mongolia’s herders,
economic diversification is the key to decreasing their vulnerability to changing climatic conditions. Economic diversification
is an adaptive measure that will decrease herder vulnerability
to climate change by providing the ability to move away from
animal-husbandry, easing pressures on the environment and
government.
Unfortunately, the Mongolian economy has only had a limited capacity to diversify away from a dependence on herding.
The two largest industrial sectors in Mongolia today are animal
husbandry and mining of coal, gold and copper.39 The formal
mining industry is Mongolia’s fastest growing industry, currently accounting for a third of Mongolia’s economy; recent surveys of miners found that more than fifty-five percent are from
families that lost their herds during the dzud and turned to mining to survive.40

Endnotes: M
 ongolia
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The World Bank Clean Technology Fund:
Friend or Foe to the UNFCCC?
by Addie Haughey*

I

Introduction

n response to the Bali Action Plan’s calls for an expanded
international response to climate change, the World Bank
created a series of Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) to
provide “immediate financial resources” to respond to global climate challenge.1 Since the creation of the funds last year, more
than $6 billion has been pledged
to CIF programs by donor countries2 and the CIFs have quickly
become leaders in international
climate investment, at least in
terms dollar amount.3
The Clean Technology
Fund (“CTF”)4 is one of the
more advanced CIFs, and began
providing large-scale financial
resources for low-carbon technology projects in developing
countries in early 2009.5 This
article examines whether the
CTF is an instrument through
which donor countries can fulfill their international climate
change funding obligations
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). First, background for
answering this question is provided. Then it is argued that inconsistencies between the CTF and the UNFCCC should prevent
CTF donations from fulfilling UNFCCC obligations.

compromise meant to acknowledge that industrialized nations in
the global north are the primary cause of anthropogenic climate
change, but that all nations have a role to play in the solution.10
One key difference in obligations is that wealthier, developed
nations are responsible for funding climate change initiatives
around the globe by providing “new and additional financial resources” for developing
countries.11 In order to facilitate
this funding responsibility, the
UNFCCC established the Global
Environment Facility (“GEF”)
as its official financial arm,
responsible for aiding countries
in meeting their obligations to
the Convention.12
The Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC went into effect in
2005.13 It is the first instrument
produced by the UNFCCC with
legally binding emission reduction targets and timetables.14 The
Protocol includes flexible market mechanisms giving parties
multiple paths through which to
meet their binding targets.15 One
such path is the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), 16
which allows investment in emission reducing projects in
developing countries to generate “carbon emission reductions”
(“CERs”) that can then be traded on the market to developed
countries for use in their compliance with Kyoto.17
The market for carbon emission reduction credit trading
grew exponentially in the two years after the Kyoto Protocol
came into effect, reaching an estimated $30 billion.18 There
are now at least fifty-eight carbon funds in the market,19 which
purchase carbon credits on behalf of countries and private entities that cannot meet their Kyoto obligations through emission
reductions alone.20

The World Bank’s
Clean Technology
Fund . . . works by
pooling donations from
industrialized countries
and investing those
funds in carbon emission
reducing projects in
developing countries.

Background
In response to the imminent threat of climate change, the
international community came together at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 to create a framework convention to combat climate
change.6 The objective of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”7 The
UNFCCC was created to organize and coordinate efforts to fight
climate change as well as to build political will and accountability. The convention’s Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) is
the primary mechanism for the world to address climate issues
and solutions.8
The framework created by the convention obligates country parties to meet “common but differentiated” standards,9 a
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The World Bank
The World Bank has played a significant role in the development of the carbon market through its creation of the Prototype
Carbon Fund21 and its extensive involvement in carbon emission
*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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trading.22 The Bank’s involvement in the international climate
regime began with its prototype permit purchasing,23 and was
solidified when it was selected to serve as the trustee for the
UNFCCC’s financial arm, the Global Environment Facility.24
The World Bank is considered the “pre-eminent multilateral institution providing assistance to developing countries.”25
Established in 1945 after the Bretton Woods Conference,26 the
Bank has served as an intermediary between its powerful shareholders, wealthy developed nations, and developing countries. In
this role, the Bank provides financial assistance, technical assistance, risk guarantees, and policy advice to public and private
sector parties in developing countries.27 This history of development assistance serves as a backdrop to the Bank’s involvement
in climate change finance, focusing its efforts on development
goals that are linked to carbon emission reduction and the transition to low carbon economies.28

The Clean Technology Fund
The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund is a Climate
Investment Fund that works by pooling donations from industrialized countries and investing those funds in carbon emission
reducing projects in developing countries.29 Through the CTF,
the Bank focuses its financial expertise on scaling-up30 proven
low carbon technologies by expanding them to full sector scale,
or at least demonstrating that the technologies could be expanded
to such a wide scale.31
The Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”), the Clean Technology
Fund’s governing body, is responsible for approving programs
and project pipelines, establishing project criteria, determining
what financing products will be available, and ensuring consistency between CTF practices and the UNFCCC.32 The Committee is comprised of eight representatives from donor countries
and eight from countries eligible to receive CTF financing.33
TFC representatives are selected by consultation with the parties
eligible to serve.34
The CTF is structured so that Multilateral Development
Banks (“MDBs”) work with partner countries to develop country-specific investment plans.35 These plans incorporate CTF
financed projects and programs36 into the county’s existing
climate change reduction strategies. Recipients of CTF funds
can be public or private, though private recipients must demonstrate their place within a broader public climate change plan.37
Once developed, projects are sent to the Trust Fund Committee
for approval, after which funds are transferred in the form of
grants, concessional loans, and guarantees.38 Projects are examined based on established standards, including greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emission savings,39 demonstration potential,40 development impact,41 implementation potential,42 and additional
cost and risk premium.43

Analysis of the Clean Technology Fund
The founding document of the Clean Technology Fund
goes to great lengths to demonstrate consistency and collaboration with the UNFCCC,44 but that consistency does not extend
far beyond rhetorical principles. This is evidenced by significant
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criticisms of the CTF’s motives, the World Bank’s record on
climate change, the Bank’s “technology neutral” approach to
carbon emission, and more.45 Beneath the layers of policy disagreement, even the CTF founding document46 itself demonstrates at least three areas where the CTF is inconsistent with the
UNFCCC. First, circular language in the document absolves the
CTF of responsibility for ensuring “new and additional” funding
to its recipient countries. Second, measures put in place to ensure
equitable governance of the CTF do not achieve this purpose.
Finally, the so-called “sunset clause,” intended to prevent undermining of the UNFCCC process by the CTF, is drafted poorly,
with a major loophole that allows the CTF to avoid sunset.

New and Additional Financial Resources
Are Not Guaranteed by the CTF
Article 4 of the UNFCCC lays out the commitments of the
party countries, including paragraph 3, which requires “new
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing country parties in complying with their
obligations.”47 Similarly, the Clean Technology Fund founding
document uses the phrase “new and additional” in its principles.48 It is telling, however, that the document neglects to cite to
the provision of the UNFCCC in which that terminology originated, despite extensive citation to other UNFCCC provisions.
Undoubtedly, all donor countries consider their donations
“new and additional” and intend to report their CTF donations to
the UNFCCC as part of meeting their Article 4 commitments.49
The CTF, however, has absolved itself of responsibility for
ensuring that obligations are met by placing the responsibility
on the donor country, not the CTF, to “ensure that contributions
are new and additional resources supplementing existing [Official Development Aid] flows otherwise available for developing
countries.”50
Even if some of the $6 billion donated into the CIFs so far
is new and additional, money donated to the CTF is comingled
and combined with other sources of funding.51 This is problematic because the UNFCCC reporting process requires that countries demonstrate that their individual contributions to climate
change are new and additional.52 Under this system it will be
difficult for a country to demonstrate this,53 and equally difficult
for a UNFCCC body to determine whether funds are new and
additional if they are mixed with other funding sources from the
outset.
In the midst of confusion and disagreement over exactly
what is new and additional funding and where the responsibility
for it lies, it appears that the CTF has used its founding document to pass responsibility on to its donor countries. This creates
a conflict; the system makes it difficult to ensure that funds are
new and additional and demonstrates that the World Bank is
either not prepared or not willing to meet UNFCCC standards
for climate change financing.
The Bank still has the opportunity to tighten up this lose
provision by not just asking donor countries to ensure that funding is new and additional, but by requiring them to demonstrate
that it is. In addition, the CTF could include an analysis of
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whether or not funding is new and additional in their donation
acceptance process, and/or incorporate new and additional status
into the investment criteria for projects.54 This has potential to
be complicated administratively,55 but may be required if donor
countries are to report donations as “new and additional” to the
UNFCCC. The CTF has multiple opportunities to ensure that
“new and additional” funding is used, and it should do so.

Equitable Governance is Not Guaranteed
by the CTF
Under the current international climate regime, each party
has an equal vote in all UNFCCC decisions,56 ensuring that
developed countries cannot use their superior political and financial circumstances to overpower the developing countries of the
global south.57 In the context of financing, this was a battle hard
fought, and won, by developing countries to ensure their equal
say in the distribution of financial resources coming from the
global north.58 Unfortunately,
the CTF has demonstrated
inconsistencies with this principle since its creation.
The G8, an organization
that lacks representation and
input from developing nations,59
made the initial request to the
World Bank to establish the Climate Investment Funds.60 This
means that even if developing
countries have subsequently
been included, they were not
involved at the outset in determining what international body
should house and administer the
fund, the fund structure, or fund
goals and objectives.
In its attempt to have equal
representation of developing
countries, the CTF included
an equal number of donor and
recipient country members on
its governing board.61 It also
established decision-making by consensus, allowing an unsatisfied board member to block decisions entirely or to abstain.62
In reality, however, the CTF governance structure does not
involve developing countries in the decision-making process in
a meaningful way. The consequences of this are potentially dire
in terms of the legitimacy of CTF projects. The inconsistency
between the CTF’s governing body and the governance principles of the UNFCCC is twofold.
First, Membership on the Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”)
is acquired through a “consultation” with an undefined group
of stakeholders.63 The CTF founding document is loose in its
instructions on the selection of Trust Fund Committee membership and unclear as to how the consultation among those parties should work.64 A footnote says that the “selection of donor

country representatives is to be primarily guided by total contributions to the CTF,”65 which implies less of a “consultation” and
more of a selection process based on the highest dollar donation.
What is more disconcerting is that no such instructions are given
regarding the recipient country representation on the committee; the document simply instructs that a consultation will occur
among the interested countries.66 This leaves interested countries to wonder how to ensure fair representation—or any representation at all—on the Committee.
The first Trust Fund Committee membership selection process took place behind closed doors at a meeting in Washington, DC in October of 2008.67 The “recipient” countries that
will serve on the committee include Brazil, China, Egypt, India,
Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.68 While these countries are
vital to solving climate change, they represent emerging economic superpowers that are unlikely to share the concerns of a
vast number of smaller, less developed recipient nations, which
may now have inadequate and
ineffective representation on the
CTF committee.
The Trust Fund Committee
is charged with decision making
authority regarding which programs and projects will receive
funding from the CTF.69 This
vital role should be given to a
body that equitably represents
all parties involved.70 The current system does not guarantee
fairness or equity in selection
for the Committee and is inconsistent with the UNFCCC’s
principles of equity.71
The World Bank should
clarify the founding document’s language that lays out
the involved parties and defines
“consultation.” Alternatively, the
Bank should give more power
to the “Partnership Forum,” a
body established to encourage
dialogue about the Climate Investment Funds among diverse
interested parties.72 The role of the forum could be increases
to something more like the UN’s Global Environment Facility
(“GEF”) Assembly, which has some decision-making power
over GEF activities.73 Involving more stakeholders in actual
decision-making, beyond the current Partnership Forum role of
“dialogue and consultation,”74 would create a model much more
in line with the principles of the UNFCCC.75
Second, the committee is given little, if any, real power. The
board of the World Bank maintains control over all actions of the
bank, potentially including actions of the CTF as well.76 In addition, the MDBs maintain implementing power over CTF projects
after the TFC approves them,77 and the CTF founding document
provides only weak language to ensure that consistency with the

It is vital that the UN find
ways to make sure that
even non-UN programs
that are working towards
climate change goals
meet the necessary
standards of quality and
integrity in all facets of
the their operations.
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UNFCCC is maintained outside the scope of Trust Fund Committee responsibilities.78
The Trust Fund Committee is affirmatively given some
power over the Multilateral Development Banks that administer CTF projects: it is charged
with “ensuring monitoring and
periodic independent evaluation of performance and financial accountability of MDBs.”79
The CTF document also, however, specifies that MDBs “rely
on their own policies and procedures in developing and managing activities the [CTF] funds will
finance,”80 including fiduciary
standards and environmental and
social safeguards.81 This structure
implies that projects voted on by
the Trust Fund Committee will be
passed down to MDB boards to
control.
The CTF should ensure separation between the CTF’s
Trust Fund Committee and the World Bank Board by making it
explicitly clear how the CTF’s decisions might, or might not, be
subject to oversight from the World Bank Board and the Boards
of the MDBs. This would bring the actual practices at the World
Bank into compliance with the CTF’s claims of Trust Fund Committee leadership.82 In addition, the CTF founding documents
should set firm guidelines for MDB administration of projects
and should require MDBs to incorporate UNFCCC principles
into their standards and into their reporting to the Trust Fund
Committee.

On its face, then, it appears to offer up the CTF’s fate to the
UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties, but this language is problematic. The World Bank will have strong motivation to ensure
that the UNFCCC negotiations leave room for the CTF to continue. This motivation comes
from the Bank’s pronounced
desire to be at the forefront of
climate change funding and
carbon finance. The Bank also
has a strong case to make—the
CTF has already demonstrated
interest from big league donors
to the tune of over $6 billion,89
a number no doubt envied by
other players in the climate
change field.90
The sunset clause loophole leaves room for the Bank
to use its clout to keep the CTF
alive.91 It is unclear that the
CoP will be able to take strong
enough action to counteract political pressures coming from the
Bank and donor countries, which may be fonder of the CTF than
more regulated UNFCCC climate funding mechanisms.92
Indeed there are strong arguments that the CTF loophole
should remain in place to allow the Fund to continue beyond the
current climate negotiations. Proponents argue that World Bank
involvement in long-term projects could create market stability because many climate change related investments occur on
longer timelines than the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol has
provided for thus far.93 The CTF could offer ongoing and guaranteed financial support for such projects. It is also predicted that
tens of billions more dollars will be needed to finance emission
reducing projects if the global community is going to successfully combat long-term climate change.94 It may be unwise to
remove any avenue for funding from the market until that target
amount of investment is reached.
These arguments, however, do not change the ineffectiveness of the sunset clause as a tool to insulate the UNFCCC negotiations and do not change the possibility that the term “interim”
was used only to make the CTF easier for doubters to swallow.
The sunset clause was a politically shrewd addition, couched as
a compromise, which required little concession from the Bank.
The sunset clause leaves a gap between what the World
Bank claims the CTF does—prevent the undermining of future
UNFCCC negotiations—and what is likely, or even probable, to
do in Copenhagen. Even if the UNFCCC negotiations result in
the end of the CTF, the World Bank will ultimately have gained
experience, capacity, and connections in climate change finance
that will allow it to continue operations (similar to the CTF or
otherwise) in the field. It is possible that the CTF itself will
sunset only to be replaced by a similar program under another
name. The World Bank has successfully placed itself at the forefront of climate change finance with little or no input from the
UNFCCC.

Steps must be taken in
good faith to address the
inconsistencies between
the Clean Technology
Fund and the UN
Framework Convention
on Climate Change.

The CTF Sunset Clause Does Not Effectively
Prevent Undermining of the UNFCCC Process
The World Bank calls the CTF an “interim measure” to
provide funding for climate change projects during the negotiations of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.83 The Bank claims
that the CTF’s “sunset clause”84 is sufficient to limit it to this
temporary goal and prevent diversion from or preemption of
UNFCCC negotiations.85 However, diversion and preemption
are possible if the CTF operates as a parallel structure to already
existing UNFCCC mechanisms, and in so doing creates a channel for climate related financing to bypass existing mechanisms
and flow through the CTF instead.86 The idea of having a sunset for the Fund after its “interim” purpose has been served is a
logical way to prevent this potential problem. The language of
the actual sunset clause, however, lacks a guaranteed ending for
the fund. A built-in loophole allows the CTF to remain operational if UNFCCC negotiations so indicate, thus rendering the
clause ineffective and creating a strong incentive for heavy Bank
involvement in the UN negotiations.87
The sunset clause states that “if the outcome of the UNFCCC
negotiations so indicates, the Trust Fund Committee . . . may
take necessary steps to continue the operations of the CTF.”88
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Conclusion
Analyzing the Clean Technology Fund governance structure and founding documents provides a broader picture of the
international financing of climate change solutions. It is valuable to the extent that it provides new ideas and new models
for future finance structures, which will need to generate and
invest an unprecedented amount of funding in order to meet the
challenge that global climate change presents. Advocates may
be hesitant to endorse and foster non-UN programs, but as the
CTF demonstrates, major donors do not feel the same hesitation. As such, it is vital that the UN find ways to make sure that
even non-UN programs that are working towards climate change
goals meet the necessary standards of quality and integrity in all
facets of the their operations.
Steps must be taken in good faith to address the inconsistencies between the Clean Technology Fund and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Efforts can and should
come from both sides: the World Bank and the UNFCCC. The
World Bank must show that it can play nice when international
“soft law”95 conventions regulate its investment targets. The UN
must manage the reality that the CTF and CTF-like instruments
are here to stay and will have to be dealt with within the existing
framework.

Ultimately, the global goal is to slow climate change before
it causes permanent damage. Clean Technology Fund projects
will no doubt contribute to a global reduction in GHG emissions
and an increase in low carbon economies around the world, but
these benefits come at a cost. The world spoke with one voice
when it established the UNFCCC, and success in the battle to
slow climate change requires that the voice of the UNFCCC be
respected and maintained in the international community.
The UNFCCC secretariat continues to call for a “political
answer” to the scientific community’s increasing knowledge on
the threat of climate change,96 and it has been asserted that the
2009 Copenhagen negotiations may be the last chance for this
political answer. It is vital that the UNFCCC and those working for its success learn from the current state of climate change
finance. In Copenhagen, the CTF’s governance structure, financial success, and environmental effectiveness will each need to
be scrutinized and analyzed to learn more effective paths forward and for the UNFCCC and to generate the political will for
the Conference of the Parties to utilize the sunset clause freely
and based on results, without the undue influence of politics.

Endnotes: T he World Bank Clean Technology Fund
1

See Press Release, The World Bank Group [World Bank], World Bank
Board Approves Climate Investment Funds (July 1, 2008) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Board Approves CIF].
2 See Press Release, World Bank, Donor Nations Pledge Over $6.1 Billion to
Climate Investment Funds (Sept. 26, 2008) (on file with author).
3 See, e.g., World Bank, World Bank Project Implementation Review FY07
2 (2008) (reporting that the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility, the
financial arm of the UNFCCC, had a portfolio of $3.9 billion in 2007, more
than $2 billion less than the CIFs).
4 See generally World Bank, Clean Technology Fund (2008) [hereinafter
Clean Technology Fund], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTCC/Resources/Clean_Technology_Fund_paper_June_9_final.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009) .
5 See Press Release, Board Approves CIFs, supra note 1; and Press Release,
World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: Countries Selected for Governing
Bodies (Oct. 17, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Countries Selected].
6 See, e.g., David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and
Policy 667-69 (3rd ed. 2007).
7 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], art. 2, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
8 See id. art. 7 (establishing the Conference of the Parties as the “supreme
body of this Convention”); UNFCCC, Status of Ratification 1-7 (2007)
(exemplifying the near universal ratification of the Convention by 195 countries
as of Aug. 22, 2007).
9 Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
10 See e.g., Michael McKenzie, Climate Change and the Generalized System of
Preferences, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 679, 680-82 (2008) (discussing that developing countries “are less culpable for [climate change], and less capable of dealing with it, than developed countries”); Anita M. Halvorssen, Global Response
to Climate Change – From Stockholm to Copenhagen, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev.
841, 847-49 (2008) (discussing that even though the UN Charter gives all countries equal rights and obligations, “developing countries have not historically

61

had the same economic growth and social benefits” and have contributed less to
global environmental problems).
11 See Halvorssen, supra note 10, at 849 (citing Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E.
Boyle, International Law & The Environment 101 (2d ed. 2002)) (stating that
common but differentiated responsibilities can be “seen as requiring obligations
of solidarity assistance in the form of technology transfer and financial assistance”); see also Michael Bothe & Eckard Rehbinder, Climate Change Policy
4-5 (2005) (“For all practical purposes, the developed countries should bear the
actual compliance costs of the developing countries,” attributing the smooth
ratification process of the UNFCCC to this “soft approach”).
12 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 11 (establishing the Global Environment
Facility).
13 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto]. See also Hunter
et al., supra note 6, at 679-80.
14 See Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Climate Change Policy
after Kyoto: Blueprint for a Realistic Approach 43 (2002) (describing Kyoto
as the “treaty that formalized the targets and timetables approach that had been
taking shape since COP 1. The protocol set explicit emission targets for the
thirty-nine countries listed in its Annex B, which included essentially all industrialized countries that were signatories”).
15 See Bothe & Rehbinder, supra note 11, at 6-7 (describing each of the four
flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol).
16 See generally Kyoto, supra note 13, art. 12 (establishing the Clean Development Mechanism).
17 See id. art. 12, ¶ 3.
18 See Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate
Change Compliance: Emissions Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 44, 50 (2008).

Endnotes: The World Bank Clean Technology Fund
continued on page 76

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Litigation Update
Winter v. NRDC, Inc.
by Natalie Dillree*

O

Introduction

n November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court vacated portions of a preliminary injunction limiting the Navy’s
use of mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar in training
exercises.1 Environmental organizations argued that MFA sonar
would cause injury to marine mammals.2 Ultimately, the Court
held that the Navy’s interest in adequately training its sailors
outweighed the alleged irreparable injury.3

Legal Background and Arguments
This case involves Navy MFA sonar training exercises
performed in the waters off the coast of southern California
(“SOCAL”).4 The Navy’s fleet faces a threat from diesel-electric submarines because they operate “almost silently” and are
“extremely difficult to detect and track.”5 To track these submarines, the Navy uses MFA sonar, “which involves emitting
pulses of sound underwater. . . .” 6 To ensure that sonar operators
are “thoroughly skilled” in its use, the Navy conducts regular
training exercises under “realistic conditions.”7
At least thirty-seven species of marine mammals can be
found in the SOCAL operating area.8 The plaintiffs assert that
“MFA sonar can cause much more serious injuries to marine
mammals than the Navy acknowledges, including permanent
hearing loss, decompression sickness, and major behavioral
disruptions.”9 Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that MFA sonar
has been linked to “several mass strandings of marine mammals” in the area. 10
Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.11 The environmental groups asserted that the training
exercises violated several federal laws, including the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).12 Under NEPA,
an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) must be prepared
for any “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.”13 However, no EIS is required if,
based on a shorter environmental assessment (“EA”), a federal
agency determines that “the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the environment.”14
In February 2007, the Navy prepared an EA that concluded
that the SOCAL training exercise scheduled through January
2009 “would not have a significant impact on the environment”
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and, because of this finding, did not prepare a full EIS.15 The
Navy insisted that MFA sonar could only cause “temporary
injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as migration,
feeding, surfacing and breeding.”16
Based on the plaintiffs’ demonstration of a “possibility of
success” on their claims under NEPA and another federal law,
the District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the Navy from using MFA sonar during its training exercises.17
The District Court further determined that there was “a ‘near
certainty’ of irreparable injury to the environment, and that this
injury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy.”18
The Navy appealed. The Court of Appeals held that this
“blanket injunction” was “overbroad” and remanded to the District Court.19 The District Court then entered a revised preliminary injunction, imposing six restrictions on the Navy’s use of
MFA sonar training exercises.20
However, in a simultaneous development, the Council on
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) allowed the Navy to adopt
“alternative arrangements” because the injunction created a
“significant and unreasonable risk” that Navy sailors would
“not be able to train and be certified as fully mission capable.”21
Therefore, the CEQ authorized the Navy to continue its training
exercises under previously adopted mitigation measures.22
Subsequently, the Navy moved to vacate the District Court’s
preliminary injunction with respect to two of the imposed conditions.23 The District Court rejected the Navy’s motion.24 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preliminary injunction was appropriate because “the balance of hardships and
a consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of the
plaintiffs.”25 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.26

Holdings
The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the preliminary
injunction challenged by the Navy.27 The Court concluded that
the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” of irreparable harm standard
was too lenient to warrant a preliminary injunction, stating
that their “frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs
*Natalie Dillree is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely.  .  .  .”28 Furthermore, “even if plaintiffs have shown
irreparable injury .  .  . any such injury is outweighed by the public
interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training. . .
.”29 The Court further concluded that the “most serious possible
injury” to plaintiffs would be “harm to an unknown number of
the marine mammals that they study and observe.”30

Conclusion
The Navy’s arguments challenged the government’s obligation to adhere to environmental laws. 31 Therefore, some
environmental groups feared that an unfavorable ruling would
essentially excuse the government from performing studies
of the effects of their actions on the environment.32 However,
Chief Justice Roberts evaded such broad arguments, writing
that the majority did not mean to say that military interests will
always trump environmental concerns.33 In addition to the decision’s narrow language, some protections for marine mammals
are still intact, as four of the originally imposed restrictions on
MFA sonar use remain.34
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Book Review
Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet
by Mark Lynas
Reviewed by Matthew Padilla*

M

ark Lynas, writing for National Geographic, pens his
warning as if writing a travel book. The book begins
with a quote from Dante, warning the reader that the
journey they are embarking on is akin to a visit to the depths,
where sinners atone for their misdeeds on earth. The sinners in
this story are the emitters of carbon, however, and those who
will atone are likely not yet born.
While Dante’s allegorical journey takes the reader to successive depths, Lynas’ work takes the reader on a journey of
degrees: both authors lead the reader through a series of frightening and potentially catastrophic stages. Broken into six parts,
Lynas explains what may occur as global temperatures increase
and the climate changes. Lynas distinguishes between the
impacts of an average temperature increase and a mere seasonal
rise in temperature, emphasizing the dire consequences of the
former. While a difference of a few degrees on a day-to-day
basis is hardly noticeable, an average annual increase of only a
few degrees will affect global air and water circulation causing
dramatic and dangerous impacts.
As Lynas effectively conveys, the extent to which one or
two degrees can affect the planet is alarming. Beginning with
a rise of one degree, which is already occurring, Lynas takes
the reader to places where climate impacts are already starkly
apparent. He travels from the highest peaks, where glaciers once
covered mountains but now are quickly receding, to the depths
of the sea, where coral bleaching is now afflicting Australia’s
Great Barrier Reef.
Along with concrete examples, Lynas uses scientific models to demonstrate that multiple species face eminent extinction
as temperatures rise. For most species, climate change means
that habitats will shift towards the poles and to higher elevations. However, migration is not always an option; some species cannot move to new locations fast enough to beat the rising
heat. Other species, such as polar bears, will have no place to go.
The overall effect described by the author is a great extinction of
plant and animal life, caused primarily by human activity.
Lynas makes it clear that it is not certain whether even
humans will be able to adapt fast enough to avert disaster. A
mere two to three degree rise in temperature will lead to wider
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desertification, water shortages, crop failures, and increased
risk of disease which may force human populations to migrate.
Although wealthy, developed nations are better situated to adapt
to the impacts of climate change than poor, developing countries, we will all feel the impacts of each degree. Using the fall
of the Maya as an example, Lynas warns that even the heartiest civilizations may succumb to the adverse impacts of climate
change.
Serious students of climate change may not find much new
information in this book, which covers many of the same topics Al Gore described in An Inconvenient Truth and Earth in
the Balance. Without going into the more complicated aspects
of climate science, Lynas describes global warming in simple
terms enabling him to reach an audience that may otherwise shy
away from a scientific text. Six Degrees is probably most similar
to Tim Flannery’s The Weather Makers. However, where Flannery’s book arguably offers more hopeful solutions, Six Degrees
views those solutions through a skeptical lens. There is good
reason for skepticism. As the book outlines the realities of a hotter world, it becomes clearer and clearer that our future planet
is likely to be drier and more desolate despite human efforts to
reduce carbon emissions.
At the end of Lynas’ journey, the author brings us back to
Dante’s expedition and questions the potential for a solution to
this harrowing problem by looking at science and psychology.
The last chapter is dedicated to the possibility that we can solve
the climate change crisis, but also clearly outlines the pitfalls
and challenges that interfere with eliminating a carbon-fueled
lifestyle. Echoing a line from Al Gore’s award-winning documentary, Lynas states that there “is nothing so difficult as trying
to get a man to understand something when his salary depends
on his not understanding it.” Despite the grim outlook presented
by Six Degrees, the book is recommended for all readers concerned about climate change. Lynas’ perspective is sure to send
chills down the spine of a casual reader on an unseasonably
warm winter day.
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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